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Israel and the United States have both been routinely subject to severe interna-
tional criticism for the conduct of their respective militaries in irregular combat. 
But the Israeli case is unique in important respects. Israel has had to face foes 
who not only regularly flout generally accepted laws of war, but do so as part of 
a larger strategy of political warfare designed to discredit Israel in the eyes of an 
international public that is already disposed to be hostile to the Jewish state. In 
“Israeli Targeting: A Legal Appraisal,” Major John J. Merriam, USA, and Michael 
N. Schmitt provide an assessment of Israeli policy and behavior in relation to 
the restrictions on targeting embodied in the law of armed conflict. Based on an 
extensive review of internal Israeli documents and interviews with senior Israeli 
officials, the authors conclude that the doctrines and practice of Israel’s military 
track closely with those of the American military and are in fact eminently de-
fensible. Professor Schmitt and Major Merriam are the director and associate 
director, respectively, of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law 
at the Naval War College. (The previously posted electronic version of this article 
has generated considerable discussion, which can be accessed by searching for 
“Schmitt Israel Targeting.”)
It is fair to say that serious questioning of the future role of aircraft carriers 
within the U.S. Navy has increased significantly over the last several years. In 
“Connecting the Dots: Capital Ships, the Littoral, Command of the Sea, and the 
World Order,” Robert C. Rubel places these debates within a larger framework by 
raising the issue of whether the idea of the capital ship itself is not becoming ob-
solescent in an operational environment increasingly dominated by long-range 
missiles and precision sensors. Rubel makes the underappreciated point that our 
habit of speaking of capital-ship-intensive fleets as “blue-water” navies obscures 
the fact that most capital-ship-centered battles thoughout history have in fact oc-
curred in the littorals, and that it is precisely here that the weight of land-based 
air and missile defenses and sensors tells most heavily against aircraft carriers. 
Further, he explores the far-reaching implications of capital-ship obsolescence for 
traditional notions such as command of the sea and protection of the global com-
mons. In all of this, Rubel carries on the fundamental reflections on the nature of 
contemporary sea power that have appeared over the last decade and beyond in 
FROM THE EDITORS
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these pages as well as in the collected volume Writing to Think: The Intellectual 
Journey of a Naval Career (Newport Paper 41). Captain Rubel, USN (Ret.), is the 
former dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.
China’s ongoing effort to reclaim and fortify islands in the South China Sea 
raises the most fundamental questions concerning its strategic intentions with 
respect to its immediate neighbors as well as the global maritime commons. It 
also provides an important context for understanding the strategic logic behind 
China’s massive buildup of naval and maritime capability in recent years. A con-
spicuous element of that buildup has been China’s acquisition of its first aircraft 
carrier and its apparent commitment to building at least four additional ships of 
this class. In “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: Drivers, Developments, Implica-
tions,” Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. Cooper III assess the 
motives behind China’s acquisition and overhaul of the ex-Soviet vessel Varyag 
(now Liaoning) and its eventual decision to commit the nation to a serious pro-
gram of carrier construction. While intangible motives such as national prestige 
no doubt have played a role, the authors believe the overriding strategic logic of 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) evolution into a blue-water navy 
has been the decisive factor.
It is well to be reminded that the United States does not have a monopoly 
on theorizing about sea power. In “A General Review of the History of China’s 
Sea-Power Theory Development,” Zhang Wei provides a succinct overview of 
Chinese views of sea power from their initial encounter with Western navies and 
naval theorists in the nineteenth century through China’s definitive break with 
its traditional “continentalist” orientation in the 1990s and the rapid expansion of 
its naval and maritime ambitions and capabilities over the last decade and more. 
The author of this article, which was originally published in Chinese in July 2012, 
Senior Captain Zhang Wei, PLAN, is a researcher at the People’s Liberation Army 
Naval Research Institute. 
In this connection, it is fitting that this issue concludes with a long-overdue 
tribute to a man who has a claim to be the author of the first book ever published 
on naval strategy. In “Fernando Oliveira’s Art of War at Sea (1555): A Pioneer-
ing Treatise on Naval Strategy,” Luis Nuno Sardinha Monteiro provides a brief 
introduction to this forgotten figure whose work had the misfortune of never 
being translated from his native Portuguese (an English version is currently in 
preparation). Unlike most military treatises of the early modern centuries, this 
work rises above the merely tactical and operational levels of naval warfare and 
sounds a number of surprisingly Mahanian themes. Commander Monteiro is an 
officer in the Portuguese Navy. 
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Finally, with this issue, the “editors” of this column are reduced from two to 
one, with the retirement of Pelham (“Pel”) Boyer after twenty-four years of ser-
vice as managing editor of the Naval War College Review, as well as the Naval War 
College Press as a whole. Originally a U.S. naval intelligence officer with Russian 
language expertise, Pel assumed this position with very little prior preparation. 
He has been very largely responsible for establishing and maintaining the high 
standards of editorial production and design that have become a hallmark of 
this journal and of our various book and monograph series. His attention to the 
many details of his job has been extraordinary, his editorial skill and judgment 
unfailing, and his dedication to the mission remarkable. Not least, in his personal 
relationships he has ever been the gentleman. We wish Pel fair winds and follow-
ing seas. 
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Howe became the fifty-fifth President 
of the U.S. Naval War College on 8 July 2014. He is 
a native of Jacksonville, Florida and was commis-
sioned in 1984 following his graduation from the 
U.S. Naval Academy.
Howe’s operational assignments have included a full 
range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and joint 
Special Operations communities. He commanded 
Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain, Naval 
Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, and Special 
Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service 
overseas includes multiple deployments to the west-
ern Pacific and Southwest Asia and participation in 
Operations EARNEST WILL, PROVIDE PROMISE, EN-
DURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.
His key joint and staff assignments include current 
operations officer at Special Operations Command, 
Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare 
Development Group; Assistant Chief of Staff for Op-
erations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare 
Command; Director of Legislative Affairs for U.S. 
Special Operations Command; and Assistant Com-
manding Officer, Joint Special Operations Command. 
Howe graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School 
in 1995 with a master of arts in national security af-
fairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and 
from the National War College in 2002 with a master 
of arts in national security.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
MY FIRST YEAR as President of the Naval War College has been 
an incredible experience and a real journey of professional dis-
covery. Besides what I’ve learned about the inspiring work of the College, I have 
made two additional, significant discoveries over this first year’s journey. These 
are things I didn’t fully appreciate when I assumed this command, but wish I had 
a long, long time ago.
• The first is that there is an operational imperative—a war-fighting  
imperative—that we view our Navy as a profession, and ourselves as mem-
bers of a true naval profession.
• The second is that to successfully execute our Navy missions as effectively 
as possible, there is nothing more important over the long term than leader 
development.
In this Forum, I’d like to “unpack” these discoveries, but before I do, two ca-
veats are in order.
First, I hope our readers do not interpret these remarks as preaching from the 
“Ivory Tower.” I believe the things about which I’m speaking are far from abstract 
considerations. Quite the contrary, I am convinced there are practical and opera-
tional implications to the subjects of professionalism and leader development, 
and that it is vital to engage in much more explicit discussion of these subjects 
than has been typical in Navy culture in the past. 
Second, this discussion is not about trying to fix a significant problem we have 
today. It is much more about ensuring we are prepared for the challenges of to-
morrow. In the past, our institution and our leaders have been largely successful 
—in some cases exceedingly successful. Today, however, the world is changing 
Professionalism and Leader Development
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at an increasing rate, and the “VUCA” acronym accurately captures the environ-
ment for which we need to prepare our leaders. The operational environment is 
volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous and promises to become ever more 
so in the future. What has proved successful in the past is not going fully to pre-
pare us for the future. This discussion is about moving from good to great, and 
being ready for the increased challenges we will face in the future.
Professionalism. Let’s return to my first “discovery”: there is an operational im-
perative—a war-fighting imperative—that we view ourselves as members of a 
profession in a nontrivial sense of the word. It has come as something of a shock 
to me that I have had this realization so late in my career! But that is precisely 
what makes me think we owe the Navy and the nation a change in our culture 
so that the sense of personal identification with the Navy profession is pervasive 
through the fleet at all levels of rank.
Over the years I’ve read multiple articles in Joint Force Quarterly and other 
military-related periodicals on the subject of professionalism. At the time, much 
of those discussions didn’t resonate with me. I had been exposed to the concept 
of the military as a profession in my early years at the U.S. Naval Academy, but, 
for almost my entire career, to be professional meant looking good in uniform 
and being technically and tactically competent. When I read the Navy Ethos, the 
word “professional” was simply an adjective meaning the sailor was squared away 
and a good operator.
In my current job, I’ve been reexposed to the basic ideas of what it means to 
be a member of the profession of arms. Here’s what I’ve come to understand. Our 
Navy has a dual character. On one hand, it is a military department organized as 
a bureaucracy. The bureaucratic dimension of our organization is unavoidable for 
any organization of our size and complexity. But on the other, it is an organiza-
tion dedicated to supporting a military profession. It is this dual nature as both 
a bureaucracy and a profession that shapes our key challenge as Navy leaders.*
• Bureaucracies originated out of society’s need for efficient, routinized work. 
The focus on efficiency drives an organization characterized by centralized 
planning and control, little delegation of discretionary authority, and  
compliance-based behavior.
• Professions originated out of society’s need for the expert application of 
specialized knowledge. For professions to provide that expert knowledge 
most effectively, they need autonomy. That autonomy is based on trust: trust 
between society and the profession, and trust among the members of the 
* A great deal of the language and concepts of this way of thinking is reliant on the Army’s excellent 
work articulating the profession/bureaucracy tensions in its service. It is clearly articulated and 
laid out in U.S. Army Dept., The Army Profession, ADRP 1 (Washington, D.C.: June 2013), pp. 1–4.
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profession� This trust is based on shared values/ethos, and demonstrated ac-
tions in accordance with these values/ethos�
The dual character of our Navy is important to understand� The attributes 
and strengths of both the bureaucracy and the profession are needed to execute 
the wide variety of functions across the Navy every day, and tension between the 
two is necessary and natural� As the leaders of the Navy, however, our challenge 
is to ensure the overarching characteristic of the Navy is—and remains—that of 
a military profession�* Why? Because a bureaucratic organization will never suc-
ceed in combat; only a professional organization can and will�
• The operational environment—on the land, on the sea, or in the air—is vio-
lent and complex, dominated by uncertainty and ambiguity�
• Success in this environment requires much more than tactical competence; 
it requires judicious and decentralized employment of that competence at all 
levels: tactically, operationally, and strategically�
• And the key enabler of decentralized employment is trust—trust up, down, 
left, and right within an organization, and trust between the military and the 
nation it serves�
My colleagues that study organizations have taught me that trust is largely 
absent from bureaucracies� In fact, such organizations are specifically designed to 
function in low-trust environments� By contrast, trust is the central characteristic 
of a professional organization� Trust in a profession is built on each member’s 
core identity being associated with the profession, and each member’s actions 
being guided by an ethic shared across the profession�
It is here, in this difference in the nature of trust in bureaucracies and profes-
sions, that I’ve come to understand the war-fighting relevance of professionalism� 
I now clearly see the absolute operational imperative to thinking, seeing, being 
a profession: only this identity engenders the trust necessary to fight and win in 
today’s operational environment.
This updated understanding of professionalism has also improved my thinking 
about ethics� I now see ethics through the lens of professionalism� As members of 
the maritime profession of arms, our ethic is what guides and steers our actions� 
That ethic certainly includes laws, regulations, and policies� But those are a mere 
baseline of legal compliance� Far more important for guiding our discretionary 
professional judgment are the nonlegal professional expectations established by 
our Navy culture, its values, and its highest aspirations� Our ethic guides us to act 
always in a manner that supports the values of the nation we serve, and enhances 
the trust within the organization, and with our civilian leadership / nation� In a 
* Ibid�, pp� 1–4�
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complex world, our ethic helps us understand not only what we can or what we 
must do but, more importantly, what we should do�
The tension between our Navy’s bureaucratic and professional attributes will 
grow greater as we move into times of fiscal pressure and away from sustained 
combat� We have a choice in how we see ourselves, in how we think about our-
selves, and as we think about what we’re doing from day to day�
As we all attend to our day-to-day assignments, I ask all Navy leaders to make 
a conscious effort to let the framework of the Navy as a profession drive our vi-
sion, thinking, and decisions� We’ll be a better Navy if we do�
Leader Development. My assignment as President of the Naval War College has 
afforded me the opportunity to have a wide variety of discussions on the subject 
of leader development� As a result of those discussions, I’ve come to understand 
that our traditional approach to leader development is incomplete and insuffi-
cient� In retrospect, I now clearly see that I had on many counts failed in my 
responsibility to execute the critical role of a leader in leader development� My 
rather passive approach of simply serving as a role model was good but insuf-
ficient� As I argued earlier, the world is changing at an increasing rate, and the 
operational environment continues to grow more complex� We can’t rely only on 
experience and observation to develop our future leaders� Nor can we rely solely 
on the schoolhouse, mobile training teams, or General Military Training pro-
grams� I have come to believe that the single most effective means of improving 
leadership across the Navy is “leaders engaging leaders�”
Leaders at all levels must be actively involved in development of those in their 
charge� Preparing them for the challenges of the future is not an ancillary aspect 
of their “real” job—in some respects it is their most important job� There is no 
need for one to be a “leadership expert” to move out with leader development 
efforts� One doesn’t need to have all the answers� In many respects, the most im-
portant thing we can do to make us all cognizant of our professional identity is 
simply ensuring that conversation about leadership, ethics, and the naval profes-
sion is a routine aspect of our interactions with each other� Explicitly raising such 
issues in the midst of routine operational activity will have a significant impact 
on our personnel as they realize it is a shared expectation that professionalism 
is part of what it is to be a member of our Navy� And no one is in a better posi-
tion to do so than leaders at all levels� Leaders engaging leaders—this is the key� 
Making professionalism, leadership, and ethics an integral part of Navy life will 
do far more to encourage and embed professional identity than any number of 
PowerPoint presentations by “leadership experts�”
So these are two key “discoveries” since reporting to the Naval War College: 
the operational imperative of seeing ourselves as a profession, and the critical 
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role of leaders in leader development� As I look to the future, I believe we need 
to do the following:
• Acknowledge that there is an operational imperative for the Navy to rec-
ognize the tension between bureaucracy and profession in our Navy, and 
deliberately choose to nurture our professional identity�
• Recognize the critical role of “leaders engaging leaders” in our development 
efforts and recognize that explicit attention to issues of leader development 
and ethics is a vital and important aspect of leaders’ responsibilities at every 
level and rank�
P� GARDNER HOWE III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College 
(This “President’s Forum” is derived from a presentation on professionalism and 
leader development delivered at the Navy Flag Officer and Senior Executive Sym-
posium in April 2015.)
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Major Merriam, of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps, is associate director of the Stockton 
Center for the Study of International Law at the Na-
val War College in Newport, Rhode Island. 
Michael N. Schmitt, Charles H. Stockton Professor at 
the Naval War College, is the director of the Stockton 
Center. He is also professor of public international 
law at Exeter University in the United Kingdom and 
a fellow in the Harvard Law School Program on In-
ternational Law and Armed Conflict.
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 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is seemingly intractable� It involves conten-tious issues, such as extended occupation, the status of Jerusalem, a claimed 
“right of return” for Palestinian refugees, and recognition of a Palestinian state� 
Episodic hostilities have punctuated the conflict, causing heavy civilian casualties 
on both sides� The tactics employed have proved highly controversial, with some, 
such as terrorism and the direct targeting of the Israeli population, self-evidently 
qualifying as war crimes� 
Between June and August 2014, Israel engaged in yet another round of intense 
hostilities with Palestinian organized armed groups in the Gaza Strip� What be-
gan with the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers quickly escalated 
into full-scale conflict featuring a rain of rockets from Gaza and Palestinian raids 
mounted through an extensive tunnel network� The Israeli military response, 
dubbed Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE (OPE), included an intense air campaign 
against Hamas and other armed groups and an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
ground incursion that resulted in firefights across the Gaza Strip� After a series of 
failed cease-fires, a precarious end to hostilities was negotiated, one that presently 
appears to be holding�
The short but violent conflict was devastating for the civilian population and 
infrastructure in Gaza� The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs estimates that over two thousand Palestinians, more than half 
of them civilians, died during the hostilities�1 Israeli losses exceeded seventy, the 
bulk of them IDF personnel�2 Both sides suffered hundreds of wounded� As is 
normally the case, the conflict generated widespread criticism of Israel by various 
prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Human Rights 
A Legal Appraisal
Major John J. Merriam, U.S. Army, and Michael N. Schmitt 
ISRAELI TARGETING
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Watch, Amnesty International, and Israeli groups such as B’Tselem�3 Much of the 
criticism centered on a perception that the Palestinian side suffered dispropor-
tionate casualties and damage�
The condemnation was not, however, universal� As the dust settled, mili-
tary professionals from the United States and several other countries carefully 
examined Israeli practices� They found much to commend about IDF opera-
tions, particularly the extent to which the IDF exercised restraint and the highly 
precise manner in which it conducted strikes� The U�S� Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, noted that Israel “went to extraordi-
nary lengths to limit collateral 
damage and civilian casual-
ties�”4 He praised several IDF 
techniques that have been 
the source of controversy in 
human rights circles, such as 
the “knock on the roof ” technique employed to warn Palestinian civilians of an 
impending strike�
Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE invites an examination of one facet of interna-
tional law as it applies to the conflict—the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and a 
particular subset thereof known colloquially as “targeting law�” The analysis need 
not address the righteousness of either side’s cause, because an important, but 
often misunderstood, feature of international law is a strict separation between 
the jus ad bellum, the law addressing when states may resort to force, and the jus 
in bello, which comprises the rules governing how hostilities must be conducted�5 
The latter applies equally to all parties to an armed conflict, irrespective of which 
is right or wrong in terms of its origins�6 In other words, it matters not whether 
Israel or Hamas (and other Palestinian groups) was the aggressor; both were ir-
refutably bound to conduct their operations in accordance with the LOAC� 
This article examines how the IDF applies the LOAC rules of targeting� Israel 
has long refrained from revealing many aspects of its targeting processes and 
precise positions on key aspects of targeting law, out of concern that transparency 
might be misused to subject Israel to further criticism in international forums� 
This approach may be changing� In late 2014, the IDF invited this article’s au-
thors, members of the U�S� Naval War College’s Stockton Center for the Study of 
International Law, to Israel to assess its targeting practices and positions�7 Their 
research comprised a visit to the Gaza Division Headquarters, including an “at-
tack cell,” and an examination of Hamas attack-tunnel infrastructure� Combat 
footage of Israeli strikes on Hamas rocket sites during OPE was reviewed and ex-
tensive interviews with IDF legal advisers and ground and air force commanders 
at all levels were conducted� The conclusions that follow are offered to elucidate 
If war is politics by other means, then the in-
terpretation of the laws of war will necessarily 
reflect the political environment in which war 
is waged.
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Israel’s approaches to targeting law by examining the synergistic relationship 
between Israel’s unique operational and strategic challenges and its various posi-
tions on the LOAC�
STATE POSITIONS ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Before turning to Israeli targeting, it is useful to briefly survey the broad contours 
of the LOAC� It is a body of law that seeks to maintain a delicate balance between 
the military imperative of defeating the enemy on the one hand and the humani-
tarian one of protecting civilians and other “victims of war” on the other�8 In the 
context of targeting, particular principles and rules maintain this balance� Fore-
most among these is the principle of distinction� Distinction, one of the “cardinal 
principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of [the LOAC],” and thus 
“intransgressible,” requires that the parties to a conflict “at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives�”9
Rules derived from this principle prohibit the direct attack of civilians and 
civilian objects, as well as indiscriminate attacks, such as those launched without 
regard to whether they will strike combatants or civilians�10 The rule of propor-
tionality flows from the same animating premise as the principle of distinction� It 
holds that even an attack properly aimed at military objectives is unlawful if the 
expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects is excessive in relation 
to the anticipated military advantage to be gained�11 Finally, the LOAC achieves 
balance by requiring an attacker to take certain “precautions in attack” to mini-
mize civilian harm, including doing everything feasible in the circumstances to 
verify the target is a military objective and selecting targets, weapons, and tactics 
that will limit civilian harm so long as they do not involve sacrificing military 
advantage�12 There is also a requirement to warn the civilian population of attacks 
that may affect them when the circumstances so permit�13
These principles and rules lie at the heart of targeting law� However, it must be 
cautioned that targeting is subject to an array of further legal limitations, such as 
the ban on wanton destruction; the prohibition of unnecessary suffering (which 
disallows use of weapons that result in unnecessary suffering or superfluous 
injury to combatants); and the various “special protections” that bar or restrict 
attacks on specified persons and objects, such as medical, religious, and cultural 
entities�14 
Most such rules and principles are set forth in treaty law� The primary instru-
ment governing targeting is the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions�15 Neither the United States nor Israel is party to 
the protocol, but both recognize that certain aspects of the instrument reflect 
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customary law norms�16 Customary norms develop through the nearly universal 
practice of states engaged in out of a sense of legal obligation�17 While customary 
law is sometimes hard to discern since it is not enshrined in treaty text, it is no 
less the law�
Nonlawyers may find it surprising to learn that states harbor different views 
on the LOAC� Despite broad consensus regarding most core principles and rules, 
at a more granular level there is a great deal of room for divergence on the scope 
and application of the LOAC in actual combat� For instance, distinction requires 
that attacks be directed only against military objectives, but what entities qualify 
as military objectives? For that matter, what is an attack as a matter of law? What 
measures will satisfy the law requiring an attacker to avoid civilian harm when 
feasible? What is feasible in a given situation? How much certainty is required 
about the nature of a proposed target before it may be struck?18 When are warn-
ings required, and how must they be delivered? On these and many other matters, 
a variety of views—often quite divergent—exist�19
The positions states take on such issues are not developed in a vacuum; if war 
is politics by other means, then the interpretation of the laws of war will neces-
sarily reflect the political environment in which war is waged� Indeed, if war “is 
not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass � � � but always the collision of 
two living forces,” the interaction between adversaries in a specific operational 
and strategic environment is going to affect how it is fought and consequently 
how a state will view and apply the constraints of the LOAC�20 That is plainly the 
case with respect to Israel�
ISRAEL’S UNIQUE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL  
ENVIRONMENT
To understand why Israel adopts particular interpretations of the LOAC and how 
the nation applies them in practice, one must comprehend the operational and 
strategic dilemmas it faces� First, it is constrained by geography� Israel is a small 
country and its enemies—chiefly Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in southern 
Lebanon, but also their state sponsors, including Syria and Iran—are close� Its 
foes possess arsenals of rockets capable, in the absence of an effective antirocket 
capability, of striking all of Israel’s major population centers� When rocket attacks 
are launched, a nationwide network of early warning sensors triggers flight to 
hardened shelters and, in some cases, widespread evacuation of civilians to less-
threatened regions of the country�21 
Given the long history of warfare between Israel and these nonstate actors, as 
well as Israel’s relative isolation in international affairs, the Israeli population of-
ten perceives itself as “under siege�” This stands in marked contrast to the United 
States, which operates globally and from a forward presence precisely to ensure 
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that it can confront threats far from the homeland� Barring a “black swan” event 
like the 9/11 attacks, the American people have rarely felt personally at risk� For 
Israel, by contrast, protection of the civilian population is of paramount impor-
tance� From the perspective of its adversaries, the Israeli civilian population is 
consequently a center of gravity against which attacks are routinely launched�22
Second, unlike the U�S� all-volunteer professional military, the IDF relies on 
conscription�23 Most Israeli families have therefore seen loved ones put in harm’s 
way, whether during a period of open hostilities, when facing the constant threat 
of terrorism, or simply in the long-simmering and often dangerous environment 
attendant to the Israeli presence in the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, or 
Lebanon� One result is an extreme aversion to casualties coupled with a pervasive 
fear of IDF soldiers’ being taken prisoner�24 Once more, Israel’s foes have taken 
notice, repeatedly launching raids to isolate and capture IDF soldiers to leverage 
them for massive concessions from Israel� In this way, the safety of IDF soldiers 
represents another center of gravity, and potential vulnerability, exploitable by 
its enemies� Again, it may be useful to compare the Israeli perception of these 
matters to that of the United States� Whereas the United States only reluctantly 
accepted a prisoner exchange of five Taliban fighters for the return of Sergeant 
Bowe Bergdahl, Israel routinely exchanges hundreds of militants for a single cap-
tured IDF soldier�25 In some cases, the exchanges were made simply to regain the 
remains of fallen Israelis� It is a stark contrast�
Despite these vulnerabilities, Israel benefits from certain factors� By virtue 
of its interior position, it can quickly mobilize air and ground forces to defeat 
threats arising on its borders� It does so with a highly advanced military force 
that generally enjoys overwhelming conventional overmatch, particularly with 
respect to Hamas� Israel also enjoys the relative luxury of knowing the location 
of its next battlefield� Unlike the United States, which must constantly prepare for 
expeditionary warfare around the globe, the IDF recognizes that it will fight in 
Gaza, southern Lebanon, or the West Bank� This allows it to develop exception-
ally precise battlefield and target intelligence—Israeli forces fight on ground that 
they have physically occupied in the recent past or continue to occupy to this day 
(the West Bank), and it is ground on which they have fought many times before�
Today, Israel’s adversaries no longer engage solely in irregular warfare� Hezbol-
lah in particular has demonstrated the capacity to fight both conventionally and 
irregularly in what is now styled “hybrid warfare,” while Hamas is demonstrating 
a growing tendency in that direction�26 Still, in the face of conventional over-
match and their opponent’s sophisticated understanding of the battlefield, they 
cannot go toe-to-toe with the IDF� Therefore, they create favorable asymmetries 
that allow them to exploit Israel’s vulnerabilities and mitigate its advantages; tac-
tics for doing so include fighting from within densely populated urban terrain, 
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employing human shields, feigning civilian and other protected status to conduct 
attacks, and using civilian objects like homes, schools, and medical facilities to 
cache weapons and from which to launch attacks—all violations of the LOAC� 
In particular, Israel’s foes hope to draw the IDF into strikes that cause civilian 
casualties and destroy civilian infrastructure so as to intensify international pres-
sure on Israel and exacerbate its isolation� The groups also attempt to leverage 
the aforementioned centers of gravity� As examples, they launch indiscriminate 
rocket attacks against Israeli civilians using cheap, inaccurate, and widely avail-
able rockets and use tunnels and the protection provided by operating from 
among civilians to get close to IDF positions in the hope of overwhelming or 
capturing Israeli soldiers�
This operational and strategic environment undergirds the focus and nature 
of IDF targeting� For instance, the IDF attaches great value to destroying rocket 
platforms and weapons caches and to locating and destroying tunnels� In the lan-
guage of the LOAC’s rule of proportionality, such targets are viewed as providing 
a very high “anticipated military advantage�” Similarly, the fact that its enemies at-
tempt to frustrate identification by fighting in civilian clothing and from civilian 
structures can result in the IDF striking what to outside observers appear to be 
unlawful targets� Also, Israel’s deep insight into its likely battlefields—especially 
in Gaza—may lead it to attempt such attacks with marked confidence in their 
precision�
These examples illustrate how strategic and operational context affects the 
manner in which targeting is conducted� As will be discussed, such factors equal-
ly influence the value judgments that underlie targeting, especially the exercise of 
such discretion as the law allows�
LOAC AND TARGETING IN THE IDF
As noted, AP I captures much of the LOAC applicable to the conduct of hostili-
ties� Despite not being a party to the treaty, Israel (and the United States) none-
theless considers many of the specific rules in that instrument to reflect custom-
ary international law� Thus, AP I’s targeting provisions serve as a logical starting 
point for examining IDF positions on targeting law� 
Military Objectives 
Given the principle of distinction’s prohibition on directing attacks at other-
than-military objectives, it is essential to understand what is, and is not, a lawful 
military objective� AP I defines military objectives as “those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage�”27 Israel ac-
cepts this definition as reflecting customary international law�
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Simple though it may appear, applying the definition in practice can prove 
challenging� Of particular significance in the Israeli context is understanding 
what the terms “use” and “purpose” mean� An otherwise civilian object (like a 
home, school, medical facility, or factory) becomes a military objective by use 
whenever it is converted to military ends� When intended to be so converted in 
the future, it qualifies as a military objective by purpose� Application of this norm 
can be relatively uncontroversial� For instance, when Hamas uses a school to store 
rockets or a residence to command and control its fighters, those formerly civil-
ian objects become lawful military objectives subject to attack�
Israeli targeting has nevertheless come under critical scrutiny with regard to 
its application of the military objective definition� Consider tunnels� Hamas uses 
purpose-built tunnels for a variety of military ends� Some run under the border 
to Israel proper and are devoted to launching raids in an effort to overwhelm IDF 
positions or to capture Israeli soldiers� Others traverse Gaza itself and are used to 
move fighters and weapons underground and thereby elude detection and attack 
by air� These tunnels are clearly military objectives; the IDF appropriately targets 
them on the basis of their nature�
Applying the LOAC to Hamas tunnels that run under the border between 
Egypt and Gaza proves more complicated� In some cases, the tunnels are some-
times used both to bring rockets and other war material into Gaza and for 
nonmilitary smuggling purposes� Except for those employed exclusively for 
transporting military matériel, such tunnels must be treated as “dual use” objects; 
they may be attacked only when they become military objectives through their 
use or purpose�
Questions have arisen about cement plants that produce what Israel alleges are 
specially designed concrete supports, the sole purpose of which is tunnel con-
struction� The IDF has repeatedly struck cement plants in Gaza, leading NGOs 
to claim that these are unlawful attacks against clearly civilian infrastructure�28 In 
the view of the authors, if the factories do in fact produce supports used for the 
tunnels that qualify as military objectives, they unquestionably qualify as a law-
ful military objective by use since they are producing “war supporting” material�
To take another example, the IDF has repeatedly attacked allegedly “nonmili-
tary” Hamas government buildings� It insists that it does not target such buildings 
solely on the basis that they are Hamas government infrastructure� Rather, the 
IDF avers that in some cases Hamas military leaders inside the buildings were the 
targets, while in others the buildings themselves had a military use irrespective of 
any presence therein of Hamas fighters (such as a weapons cache or a command 
and control facility)� Both situations would render an attack on the buildings 
lawful� 
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But this does not conclude the legal analysis� When Hamas fighters in a gov-
ernment building are the target of an IDF attack, any damage to the building 
or nearby buildings, and any harm to civilians, must be included as collateral 
damage when determining the proportionality of the attack and deciding what 
precautions must be taken to minimize collateral damage� If the building is itself 
the target, harm to the building need not be considered in these assessments�
Environment
There is a great deal of debate about protection of the environment in the con-
text of the LOAC� Article 35(3) of AP I prohibits using means and methods of 
warfare that “are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, 
and severe damage to the natural environment�” This article protects the environ-
ment as such� Article 55(1), on the other hand, prohibits such attacks when those 
effects would “thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population�” Unlike 
article 35(3), it is anthropocentric in the sense of protecting the civilian popula-
tion from negative effects on the environment, rather than the environment itself�
Since Israel is not a party to the protocol, the question arises whether the two 
articles reflect customary law binding on nonparties� Neither the United States 
nor Israel believes they do�29 First, both reject the premise that there is any set 
threshold of environmental harm that would prohibit an attack, such as “wide-
spread, long-term, and severe,” irrespective of any military advantage resulting 
from the attack� Moreover, Israel apparently rejects the proposition that the 
environment is to be treated as a civilian object, such that attacks against the 
environment are prohibited and that environmental harm must be considered 
in proportionality and precautions-in-attack determinations� Rather, it is of the 
view that the proportionality rule requires an attacker to refrain from attacks that, 
by their effects on the environment, would disproportionately harm civilians and 
civilian objects�
The distinction is important, particularly in the Middle East where oil infra-
structure plays such a prominent role and offers both a tempting target and a 
source of grave potential environmental damage if attacked� One need only con-
sider the Iraqi destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells during the 1991 Gulf war to grasp 
this point; in a high-intensity conflict in that region of the world, it is reasonable 
to anticipate such conduct�30 In this respect, the Israeli position differs from that 
of the United States, which is of the view that the environment is a civilian object, 
and thus damage to it must be factored into a targeting analysis, even if there is 
no ensuing harm to other civilian objects or persons�31
Persons on the Battlefield
Perhaps no LOAC issue is fraught with more disagreement in the modern age 
of irregular and hybrid warfare than that of “direct participation in hostilities�” 
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Generally, persons on the battlefield fall into one of two categories: members of 
the armed forces or civilians� Members of the armed forces are clearly subject to 
being attacked at any time, unless they are hors de combat by virtue of wounds, 
sickness, or having been made prisoner�32 They are targetable on the basis of their 
status� In contrast, civilians are immune from attack “unless, and for such time 
as, they directly participate in hostilities�”33 Those who directly participate may 
accordingly be targeted on the basis of their conduct rather than their status; ci-
vilians may be attacked when they engage in acts that constitute direct participa-
tion, and only “for such time as” they so participate� Defining direct participation 
and determining when that participation begins and ends have been the source 
of ongoing controversy for years�
Beginning in 2003 and concluding in 2008, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) undertook a multiyear study culminating in the release 
of its Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Par-
ticipation in Hostilities�34 The 
ICRC, wrongly in the view of 
many observers, including the 
United States, takes a restric-
tive approach to the meaning of “for such time as,” effectively holding that direct 
participants may only be attacked during a limited window when they deploy for 
combat, conduct combat, and redeploy; they remain immune from attack at all 
other times�35 This grants more protection to these fighters than that enjoyed by 
regular members of the armed forces—an unsatisfactory result�
In an effort to address this concern, the ICRC was willing to differentiate be-
tween civilians who fight as members of an “organized armed group” (OAG) and 
those who do so only sporadically and on a more spontaneous or independent 
basis�36 According to the ICRC, members of an OAG may be treated as members 
of the armed forces for targeting purposes (e�g�, targetable at any time), but with 
an important caveat—they must perform a “continuous combat function�”37 
Support personnel without duties that directly affect the combat capabilities of 
one side or the other would not be targetable on the basis of OAG membership� 
Again, this results in less favorable treatment for uniformed members of the 
armed forces, since all members except medical and religious personnel are un-
doubtedly lawful targets on the basis of mere military status�
The IDF, like the United States, accepts the concept of OAGs but rejects the 
continuous-combat-function limitation�38 Thus, the IDF characterizes members 
of Hamas’s military wing (the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) as members of an 
OAG rather than as sporadic civilian direct participants� By the Israeli approach, 
they are targetable at any time, and it is irrelevant whether their duties qualify 
It matters not whether Israel or Hamas (and 
other Palestinian groups) was the aggressor; 
both were irrefutably bound to conduct their 
operations in accordance with the LOAC.
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as a continuous combat function� The IDF accepts the premise that groups like 
Hamas can have distinct military and civilian wings� It only targets the former 
on the basis of an OAG-membership theory and the latter on the basis of direct 
participation in the hostilities� A Hamas leader who has both civilian and military 
functions, such as command and control, may be targeted owing to his position 
in the military wing, notwithstanding the fact that he may also have a role in the 
civilian government of Gaza�
With respect to individuals who are not OAG members and thus targetable 
only for such time as they directly participate, both Israel and the United States 
reject the ICRC’s restrictive view of the “for such time” phrase� Their position is 
that a civilian who regularly participates in hostilities may be attacked through-
out the entire period of participation, not just during individual acts� Thus, a 
civilian who is engaging in repeated acts of participation may be attacked during 
periods of rest or inactivity between those individual acts� Additionally, both 
countries take a broader view of conduct that qualifies as direct participation 
than the ICRC� As an example, Israel and the United States would characterize 
an individual who makes homemade rockets or improvised explosive devices as 
directly participating in hostilities; the ICRC labels such activities as indirect par-
ticipation� Similarly, whereas a Hamas member smuggling weapons into Gaza for 
general use would not be directly participating by the ICRC restrictive approach, 
Israel would label such activity direct participation, as would the United States�39
Human Shields
The LOAC clearly forbids the use of human shields�40 This has not prevented 
many states and nonstate actors from regularly using them, since the tactic holds 
out the prospect of either discouraging an attack by the adversary or mischar-
acterizing its strike as an intentional attack on protected civilians or as one that 
violates either the rule of proportionality or the requirement to take precautions 
in attack� Given the tactics of its enemies and the urban battlefield on which it 
usually fights, human shielding is particularly problematic for Israel�
The issue of how to treat civilian shields as a matter of the LOAC is hotly con-
tested� Are they to be fully considered as civilians, or are they direct participants 
who do not factor into the proportionality or precautions-in-attack assessments? 
There are a variety of positions� 
First, one must differentiate between voluntary and involuntary human 
shields� The former are civilians who choose to place themselves on, in, or near 
a military objective in the hope that an attack will be deterred� The latter are co-
erced or forced to serve as shields; they make no voluntary choice�
Israel is of the view that involuntary human shields retain their status as 
protected civilians� They may not be directly attacked and are factored into 
proportionality and precautions-in-attack analyses� Since it is often difficult or 
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impossible to know whether a human shield is there by choice or has been com-
pelled to be present (or prevented from fleeing), Israel presumes a human shield 
to be involuntary until it has evidence to the contrary� This is an uncontroversial 
and mainstream position�
When it comes to voluntary human shields, by contrast, there is broad dis-
agreement� The ICRC view is that civilians only lose their protection when they 
are voluntarily physically shielding or blocking a specific military objective, as in 
obstructing passage over a bridge�41 Israel takes a different view, one shared by 
the United States�42 It asserts that voluntary human shields are direct participants 
and in consequence need not be factored into a proportionality or precautions-
in-attack assessment as collateral damage, even when shielding against air or 
artillery attacks� This is vitally important to the conduct of warfare in an urban 
environment against a foe employing asymmetrical tactics� Otherwise, the adver-
sary could prevent attacks by simply stationing enough voluntary human shields 
throughout the battlefield near military forces and objectives to render them 
disproportionate or require, as a matter of law, the adoption of tactics or weapons 
that will avoid harming them� Of course, policy and operational concerns may 
drive a decision to take a more restrictive approach�
Placement of Fighters near Civilian Objects
A closely related matter is the more general use of the entirety of the civilian 
population and infrastructure to shield military operations� Israel confronts this 
in every battle in Gaza, a densely populated urban environment�43 When Hamas 
uses civilian objects such as homes or schools as locations from which to launch 
military operations, they undoubtedly become military objectives through their 
use� They may be attacked, and no damage to the former civilian object counts 
as collateral damage�
However, Hamas often makes this more complicated for Israel by convert-
ing only a part of a structure to military use; the classic example is a multistory 
apartment building in which Hamas fighters use only certain floors� Is the entire 
building thereby transformed into a military objective? Or must damage to areas 
other than those used for military ends be calculated as collateral damage? If the 
IDF possesses a precise weapon capable of striking only a part of the structure, 
must it be used?
The IDF takes the position that, as a matter of law, the building is a single 
military objective, and therefore damage to other parts of the building need not 
be considered as collateral damage; the weapons choice issue only comes into 
play if adjacent buildings will be damaged or when civilians will be harmed in 
the attack� It must be noted in this regard that as a matter of policy, rather than 
law, the IDF insists it seeks to limit damage to parts of a structure not being used 
for military purposes� 
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This is a defensible view, but one with which one of the authors disagrees� He 
suggests that if it is feasible to strike only the relevant part of the structure, then 
damage to the other parts must be considered collateral damage and the pro-
portionality and precautions-in-attack rules apply� Application of this approach 
hinges on what is feasible, an important term in the LOAC� Article 57(2)(a)(ii) 
of AP I requires attackers to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means 
and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing [col-
lateral damage]�” “Feasible” has been held by many states to mean “practicable or 
practically possible, including both military and humanitarian considerations�”44 
Of course, in many cases, Hamas does not convert nearby structures to 
military objectives� Rather, it positions its military assets—rocket launchers, for 
example—in close proximity to civilians and civilian objects such as schools and 
mosques� These retain their protection from attack and their civilian status, and 
Israel correctly considers damage to them in the proportionality analysis�
Uncertainty
When trying to distinguish between military objectives and protected civilians 
and civilian objects, the attacker is often left with some uncertainty over status� 
AP I, article 50(1), states, “In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian�” As to objects, a similar presumption 
applies in article 52(3), although it is limited to those objects “normally dedicated 
to civilian purposes�” Israel accepts both presumptions as reflecting customary 
international law, as does the United States� 
This raises the question of how much doubt is required to trigger these pre-
sumptions� Although Israel often enjoys highly refined intelligence about targets 
in Gaza, absolute certainty is rarely present in war, no matter how solid the at-
tacker’s intelligence� But what amount of uncertainty may exist and still make a 
targeting decision lawful?
It is sometimes asserted that any doubt, even slight doubt, triggers a pre-
sumption of civilian status�45 This is an unrealistic standard and most states that 
regularly engage in combat reject it� For instance, the United Kingdom applies 
the presumption only when “substantial doubt” still remains after consideration 
of all available intelligence�46 The authors take the view that levels of certainty 
or doubt cannot be realistically quantified in any meaningful way; the targeting 
decision should rather be considered for its qualities—in particular, the quality 
of reasonableness�47 The IDF concurs, as does the United States�48 So too have tri-
bunals agreed when considering whether errant strikes constituted war crimes�49
Reasonableness is an admittedly vague standard; what is reasonable to one 
observer may seem unreasonable to another� The IDF asserts that reasonableness 
depends on context� The value of the target, whether it is fleeting or persistently 
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vulnerable, the feasibility of refining the intelligence, and the effect on the wider 
military situation of delaying a strike to resolve doubt are, among other things, 
factors in determining reasonableness� While this introduces a degree of discre-
tion into the LOAC, in the authors’ view it is unavoidable and, in the final analysis, 
sensible� Military commanders must exercise judgment and make tough decisions 
in battle, and they must do so knowing that their decisions will stand up to scru-
tiny later� Only a reasonableness standard can viably account for these realities�
Proportionality
The rule of proportionality has been discussed above several times in different 
contexts� Israel accepts the AP I articulation of the rule as customary inter-
national law—that is, one may not launch an attack if the expected collateral 
damage would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage�50 
Albeit simple and elegant, the rule frequently presents difficulties in applica-
tion, because it requires a comparison between dissimilar values—avoidance of 
civilian harm on the one hand and military advantage on the other� Compliance 
requires military commanders to make value judgments, judgments that cannot 
be formulated mathematically� 
In the conduct of its operations against Hamas, Israel takes as much criticism 
on proportionality as on any other point of law� During OPE, which lasted fifty 
days, the IDF reportedly struck over five thousand targets in Gaza, resulting in, 
as noted, over two thousand Palestinian deaths�51 While many of these were un-
doubtedly fighters who would not be factored into a proportionality analysis, the 
raw numbers still strike many observers as extremely high� 
The resulting criticism gains added weight when one considers the fact that 
the primary threat posed to Israel was rocket attacks, and the IDF employs the 
Iron Dome antirocket system, which may be the most effective defensive system 
of its kind in the world� By the conclusion of the war, only a handful of Israeli 
civilians had been killed by Hamas rockets� Thus, the legal question is whether 
the very effectiveness of the Iron Dome system should require the IDF to accept 
less collateral damage from its own attacks� In other words, should Iron Dome’s 
success alter the calculation of the “military advantage” of destroying Hamas 
rocket launchers and weapons caches?
Every Israeli interlocutor with whom the authors engaged during the project 
rejected this approach� They make a four-pronged argument that is compelling 
but potentially controversial� First, they point to the inherent military value of de-
stroying the enemy’s primary weapons system� Rockets are deadly and have their 
own value that remains extant even in the face of a capable defensive system� Sec-
ond, they argue that it is illogical and unfair to suggest that a state’s effectiveness 
at defending its population from unlawful attacks should be allowed to impair its 
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ability to take offensive action� By such an approach, if a state determines that the 
optimal way to eliminate a threat is to go on the offensive, it would have to know-
ingly subject its population to increased risk by refraining from fielding effective 
defensive systems� Third, they argue that the rocket threat has a psychological 
component that is every bit as potent as its physical one; the fact that Iron Dome 
intercepts 95 percent of incoming rockets does not mean the Israeli population is 
95 percent less terrorized by the attacks� Finally, those interviewed insisted that 
the IDF attacks on rocket launchers were precise; they were unaware of any cases 
of civilians being killed by IDF attacks on rocket launchers�
The authors have no way of confirming or denying the final argument and 
will not address it� With respect to the other prongs of the argument, they find 
them compelling� After all, Sun Tzu exhorts the strategist to “attack the enemy’s 
strategy” above all�52 Hamas 
has selected indiscriminate 
rocket attacks to terrorize 
the Israeli population as its 
strategy; a competent Israeli 
commander is entitled to de-
feat this strategy� Moreover, while Iron Dome is good, it is not perfect—some 
rockets get through� Nonetheless, it remains the view of the authors that the ef-
fectiveness of Iron Dome must have some limited bearing on the proportionality 
calculation� It does not render rocket launchers without military value, but it does 
decrease the value of attacking them—and if that is the case, then the acceptable 
collateral damage during an attack on them must correspondingly decrease to 
an extent� This reduction may be minor or even de minimis, but it should be a 
consideration�
Proportionality valuations come into play in another respect worth noting� 
The IDF places an extremely high value on preventing the capture of its soldiers, 
and Hamas endeavors to exploit this using its attack tunnels� In response to fre-
quent abductions over many decades, the IDF reportedly issued what is known as 
the Hannibal Directive, which allows specific actions in response to the capture 
of a soldier� Although much of the directive is technical and related to command 
and control, an important provision apparently authorizes robust measures, in-
cluding operations that pose a significant risk to the captured soldier himself�53 In 
other words, the IDF may chance the death of the captive soldier to prevent the 
abductors from escaping the area and being able to exert strategic leverage over 
Israel by using the prisoner�
The fact that the IDF is willing to risk the death of its soldiers to prevent cap-
ture demonstrates the high degree of military advantage it attributes to denying 
Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE invites an ex-
amination of . . . the law of armed conflict and 
a particular subset thereof known colloquially 
as “targeting law.”
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the enemy the benefits of capture� This advantage must be considered when de-
termining the value during proportionality calculations that should be assigned 
to targets such as tunnel entrances, cement plants, and other infrastructure that 
supports Hamas kidnap operations� As that value rises, the IDF may countenance 
a degree of collateral damage during strikes on these targets that could seem ex-
cessive to an outside observer who has not considered the strategic implications 
of an IDF soldier falling into Hamas hands� 
Warnings
Article 57(2)(c) of AP I, which Israel accepts as reflecting customary law, requires 
an attacker to provide “effective advance warning” of attacks that may harm ci-
vilians, “unless circumstances do not permit�” The latter clause recognizes that 
in many cases the element of surprise is essential to the success of an attack, 
and thus the warning requirement is by no means absolute� But the IDF goes to 
extraordinary lengths to provide warnings to civilians whenever it is feasible to 
do so� The manner in which this is done has, curiously, been a major point of 
contention�
Israel takes the position that an effective warning is one that is communicated 
to civilians who may be affected in a manner that permits them to take protective 
measures, including evacuation when possible� The “effectiveness” of warnings 
should not be measured by how many civilians actually take advantage of them 
but rather by whether they received the warnings and had the opportunity to 
heed them� This is especially important because Israel alleges that Hamas repeat-
edly instructs civilians to ignore the warnings and often actively prevents them 
from evacuating a target area�
This practice often places the IDF on the horns of a dilemma� If it warns well 
in advance of a strike, the warning may actually hamper the ability of civilians to 
comply because Hamas can mobilize efforts to prevent compliance� Conversely, 
if the IDF allows only a short time between the warning and the strike, it will be 
accused of failure to provide an effective warning�
The methods by which some warnings are delivered have also proved con-
troversial� This is particularly so with the knock-on-the-roof technique�54 The 
technique involves striking a target with a small submunition that detonates a 
minute or more before the actual destructive attack� The noise and concussion 
from the submunition are intended to frighten civilians into leaving the target, 
which is then clear to be attacked by a regular bomb or missile� In many cases, the 
IDF places an unmanned aerial vehicle over the target and physically counts the 
civilians leaving the target area before launching the destructive strike� Human 
rights groups are outraged by this technique, insisting that the risk to civilians is 
increased and that they are unlawfully terrorized�
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The authors’ view is that the IDF’s measures to warn civilians are incredibly 
robust and represent a laudable effort to save lives� As the previous discussion 
of the law makes clear, warnings are only required when circumstances permit� 
Many military commanders would find it easy to decide that warnings are coun-
terproductive, because, of course, Hamas fighters can also elude attack� While the 
knock on the roof may be a frightening way to deliver a warning, it is a creative, 
effective, and lawful means of limiting harm to civilians� 
Israel’s positions on targeting law are consistent with mainstream contemporary 
state practice� While some of them may be controversial, they are generally rea-
sonable and in great part closely aligned with those of the United States� In the 
few cases where Israeli practice or positions diverge from those of the United 
States (or the authors), they nonetheless remain within the bounds of the broader 
contours of the LOAC� Differences can usually be attributed to the unique op-
erational and strategic context in which Israel finds itself� Of particular note in 
this regard are the perception that the Israeli population is constantly at risk of 
attack and the understanding that IDF soldiers represent irresistible targets for 
abduction by its adversaries� 
Like the United States, or any other country for that matter, Israel cannot 
make legal judgments in a vacuum� Rather, it must apply the law to the conflict in 
which it finds itself� The nature of that conflict affects the value judgments mili-
tary commanders make, as well as the manner in which a state interprets its legal 
obligations� War and the law governing it are contextual� The Israeli case provides 
further evidence to support this seemingly self-evident proposition� 
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Handbook, para� 6�2�6�4�2� For unnecessary 
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Hague Regulations, art� 23(e); AP I, art� 35(2); 
Commander’s Handbook, para� 5�3�4�
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NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   31 8/13/15   3:06 PM
36
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
 3 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
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www�haaretz�com/�
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Force, 2014 Gaza War Assessment: The New 
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Operation Cast Lead (New York: May 2010), 
p� 59, available at www�hrw�org/�
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Handbook, para� 8�4�
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Department of Defense Report to Congress 
on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: 
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International Legal Materials 31, no� 3 (May 
1992), pp� 636–37�
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 33� AP I, art� 51(3); Commander’s Handbook, 
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 35� Ibid�, p� 65�
 36� Ibid�, pp� 31–32�
 37� Ibid�, pp� 33–35�
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Handbook, para� 8�2�2�
 39� On the ICRC approach, see ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance, p� 54�
 40� AP I, art� 51(7); Commander’s Handbook, 
para� 8�3�2� See generally Michael N� Schmitt, 
“Human Shields and International Humani-
tarian Law,” Columbia Journal of Transna-
tional Law 47 (2009), p� 292�
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   32 8/13/15   3:06 PM
37
Naval War College: Autumn 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 M E R R IA M  &  S C H M I T T  3 3
 41� ICRC Interpretive Guidance, p� 56�
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Schools,” UNRWA: United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency, 22 July 2014, www�unrwa�org/; 
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Identification�”
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goslavia,” United Nations: International Crimi-
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Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
5 December 2003), holding the commander 
to a reasonableness standard� 
 50� AP I, arts� 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii); Command-
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08:00 hrs),” United Nations Office for the Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Occupied 
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Griffith (New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 
1988), p� 77�
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bal Directive,” New Yorker, 6 August 2014�
 54� United Nations Human Rights Council, Hu-
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 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS21R) appeared in March 2015.1 It aims to “refresh” the strategy with the 
same primary title that first appeared back in 2007 and that has to a significant 
extent guided U.S. maritime policy over the past eight years.2 Navies both reflect 
and help shape the international context. They matter. So, when the world’s most 
powerful navy looks at its strategy and decides on a change, the rest of the world 
should pay attention, since the change will reveal at least some of America’s stra-
tegic preoccupations and help set the agenda, for a few years at least, for diplo-
mats and other navies around the world. Most especially this will of course apply 
in regions as maritime as the Asia-Pacific. How 
navies or nations react will depend first on what 
they think has changed and why, and, second, on 
who and where they are.
A number of questions immediately arise: What 
is this new “strategy,” whom is it for, and what’s 
changed? The first of these is relatively simple to 
answer. It’s what most people would call a state-
ment of doctrine, something intended to provide 
guidance for those serving in today’s U.S. Navy, 
especially its planners. Unlike grand statements 
of strategy as produced by the likes of Carl von 
Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian 
Corbett, doctrine is evanescent; it is a menu for 
today and so constantly needs to be assessed and 
adapted in the light of experience and changing 
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THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY
circumstances� CS21R identifies some of these changes (such as fiscal constraint 
and the rise of China) and, rightly, the need for a “refresh”; these things indeed 
need thinking about�
The second question—Whom is it for?—is more complicated� The fact that 
CS21R has been issued as a public document shows that it is not just an exercise 
in raising the level of strategic thought within the Navy, entirely laudable though 
that aspiration would be�3 The drafters of CS21R may have wished to target the 
audience in their three maritime services, but they knew there were other very 
important domestic audiences too—the rest of the Department of Defense, the 
administration, Congress, defense literati, the public, to name just a few� Trans-
lating CS21R into several languages reflected assumptions that it would also be 
widely read around the world� All these different audiences, with their diverse 
interests (and their likely tendency to fasten on those parts of the document that 
support conclusions they already have!), had to be catered for to some extent� 
The difficulty is that what is said to appeal to one audience will worry another� 
Accordingly, balances had to be struck, words chosen with care� That’s because, 
in essence, CS21R is for nearly everyone, whatever its drafters may have intended�
But one thing that all these diverse audiences have in common is wanting to 
know the answer to the final question—What’s changed? How different is the 
“refreshed” version from the original? The answer most of them will come to is 
“quite a lot�” For a start, it’s much longer, it looks different, and so far, the video 
isn’t as good� CS21R comprises two opening review sections—of the world and of 
what the U�S� maritime services need to do� This merges into a complex discus-
sion of their seven missions and five functions (see the figure)�
The main focus for discussion in this strategy is the functions rather than 
the missions� The missions presumably are thought to flow naturally out of the 
review, conducted in Sections I and II, of the international context and how, 
broadly, the United States feels it needs to respond� There’s plenty of evidence 
to be found in those sections for all of these missions, but they’re not much spe-
cifically discussed, and neither, 
really, is how the functions 
will support them�4 Instead, 
the emphasis is on the five 
functions themselves� It’s these 
that will therefore command 
attention� The final section of 
CS21R shows how the neces-
sary capabilities will be grown�
There is now much less di-
rect emphasis than there was 
Seven missions  . . . and five functions
 •  Defend the homeland  *  All-domain access
 •  Deter conflict  *  Deterrence
 •  Respond to crises  *  Sea control
 •  Defeat aggression  *  Power projection
 •  Protect the maritime commons  *  Maritime security
 •  Strengthen partnerships
 •  Provide humanitarian assistance  
 and disaster response
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in 2007 on the role of the U�S� maritime forces in contributing to the defense of 
the global sea-based trading system� That aspiration is still there of course, being 
implicit in the continuing accents on working with allies and partners in a “global 
network of navies” to secure international stability and maritime security and on 
the continued American determination to safeguard the freedom of navigation 
on which Washington thinks the system depends� This reduced emphasis on the 
systemic justification for U�S� seapower doubtless reflects the fact that in the 2007 
version of the strategy, it did not go down well in Congress—which ultimately 
pays the Navy’s bills� There are already signs that CS21R will do better in this 
respect�5
Instead, readers will find and many will welcome a more muscular emphasis 
on the defense of U�S� national interests at sea�6 “Defending our Nation,” said the 
first iteration of the fact sheet that accompanied the strategy, “and winning its 
wars is the core task of the U�S� Navy and U�S� Marine Corps�”7 On the face of it, 
there is nothing very remarkable in this� Most of the world’s navies, when push 
comes to shove, would say the same thing, but many of them would adulterate the 
message a little by giving greater prominence to the task of preventing wars rather 
than just winning them� Of course, the strategy’s writers will argue that prevent-
ing wars is implicit in the notion of defending national interests and ensuring 
stability; also conventional “deterrence” is specifically identified, as the second 
of both the seven missions of the sea services and their five essential supporting 
functions� 
The notion that ensuring stability prevents wars runs like a leitmotiv through-
out the glittering but intricate missions/functions structure of CS21R’s Section 
III but is not specifically articulated and could, given the limited coverage of the 
nature of the missions, easily be missed by foreign observers less well attuned 
to American ways of thinking about maritime strategy� There is moreover just 
one paragraph on conventional deterrence in a section that has twenty-six oth-
ers� Each function is justified by being shown to support several of the missions 
identified earlier of the U�S� Navy; in every case “defending the homeland” comes 
first� This is clearly nation-centric rather than system-centric�
Several additional aspects of the refreshed strategy seem at first glance to point 
in the same more muscular direction� First “humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response” (HADR) is now relegated from being one of the six main functions of 
the U�S� Navy to being a subset of the capacity to project power ashore� This task 
had been given a new and special prominence in the original 2007 version of the 
strategy and of course has been practiced extensively over the past eight years, 
most recently in dealing with Typhoon Haiyun in the Philippines� No doubt the 
Navy will continue to perform this function as it always has, but HADR’s con-
ceptual downgrading will nonetheless seem significant to outsiders� This may 
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particularly apply in the Asia-Pacific, where many of these disasters take place 
and where the HADR task is now given much conceptual prominence�8 
The increased muscularity of the new version of the strategy comes out in 
other ways too� Oddly, there seems to be less opportunity to talk of the soft-power 
advantages of naval diplomacy, an infinitely flexible means of winning friends 
and influencing people� Again, in some quarters, the first version of the strategy 
was criticized for not being a “strategy” in the sense that it neither delved into 
“ends, ways, and means” nor offered much in the way of specific guidance to force 
planners on future acquisitions�9 It simply identified the “ends�” If this criticism 
was just (and by no means had everyone thought it was), then the deficiency has 
been corrected this time�10 The concluding Section IV is all about force design 
and building the future force, with explicit targets for the future fleet (Coast 
Guard, Navy, and amphibious) clearly identified� It shows how the necessary 
technological capacities and human skills have to be grown and developed to 
deliver the capabilities needed for the five functions listed earlier�11 It’s all very 
logical, businesslike, and “back to basics�” It identifies what it thinks is necessary� 
The implication is clear—so now give us the resources!12
The same sense of a shift toward war-fighting and hard-power thinking 
emerges in the appearance of a new major function of maritime power, that of 
assuring “all domain access,” which now comes first in the list of the U�S� Navy’s 
maritime functions and therefore inevitably looks as though it is the most impor-
tant� In the consultation exercise that accompanied the “refresh” process, many 
objected to the focus on this as the primary (or at least first-mentioned) function 
of the Navy on the basis that this was not a function but more a precondition for 
both sea control and maritime power projection ashore� Perhaps the desire to 
focus on the potentially transformational impact of challenges in the domains of 
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum meant that assuring access needed 
to be treated as a function on its own rather than subsumed, with much less fan-
fare, within those two historic functions of seapower� 
Of course, this emphasis on all-domain access makes perfect sense within the 
Beltway� It has the advantage that by referring to the undoubted, and potentially 
critical, rise of sea-denial capabilities around the world, it reinforces the im-
portance and the urgency of supporting the Navy’s budget and plans for future 
acquisitions� This is particularly important for the defense of the research and 
development budget, given its importance in delivering the kind of capabilities 
needed to offset the very possibly very grave consequences of significantly greater 
challenges to assured access in the future� Moreover, it links up nicely with the 
Joint Operational Access Concept released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2013 
and the recasting of the Air-Sea Battle into the Joint Concept for Access and Ma-
neuver in the Global Commons� Elevating all-domain access therefore ticks all 
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the right Washington boxes, not least that of “jointery” (what Americans might 
call “jointness”) in general and of bringing the Army on board in particular� It 
also efficiently deals with the complaints sometimes made of the 2007 version 
of the Cooperative Strategy—that it didn’t seem quite to fit in with other official 
formulations of U�S� strategy of the time� Now it clearly does� 
If the budget, joint concepts, and mismatched statements were indeed amid 
the reasons why all-domain access was given such preeminence, then it takes us 
back to the special and probably unavoidable problem that American strategy 
makers have—namely, identifying their critical target audience� When it comes 
to strategy making, Washington, with its plethora of government institutions 
and thrusting think tanks, still has the aura of imperial Rome� Defense literati 
within the capital talk to each other, but the rest of the world listens in, or tries 
to� Two thousand years ago, the barbarians of the outer world could only marvel 
at the exciting and fast-moving intricacies of imperial policy making while barely 
comprehending its nuances� The barbarians could easily oversimplify and misun-
derstand what was really going on� The same applies now� The prospect and the 
dangers of this will need careful handling� 
For this reason, all-domain access could all too easily be seen as a response to 
the purported antiaccess/area-denial concepts of the Chinese� This would worry, 
for example, many (but admittedly not all) of America’s allies and partners in 
the Asia-Pacific region� Here, as remarked earlier, much depends on who they 
are and where they are� Take, for instance, the Chinese themselves� Their naval 
expansion, the new strategy pointedly says, “presents both opportunities and 
challenges�” What will they make of the new strategy now for the first time made 
officially available to them in Mandarin? Will they see it as a challenge or an 
invitation to cooperate in defense of a rules-based order? Most likely, they will 
turn the issue around, seeing this new doctrine as presenting them with both “op-
portunities” and “challenges�” Soft-liners will go for the opportunities, looking for 
invitations to cooperate equitably in defense of an acceptable rules-based order; 
hard-liners will see it as a straight conceptual challenge and a warning�
To an increasing extent, of course, the Chinese have a developing problem 
with the rise in the hitherto modest sea-denial capabilities of their immediate 
neighbors and so a professional interest in “all-domain access with Chinese 
characteristics,” but for the moment their preoccupation is still largely with the 
security of their near seas� Most of the People’s Liberation Army Navy seems 
much more likely to see this new stress as something to be circumvented� It, and 
some local bystanders too, will interpret the emphasis on all-domain access as 
contributing to a slow, dangerous, and unnecessary American drift into a more 
adversarial relationship with China and maybe respond accordingly� 
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How navies react to the stress on all-domain access depends, as has been said 
earlier, on where and who they are and on their immediate strategic preoccupa-
tions� Many of them will modestly stand back from it, focusing instead on the 
less technologically demanding task of defending their own waters� They will 
follow the examples of Japan, Vietnam, and other countries in Southeast Asia 
concentrating on building up their own sea-denial capabilities� If so, the kind 
of all-domain-access capabilities aspired to in CS21R will tend to be regarded 
more as ones to be outflanked and offset rather than ones to be contributed to, 
even if the putative adversary is not in many cases the United States� A few more-
capable navies, however, are also interested in developing the capabilities for 
all-domain access if of a more modest sort� This would mean taking all-domain 
access as something of an agenda� Most navies will want to do both, as far as 
their resources allow—securing sufficient access for themselves and denying it to 
others—just as they always have� Where they wish to strike the balance between 
these two and their general attitude to this part of CS21R will reflect their unique 
circumstances� 
Such diversity of international reaction reminds us that the effect of strategy 
lies very much in the eye of the beholder� How effective a strategy is at securing 
the ends its framers have in mind depends very much on how people perceive and 
react to it� The stress on all-domain access is a clear risk from this point of view� 
A bad Chinese reaction to the new strategy could well increase the hesitations in 
other regional countries about cooperating with the United States, especially if 
they already have doubts of their own about U�S� intentions or reliability� In this 
all-too-likely scenario, the stress on all-domain access cuts right across CS21R’s 
“foundational principle” about the need to cooperate with navies� To avert this, a 
careful and sensitive international strategic communications campaign will need 
to follow the appearance of the refreshed strategy� 
This brings us to the third but probably most important concern about the cre-
ation of all-domain access as what at least looks like the primary function of the 
U�S� Navy� It seems to have pushed out the opportunity evident in earlier drafts 
of the refreshed strategy to redefine and reemphasize “forward naval presence” as 
a means of shaping the strategic environment, winning friends, and influencing 
people� Of course, this criticism—if that is what it is—is not completely fair since 
the importance of U�S� forward naval presence is identified as one of two founda-
tional principles in CS21R �13 Section II is in fact entitled “Forward Presence and 
Partnership” and sits, just as it should in the strategy, after a review of the interna-
tional context and before addressing the missions and functions of the U�S� Navy 
that flow from it� Despite this, the forward-presence box has not been fully ticked, 
because apart from the comparatively short introductory paragraph of Section II, 
there is no sustained discussion of the advantages of forward naval presence and 
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absolutely no attempt to identify it as a good thing, not just for the United States, 
but for the world community generally� Instead, we read a series of regional re-
views, starting with the Indo-Asia-Pacific, which identify the proposed force lev-
els needed to deliver the required forward presence region by region, ending up 
with the Arctic and Antarctic�14 Several of these regional reviews conclude with a 
brief paragraph outlining what that resultant forward naval presence is supposed 
to deliver, but these ideas are nowhere woven together into a kind of sustained 
defense of the aspiration for a forward naval presence as a whole�
At a time of fiscal constraint when it is becoming harder to balance resources 
against commitments and when the military-technical, political, and legal chal-
lenges to a forward naval presence are clearly growing, this failure to take the 
bull by the horns and address the issue directly will strike many as unfortunate� It 
could play into the hands of domestic skeptics inclined to doubt the importance 
of forward presence, especially if the attempted defense of the capability seems 
likely to be expensive, fiscally and programmatically� At the same time, the ab-
sence of a justification for forward presence runs the risk of further antagonizing 
neutral or suspicious international opinion apt to think the worst of American 
intentions, since the determination to maintain a forward naval presence could 
simply be interpreted as illustrative of aggressive intent� 
A few years ago, for instance, Major General Luo Yuan spoke for more than 
just PLA hard-liners when he said that “the so-called forward presence means 
that the United States can send its gunboats to every corner of the world� � � � This 
way, the United States can even claim the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea 
is covered within its security boundary�”15 He and others pointed out that in the 
aftermath of the sinking of ROKS Cheonan, were USS George Washington to have 
sailed into the Yellow Sea, its aircraft would have been capable of reaching Beijing� 
If to this particular concern is added a general strategic culture deeply affected 
by the country’s historical exposure to threats from the sea and by the disastrous 
consequences for China of a failure to deter naval activities of this sort, Chinese 
sensitivity to the unauthorized presence and activity of foreign navies in “Chinese 
waters” is understandable� The point is that other countries, not the least India, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, share to some extent such hesitations about 
the unauthorized forward presence of (other) great-power naval forces�16
Since a forward U�S� naval presence is not in fact regarded by a sizable chunk 
of international opinion as a universal good to be welcomed, the failure to dis-
cuss and justify it in a doctrinal statement that will be avidly studied around the 
world seems a lost opportunity� Hitherto, the principle has largely been defended 
negatively by freedom-of-navigation exercises and repeated recourse to West-
ern interpretations of the law of the sea� To win support, it is not enough to say 
merely that something is legal; it needs also to be shown to be “right�” The case 
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for forward presence needs to be made positively� Sadly, the new strategy does not 
explicitly do that� This failure, together with the emphasis on the function of all-
domain access, will reinforce the perception, and not just among the paranoid, 
that the U�S� Navy is only interested in maintaining a forward naval presence as 
a precondition for its capacity to threaten countries� This is, of course, part of it, 
but there is so much more to tell� 
Paradoxically the case would be relatively easy to make� Much of the illustra-
tive material used to explain the ideas in CS21R indeed could be rebrigaded into 
a justification for forward presence� For instance, a forward naval presence, even 
off unwelcoming shores, provides 24/7 general assurance for all legitimate sea 
users� It facilitates maritime domain awareness, which is a universal good in that 
it increases the effectiveness of the international response to all forms of criminal 
activity at sea that threaten everybody, directly or indirectly� Forward presence 
also supports rapid and effective responses to natural disasters� In contested areas 
a forward naval presence can serve as a calming mechanism� More generally, a 
forward naval presence is part and parcel of naval diplomacy, allowing events 
to be monitored, relationships developed over time, and stability defended� The 
bones of a persuasive argument are easily discernible� 
At the moment, most countries accept, albeit with a shade of reluctance in 
some quarters, that, in Kishore Mahbubani’s words, 
the real reason why most international waterways remain safe and open—and 
thereby facilitate the huge explosion of global trade we have seen—is that the Ameri-
can Navy acts as the guarantor of last resort to keep them open� Without the global 
presence of the US Navy, our world order would be less orderly�17
For this reason too, the notion of a global maritime partnership, outlined in the 
first version of the strategy, positively extended the concept to the world’s other 
navies by providing an opportunity for them to join the U�S� Navy “on the beat”; 
the idea was generally welcomed around the world, since it addressed problems 
held in common, such as the threat of piracy, drug smuggling, international ter-
rorism, human trafficking, and catastrophic natural disasters� Any of these could 
directly threaten sea-based trade and other legitimate forms of sea use and indi-
rectly jeopardize the local stability afloat and ashore on which that trade depends� 
Hence nations participated in a multitude of cooperative multinational naval 
activities designed to curb these shared problems, to build up local capacities 
to handle them in the future, and where necessary to engage in security-sector 
reform� More discussion of this would have helped sustain the general argument 
for a forward presence and so added to the international appeal of CS21R�
The fact that the strategy has been issued in a number of different languages, 
including Mandarin, shows that its authors are well aware of the importance of 
its international appeal, not least because of the expanding need for the Navy 
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to operate alongside those of its allies and partners� Because so much emphasis 
remains in the document on the essential role of America’s allies and partners as 
a means of narrowing the gap between what must be done by the United States 
alone and what can be, the response of regional countries to this new strategy will 
be key to its success over the next decade� It is worth repeating the point that the 
relative absence of discussion on the advantages of naval diplomacy in winning 
friends and influencing people seems a pity� 
The reactions of those different navies and the countries and regions they de-
fend will of course vary, in accordance with their strategic situations� Countries 
like Japan and the Philippines, wary of China’s rising power, will probably broadly 
welcome the new emphasis on the all-domain-access function and the apparent 
reinforcement of the “rebalance” suggested by the special prominence given to 
the “Indo-Asia-Pacific” region� Both of these indicate the U�S� determination to 
stay in the western Pacific despite China’s “counter-interventionary” strategies, 
and that resolve would seem to underline for Japan and the Philippines the U�S� 
security guarantee� 
But even in those two countries there will probably be a small constituency 
of opinion that will worry that the new muscularity of CS21R will be found pro-
vocative in Beijing and so will worsen the atmosphere� It would be surprising if 
Beijing in general and the People’s Liberation Army Navy in particular did not 
find aspects of the new strategy provocative, at least in public� China has after 
all for the first time been identified as a security concern, and all-domain access 
certainly looks like a response to the antiaccess/area-denial strategies with which 
the Chinese have been associated� 
Countries with currently better relations with China, such as Thailand, Ma-
laysia, and Indonesia, may share these concerns about what some critics will 
undoubtedly consider the offensive tone of the new strategy; they may also be 
encouraged in this response by the reduced emphasis apparently given to the 
general maritime security concerns that tend to be higher in their national de-
fense priorities� Illegal fishing, human and drug trafficking, and other forms of 
criminal activity at sea are actually their most immediate concerns� U�S� support 
of efforts against crime (especially in the shape of U�S� Coast Guard activity) is of 
course frequently referenced in the early part of the strategy, but explicit cover-
age of the role is less than it was in the 2007 strategy, because Section III is about 
national security rather than the American contribution to the defense of the 
system� Maritime security is indeed “a promising area for expanded cooperation 
with our allies and partners,” and so the less-explicit emphasis on it given in the 
new version of the strategy means there is less to offset its putative muscularity�18 
How other navies respond to the whole package will doubtless reflect how they 
perceive this shift in its balance� 
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The same pattern of response will probably be replicated in other parts of 
the world too� Countries with concerns about an overmighty neighbor, such as 
Iran or a newly truculent Russia, and in need of reassurance will welcome the 
American emphasis on maintaining a forward presence for the same reasons 
as Japan and the Philippines, moderated only by concerns about the relative 
priority apparently accorded their respective regions when compared with the 
Indo-Asia-Pacific� Whether it is intended or not, describing American interests 
in geographic regions sequentially looks like a priority list, and Europeans will 
note without surprise that they have slipped to position three behind Asia and 
the Middle East� Africans come next, then neighbors of the United States in the 
Western Hemisphere� That the region closest to the United States and central to 
its homeland security comes just fifth in the list suggests that it is not in fact a 
priority list; nonetheless, that is how it will be seen�
Finally, reactions to the new strategy will also reflect different constituencies 
within countries as well as their positions in various geographic regions� Profes-
sional opinion in the world’s other navies will probably neither be surprised nor 
in many cases much dismayed at much in this strategy� A great deal of academic 
and professional attention has been paid to the rise around the world of military-
technical constraints on naval maneuver near to land and its portentous implica-
tions for the future utility of naval power;19 there has been a natural and parallel 
rise in blue-water aspirations and capabilities, not least in the Asia-Pacific�20 
Navies with such aspirations (or that privately assume they might have such as-
pirations one day) will want to maintain access too� Accordingly, the U�S� Navy’s 
explicit determination to maintain access and forward presence, and through this 
the whole gamut of the traditional naval capabilities that flow from sea control, 
will seem to other navies both natural and right—although in some cases, their 
professional sympathy for the Navy’s determination to maintain the strategic 
value of seapower in general may be kept decently private, if only because of the 
concerns of their political masters� Navies that know they will always be limited 
in their aspirations to negative sea-denial strategies, in contrast, will naturally be 
much less sympathetic professionally to the main thrust of the strategy�
The variation and complexity of the international response to CS21R and its 
importance as a means of winning friends and influencing people suggest that 
the U�S� maritime services will need to devote significant effort to their strategic 
communications plan� The problem is that the necessary audiences are varied, 
and to allay their different and often competing concerns and to build up the 
required support, the messaging will need to be tailored to particular audiences� 
This will require considerable skill and effort�
How the U�S� sea services communicate CS21R may generate the same dif-
ficulties the Obama administration faced when launching its pivot/rebalance 
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toward Asia� This occasioned huge, almost unending, debate about what it all 
meant, with different countries wanting to hear different things and major defini-
tional problems for the administration� While no one would argue against serious 
reflection on strategic matters as a means of enhancing the quality of thought, 
there is a pragmatic argument against making its conclusions too public, espe-
cially when addressed to multiple audiences� Rather than announce with fanfare 
such statements of general policy purposes, perhaps one should just get on and 
do them! After all, what a policy means is usually best clarified by what the policy 
maker does� But this, in the immediate aftermath of the delivery of one of the 
world’s most interesting doctrinal statements on twenty-first-century seapower 
for years, is probably best left to another article and another time� 
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 An announcement in 2013 by then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that the Navy might reduce its aircraft carrier fleet from eleven to eight was an indi-
cation not only of harsh budget realities but also of changed operational circum-
stances at sea�1 In World War II, the aircraft carrier displaced the big-gun battle-
ship as the capital ship� The United States subsequently used its fleet of aircraft 
carriers to exercise the command of the sea that it had won in the war to secure 
the peace� It stationed them around the periphery of Eurasia, initially to support a 
grand strategy of containing the Soviet Union and then, after the Soviet collapse, 
to maintain general strategic stability� This use of 
aircraft carriers has lasted almost seventy years, a 
period in which naval technology has evolved sig-
nificantly, and much of that new technology could 
pose a credible threat to the aircraft carrier� Absent 
actual fighting or a direct challenge to American 
command of the sea, it is hard to know when the 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier might pass into 
obsolescence� What happens in that case? This is 
not simply a technical naval question; the capital 
ship, currently in the form of the nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier (CVN), has constituted an impor-
tant feature of the global geopolitical terrain since 
at least the Napoleonic Wars� It is part of a global 
political and economic ecology, and it is therefore 
reasonable to think that any changes in its status 
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CONNECTING THE DOTS
will have ripple effects in that ecology� In this article we will explore that ecology 
and speculate on how it might change if the capital ship, as a key naval function, 
capability, and concept, passes from the scene�
When the aircraft carrier displaced the battleship as the key type of capital 
ship, the transition, for all its tactical and operational impact, did not alter the 
fundamental character of naval warfare� Decisive offensive power remained 
concentrated in a relatively small number of large, expensive combatants� It is 
not clear that a large warship of new design is waiting in the wings to replace 
the aircraft carrier if indeed it becomes obsolescent� One possibility is that naval 
offensive power will reside in various types of missiles that could be widely dis-
tributed among a variety of vessels�2 In fact, this process has been under way for 
some time in the form of Tomahawk land-attack missiles loaded on destroyers, 
cruisers, and submarines� If “missilization” is carried to its logical conclusion, 
displacing the carrier and its air wing as the principal offensive power of the fleet, 
the nature of naval warfare could change, and that change could have ripple ef-
fects in the global geopolitical ecology, one that has been, to this point, generally 
favorable to American interests�
This article will not attempt to pass judgment on whether the aircraft carrier 
and its embarked tactical air wing are in fact headed for obsolescence, although 
there exists just such a debate in the current literature�3 To be clear, and as will 
be discussed later, the U�S� Navy might elect to keep some aircraft carriers in 
commission even if only in support roles� Also, care must be taken to distinguish 
between the “capital ship” as a particular physical object and “capital ship” as a 
warfare function� Later, for illustrative purposes, we will explore a world in which 
the capital-ship function has been made obsolete by new kinds of weapons and 
sensors, whether or not aircraft carriers remain in the inventory�
COMMAND OF THE SEA AND CAPITAL SHIPS
From the galleasses of the Christian armada that prevailed at Lepanto in 1571 
to the Gerald Ford–class CVN of today, there has been an intrinsic relationship 
between capital ships and command of the sea� Command of the sea, rightly 
understood, is simply the strength relationship between two contending navies�4 
The one that is sufficiently stronger than the other enjoys freedom of action, 
including the ability to move its nation’s army by sea, disperse to protect its com-
merce, and come to the aid of allies� Such command was traditionally achieved 
by winning a decisive sea battle, and the arbiter of such battles since Lepanto has 
generally been the capital ship—the largest and strongest ship type afloat, capable 
of defeating lesser types� Since 1945 the United States has, by virtue of its eradica-
tion of the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II and thereafter in the absence 
of a serious Soviet challenge, enjoyed virtually uncontested command of the sea�
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The U�S� Navy’s dominance has been so complete that some writers question 
whether the concept has relevance anymore�5 However, a pair of analysts who 
traced the history of the concept from the late fifteenth century through the late 
twentieth argue that a particular dimension of command of the sea is operative 
especially in times of dominance—the leading nation’s ability to use command of 
the sea to enforce the rules of the international order according to its interests�6 
Throughout this period, this dimension included the ability to regulate com-
merce but also to project power ashore� A dominant capital-ship fleet either dis-
persed to support such operations or lurked in the background, dissuading by its 
existence any potential challenger from even trying to build a competitive fleet�
In the post–World War II era, the U�S� Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers has been 
employed in this way� In roles ranging from stopgap application of airpower 
against an invading North Korean army in 1950 through support of special forces 
in the opening moves of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, to most recent-
ly air strikes to limit the advance of Islamic State forces, the Navy’s carriers have 
been dispersed around the periphery of Eurasia as a ready tool for the president� 
In a 1954 U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings article, Samuel Huntington summed 
up the Navy’s postwar situation: “Its purpose now is not to acquire command 
of the sea but rather to utilize its command of the sea to achieve supremacy on 
land� More specifically, it is to apply naval power to that decisive strip of littoral 
encircling the Eurasian continent�”7 The key to the utility of the aircraft carrier 
in these roles has been its ability to project power deep inland, taking up station 
wherever the situation demanded� The pattern of aircraft-carrier utilization, 
combined with deployments and movements to assure allies or deter potential 
aggressors, clearly indicates these ships have been dispersed around the world to 
exercise American command of the sea�
ANTI–CAPITAL SHIP TECHNOLOGY
Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, a series of technological develop-
ments have challenged the dominance of capital ships� The “automotive” (i�e�, 
self-propelled) torpedo, the aircraft, the submarine, and the missile have all 
presented potentially disruptive challenges� To date, however, the capital ship in 
its various forms has survived and retained its utility for seizing, maintaining, 
and exercising command of the sea� In World War II, despite some submarine 
successes against them, both Japanese and American capital ships, mainly car-
riers, used speed, maneuver, and offensive reach to neutralize or at least contain 
threats� Beyond those at sea, threats emanating from land have always constituted 
a mortal danger to capital ships� Admiral Horatio Nelson is supposed to have said 
“a ship’s a fool to fight a fort,” referring to the high volume and accuracy of fire 
that can be produced by a fort in comparison with what can be generated by a 
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ship� A number of destroyers, cruisers, and even battleships have suffered damage 
in duels with shore batteries� In the Pacific War, American carriers before 1944 
were careful to remain out of range of Japanese air bases except for covert dashes 
into such zones for hit-and-run raids�
The post–World War II world has seen the development of nuclear subma-
rines, long-range shore-based bombers carrying antiship cruise missiles, and, 
most recently, land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles with antiship 
seekers�8 Yet in the absence of a shooting war involving these weapons, the air-
craft carrier has been able to exercise its command-of-the-sea function virtually 
unmolested� A close call occurred in the eastern Mediterranean in 1973 when 
U�S� and Soviet fleets intermingled during the Yom Kippur War� The Soviet fleet 
was well armed with antiship missiles, and a few nuclear submarines were pres-
ent�9 The author was a junior attack aviator on board USS Independence (CV 62) 
in that crisis and can attest to the precarious situation of the U�S� carriers� While 
defensive systems such as Aegis and directed energy have since been developed, 
the threats have become more challenging� The danger is that the net outcome of 
an offense-versus-defense battle cannot be truly known short of actual fighting� 
Thus the ability of aircraft carriers, as capital ships, to carry out the command-
of-the-sea mission is increasingly being placed in question�
THE LITTORAL
Many writers and theorists have divided the seas into two parts, the open ocean 
and the littoral� Conventional lay wisdom on naval matters links large ships with 
the “blue water” of the high seas and smaller craft with the “green water” of the 
littoral� In fact, most major naval battles have taken place within the littoral or 
at least in the vicinity of land features� Large ships, capital ships not excepted, 
are designed to cross oceans and to carry a lot of payload; their purpose is not to 
“hang out” in midocean� It is instructive to examine three tacit operational rules 
for capital-ship fleets that have remained valid since the seventeenth century:
• Keep the fleet concentrated�
• Do not become decisively engaged with land forces unless decisively supe-
rior (a more general rewording of Admiral Nelson’s “A ship’s a fool to fight a 
fort”)�
• Do not sacrifice the mobility of the fleet by tying it to a geographic feature�10
These rules can be broken if conditions are right, but in the presence of a sig-
nificant opposing force ignoring them has been a recipe for losing ships� We can 
skip over the first rule for the purposes of this article and focus on the second 
two� The second rule reflects, as generally noted, the ability of land-based forces 
to generate a higher rate of fire—or aircraft sorties—per unit time than can ships; 
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a land adversary is also less likely, on a force-wide basis, to suffer disabling dam-
age per hit�
The third rule has to do with detectability� A widely maneuvering fleet is 
harder to find and target than one that is forced to remain in the vicinity of an 
island or other geographic feature� The distance the littoral effectively extends 
seaward can be thought of as the distance out to which these two latter rules 
retain their salience� New weapons and new modes of search and surveillance 
have extended this effective distance considerably in several regions of the world� 
Given the strategic mission of exercising command of the sea through power pro-
jection ashore, it really is not useful to talk about U�S� aircraft carrier operations 
outside the littoral—anywhere� Where no threats are manifest, carriers disregard 
the rules with impunity, operating as airfields at sea�11 Palpable threat levels force 
their consideration�
Where the relationship of high sea to the littoral comes into practical effect is 
in the design of fleet defensive systems� A carrier strike group (CSG) employs a 
layered defense scheme in which fighter aircraft establish an outer ring, reaching 
perhaps out to three hundred miles� Inside this fighter-engagement zone, Aegis 
destroyers and cruisers employ surface-to-air missiles for area defense� Finally, 
the innermost zone consists of various point-defense systems on each ship� This 
three-layer scheme is best thought of as a strainer, not a shield� The outer layers 
are not likely to destroy all inbound aircraft or missiles in saturation raids� They 
are supposed to reduce the number of “leakers” to a number that can be managed 
by point-defense systems� To function effectively, the scheme requires distance, 
ideally hundreds of miles� A preferred operational case against a land-based 
threat would be an “approach battle,” in which the CSG launches long-range air 
and missile strikes to disable enemy defenses before they can be brought to bear 
effectively on the group� By the time the group enters the littoral, the threat level 
would be reduced to the point that the two fleet-employment rules could at least 
be bent, if not broken� But political circumstances, such as those encountered in 
the eastern Mediterranean in 1973, and long-range shore systems, such as anti-
ship ballistic missiles, not to mention cruise missile–armed submarines, force 
the CSG out of its preferred mode and make the consequences of breaking the 
rules severe�
The difficult logic of littoral warfare prompted Rear Admiral Yedidia Ya’ari of 
the Israel Navy to write twenty years ago, “I argue that when warships designed 
for the high seas enter the confined waters of the littoral arena, the fundamental 
relationships of maneuverability and firepower are upset,” and “The surface ships 
now in commission were designed with the open ocean and distant defensive 
perimeters in mind; to keep deploying them to a playing field where, under the 
most optimistic assumptions, their survival requires as a normal operating mode 
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the highest level of everything, all the time, is unhealthy and unrealistic in the 
long run�”12
The objective here is not to advance an argument against aircraft carriers; it is 
to illuminate the relationship among American command of the sea, aircraft car-
riers as the capital ships that are collectively the instrumentality for its exercise, 
a favorable world order based on that command, and the nature of the littoral� 
These factors are inextricably intertwined, and changes to one inevitably affect 
the others�
CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES AND RISK
If kinetic threats to the aircraft carrier are latent, the budgetary threat is all too 
real� USS Gerald Ford (CVN 78) will cost around thirteen billion dollars� That 
figure is for the ship alone; the air wing would add another five to six billion�13 
Moreover, the carrier aviation “enterprise” absorbs a significant plurality of U�S� 
Navy resources, including personnel and infrastructure� Beyond the absolute 
numbers, this investment represents an enormous concentration of assets and 
therefore risk� However, it has always been this way with capital ships; they re-
quire concentration both in investment and, when there is a contending navy, 
in employment� If, through their construction and use, command of the sea is 
seized, maintained, and exercised, adequate return on investment is realized�
Assuming that Secretary Hagel was correct and the CVN force will be reduced 
below eleven, the Navy faces two strategic problems that involve the connection 
between capital ships and command of the sea� The first is one of simple num-
bers� If the exercise of command is strictly associated with capital ships, what 
number of CVNs is the minimum needed? Finding the answer requires assess-
ment of which regions require such exercise and which do not� After the Cold 
War, the U�S� Navy all but abandoned carrier deployments from Norway’s North 
Cape all the way to the strait of Bab el Mandeb, because there was no further need 
for the exercise of command in those waters� As the global system evolves both 
politically and economically, the need to exercise command may shrink even 
more—or it may expand because of Chinese or Russian adventurism� In the case 
of contraction, it may be the case that the CVNs can be retained in home waters, 
whereby the justification for investment would decline even further� But even 
in the expansion case the ability to increase the number of CVNs may simply 
evaporate as their cost escalates and defense budgets contract�14
The other issue is whether the CVN itself is able to continue as a capital ship� 
Can it operate at an acceptable degree of risk in waters it needs to enter to carry 
out its power-projection function? And indeed, can manned tactical aircraft con-
tinue to be viable weapons-delivery vehicles in the face of modern air defenses? 
Again, these questions have been addressed elsewhere, and it is not within the 
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scope of this article to argue the matter either way� However, we will make the 
assumption that sufficient uncertainty exists to warrant thinking about what 
American naval posture might be like if the answer, with respect both to carriers 
and to their manned aircraft, is judged at some point to be no�
In a more general and abstract sense, there is the question whether concen-
tration in any form is a good idea in an age of cyberspace, ubiquitous sensing, 
machine intelligence, precision missiles, and, of course, nuclear weapons� Early 
in the nuclear age the Navy developed highly dispersed tactical formations and 
spread out its home ports so that one nuclear bomb could not destroy too much� 
Over the decades of the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, U�S� Sixth Fleet conducted a series 
of experiments to determine whether dispersed formations, emission control, 
and deceptive maneuvers could be effective in protecting the aircraft carrier from 
air and submarine attack� Progressive tactical development over this span of time 
produced an array of methods and equipment that appeared to be effective, at 
least for a given number of hours or days�15 Nevertheless, combat power was still 
concentrated in the carrier, and losing the carrier, through equipment failure or 
bad luck, put the fleet substantially out of business� Today, arguments for disper-
sal rotate around the networking capability of forces and the range of weapons� 
That is, given a battle-force network and long-range weapons, ships can be physi-
cally dispersed but operate as if they were in close formation� However, this dis-
position does not change the basic fact that most offensive power is concentrated 
in the carrier� Investment bankers urge diversified portfolios� Concentration of 
combat capability, like concentration of investment, may constitute strategic vul-
nerability, if, in the naval case, it has not already done so� But concentration does 
produce various efficiencies in both investment and the application of force, so 
the incentives to concentrate will always be there�
BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN COMMAND OF THE SEA AND 
CAPITAL SHIPS
Command of the sea as an operative basis for naval decision making has been 
around, whether the term has been explicitly used or not, since at least the 
Peloponnesian War, when the land power Sparta based its strategies on the 
presumption of Athenian predominance at sea� It predates the development of 
the capital ship, perhaps offering a basis for delinking the two concepts� Could 
command be maintained and exercised with a distributed force of smaller ships? 
Capital ships arose to meet the needs of gun and, later, aircraft technology, both 
of which required progressively larger hulls and physical concentration to be 
effective against “symmetric” forces—that is, adversaries armed essentially like 
oneself� It is not clear that missile, mine, or other unmanned technologies require 
concentration; they may in fact require the opposite—that is, distribution—to be 
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effective� As a result, distribution of power brings into question the whole idea of 
command of the sea as traditionally conceived� 
As long as naval power was defined in terms of fleets of capital ships, admirals 
shaped their strategies on the basis of how they viewed their strength relative to 
that of their enemies� Weaker navies, feeling they would meet defeat in a pitched 
naval battle, tried at times to compensate for their deficiencies in capital ships 
through the use of distributed small forces to interdict commerce or achieve 
some form or degree of denial using raiders, flotillas of small combatants, or 
mines against the stronger navy� However, the stronger force, enjoying com-
mand, was at liberty to blockade and to conduct amphibious operations directly 
against the flanks of the enemy or somewhere that mattered on the periphery� 
Using capital-ship power to provide security for such operations has been normal 
practice, because it has been effective�
But in today’s emerging operational environment it is not clear that using 
capital ships to cover an amphibious landing would be either tactically effective 
or strategically wise� An enemy possessing an array of modern missile, cyber, 
and unmanned forces might plausibly achieve disabling hits on several capital 
ships� If it did, the task force commander would have a difficult decision between 
proceeding with reduced security and abandoning the operation� A real-world 
example is the Falklands War of 1982� What if the Argentines had put one of the 
British carriers out of action? The British commander later admitted that such a 
loss would have caused him to cancel the landing of troops�16
The point is that emerging technology appears to give a decisive edge to the 
tactical offense at sea—that is, to reinforce the historically normal state of af-
fairs�17 In the early years of the Pacific War, aircraft carriers took advantage of this 
condition by attempting to strike effectively first, the paradigm being the battle 
of Midway�18 The logic of striking effectively first extends to projecting power 
against the shore� One of the criteria for success in the Sixth Fleet experiments on 
deception and dispersal was whether carriers remained untargeted long enough 
to get in disabling first strikes against enemy airfields�19 The presumption was 
that the resulting impairment of enemy strike operations would be sufficient to 
reduce the threat to levels manageable by battle group defenses� If initial strikes 
cannot be sufficiently disabling, or if the enemy’s offensive power (missiles, say) 
is dispersed and hidden, the logic of striking effectively first evaporates, negating 
the true value of a capital ship� The capital-ship group or fleet is thus forced to 
break the second fleet-employment rule—“Do not become decisively engaged 
with land forces unless decisively superior”—and losses can be expected� The 
question then becomes whether the operation is worth the loss of one or more 
capital ships� Unless the warfare is nuclear or an existential issue is otherwise at 
stake, the trade-off is not likely to be advantageous�20
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Capital ships generally should be hazarded only when the potential strategic 
gain—command of the sea, national survival, or some other vital interest worth 
such risk—is at stake� That said, the U�S� Navy in 1942 twice risked its few avail-
able aircraft carriers in the defense of the beachhead at Guadalcanal, and it suf-
fered losses in the process� However, it did so in the knowledge that within a year 
Essex-class carriers would start coming off the shipways in numbers� Moreover, 
the U�S� carriers were risked only when Japanese carriers were involved� Would 
the carriers have been placed in jeopardy had the Japanese dispatched a large 
flotilla of submarines and destroyers? The point is that it may not be worthwhile 
to employ capital ships even when command of the sea is at risk, as they could be 
lost without prospect of meaningful gain�
On the flip side, could distributed and possibly dispersed missile-centric 
forces perform the capital-ship function, at least the traditional one of seizing 
command of the sea against a similar force? We will explore this question more 
shortly, but it appears that distributed, missile-centric warfare obliges navies, the 
stronger as well as the weaker, to act as if they did not have command� Thus it is 
hard to see how the concept of command of the sea could be delinked from the 
function of the capital ship�
A POST–CAPITAL SHIP WORLD
What might happen in a future operational environment in which the seas, or at 
least the significant portions of them, become too dangerous for capital ships?21 
To envision such a world, we must understand what strategic functions would be 
lost� To do that, in turn, we must first recognize that there has been a shift in the 
global geopolitical ecology, a shift that has been generated in part by the displace-
ment of the dreadnought by the aircraft carrier and that, reciprocally, has trans-
formed the function of the capital ship� Prior to 1945, the strategic function of 
the capital ship was to seize command of the sea by destroying the opposing fleet� 
After 1945, following Samuel Huntington’s logic, the carrier’s strategic function 
became projecting power ashore� When Huntington wrote, land-attack cruise 
missiles were barely embryonic; carrier-based tactical airpower was the principal 
weapon of the U�S� Navy, functioning either independently or in support of Ma-
rines or other land forces� The carrier’s ability to take station in the near littoral 
(that is, close to shore) and function there as an airfield at sea was its key strategic 
capability�22 Over the years, Tomahawk cruise missiles have taken over much of 
tactical airpower’s deep interdiction and raiding portfolio, but the airfield-at-
sea function remains the carrier’s irreplaceable core capability� This capability 
has made virtually the whole Eurasian littoral accessible by American power, in 
whatever form, hard or soft� Loss of the airfield-at-sea capability removes from 
the table certain forms of power projection in certain areas�
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Command of the sea confers on its possessor, specifically the United States, 
three key strategic benefits: sanctuary for the nation’s war economy, credible and 
useful contact with allies, and strategic options in terms of lines of operation� 
In addition to breaking, potentially, the sea links with allies, loss of the modern 
capital-ship function would narrow the range of strategic options available to the 
United States� This restriction would have implications and effects not just in 
war but for the dynamics of peacetime competition� Loss of American ability to 
intervene in certain areas in certain ways would provide potentially hostile actors 
freedom of action locally or regionally that they do not now enjoy� (What, for 
instance, would now be the situation in Iraq if carrier aircraft had not conducted 
interdiction strikes against Islamic State forces in 2014–15?) Such freedom of 
action would increase the chances that the current world order, turbulent as it 
is, would deteriorate even more, trending toward worsened anarchy, the rise of 
hostile regional hegemons or trade blocs, or other geopolitical pathologies�
If the disputes spawned or exacerbated by this set of adverse trends were to 
erupt into war, especially one with a significant naval component, what would 
that war look like? Let us assume that the U�S� Navy, as well as virtually all oth-
ers, will have recognized the shift in conditions and restructured accordingly, 
distributing offensive power among submarines, unmanned systems, and smaller 
surface combatants� The advantage would still lie with coastal powers that could 
build strong antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, but the U�S� Navy would be 
more able and willing, owing to the higher risk tolerance of its new force struc-
ture, than it might be now to send forces into contested waters, and some A2/
AD systems, such as the antiship ballistic missile, might become obsolete� While 
China, for example, might be more able than today to prevent the insertion and 
support of U�S� ground forces in-theater, the United States would be more able to 
prevent Chinese deployment of ground forces into Taiwan or elsewhere� The East 
Asian littoral could become a kind of naval no-man’s-land, a zone in which only 
the most stealthy sea-denial forces would be able to operate� Similar situations 
might arise in the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean� 
Would command of the sea have any meaning in those conditions? Certain 
traditional elements of command would indeed evaporate in some way� Navies—
such as they would be—would operate dispersed not only tactically but also, 
perhaps, at the operational and strategic levels, depending on what an opponent 
did� Dispersal to avoid being found is an old tactic, but flotillas of smaller ships 
might need to be brought together if the enemy forces concentrated� (The Ger-
man U-boat wolf-pack tactic was, in this sense, the logical response to Allied 
convoys�) But in this potential world, one could never be sure where the enemy 
might show up, especially one whose offensive power was contained on board 
submarines� Strategic dispersal as a benefit of command of the sea thus becomes 
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problematic: How does one know when one has command? More than likely, a 
prolonged and dispersed attrition fight would be required, during which the risks 
of moving ground forces by sea might be unacceptable� At what point would a 
supreme commander feel comfortable in dispatching an invasion force?
One possible tenet of future naval warfare (if it is not already true) would be 
that if a vessel or force can be found and identified, it can, and most likely will, 
be hit� On this basis the naval war becomes a fight for information superiority� In 
the 1942 carrier battles, finding first meant striking first, which tended to put a 
quick end to each battle, since offensive power was concentrated in a few carrier 
decks� In the future, victories would be tactical and incremental, because offen-
sive power would be distributed and hidden� Information superiority would thus 
be episodic and require constant effort, the balance perhaps swinging daily� The 
oceans would thus become an arena for one big, long, sea-denial fight�
An aspect of command of the sea that would be problematic on both sides of 
the equation would be sea commerce� Whereas German U-boats and American 
submarines in World War II could prey on shipping with confidence that hitting 
what they were shooting at would hurt the enemy, today no such confidence 
is possible, because of the convoluted web of ownership of ships and cargoes� 
Moreover, oil changes hands on the spot market while it is at sea on tankers, and 
the container shipping system has assumed a hub-and-spoke structure in which 
the bulk of containers carry subcomponents for products�23 All this means that in 
the current shipping regime seizing or sinking merchant vessels may hurt oneself 
and one’s allies as easily as the enemy, regardless of the flag of a ship attacked� In 
fact, perhaps the only viable form of physical sea-commerce interdiction would 
be a close blockade based on a form of unrestricted submarine warfare or min-
ing� However, whether or not commerce interdiction will be feasible in such a 
world, command of the sea would not be an issue either way� The old Mahanian 
prescription of driving the enemy’s flag from the sea except as a fugitive appears 
to be increasingly irrelevant; ships of all types would either be fugitives or be left 
unmolested, whosever “side” they were on� It is possible to envision some kind of 
“limited” naval war in which each side hunts the other’s naval units but by tacit 
mutual agreement allows commercial traffic to continue�24
At this point it would appear that doing away with the capital ship does not 
simply break the link between the two concepts but invalidates the concept of 
command of the sea� But to penetrate to the most central issue, does asymmetry 
in strength continue to matter? If naval strength is a function of how much you 
can build and how well you can use it, logic says that a weaker party would seek 
to avoid a pitched fight at sea� Yet the dynamics of naval warfare in a non–capital 
ship environment may allow weaker powers to challenge the stronger in ways 
not possible when capital ships were dominant� Even in a capital-ship regime, 
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there are operational options for a weaker navy, including maintaining a fleet-in-
being, raiding commerce, and mounting local denial and disruption operations� 
This last option might be expanded beyond the local context as missile ranges 
increase, nuclear submarines proliferate, and missiles, mines, and unmanned 
systems begin to be hidden on merchant vessels or sown from submarines or 
aircraft� Such a dynamic can really be only about disruption, but that might be 
enough—for both the weaker and stronger power� What would be gone is the 
freedom of action that command of the sea traditionally provided� 
However, a complicating (or perhaps mitigating) factor in this scenario is the 
issue of sanctuary� None of the three operational options just mentioned for a 
weaker navy are viable without some sort of sanctuary, be it a secure base of op-
erations (either defended or hidden) or covertness in deployment, approach, and 
attack� In the emerging naval warfare environment such sanctuary is increasingly 
problematic, especially secure basing� Submarines armed with land-attack cruise 
missiles or land-based ballistic missiles of sufficient range could neutralize or 
disrupt almost any naval base, not to mention logistics ships� Even underground 
submarine shelters are not immune�
Forces that are significantly weaker than their opponents frequently resort to 
the disruptive form of warfare, normally manifested on land as guerrilla war-
fare�25 Three factors must exist if disruptive warfare (which is usually prolonged 
and cumulative) is to be viable: sanctuary, a sustainable tactical mechanism, and 
strategic resilience—that is, the ability to keep going despite losses and without 
clear evidence of progress toward victory� In the Battle of the Atlantic of World 
War II the German submarine force came close to achieving all three; the Al-
lies finally tilted the balance of victory in their own favor by making the U-boat 
tactical mechanism unsustainable� They did so by adopting the convoy, forcing 
the U-boats to go to where the escorts were, and inflicting enough attrition to 
prevent the German navy from keeping enough boats at sea to generate the level 
of merchant sinkings needed to ruin the British war economy�
In the future, non–capital ship naval warfare might evolve to the point that 
both sides operate as if they were the weaker and both adopt disruptive warfare� 
The fight would be very much a distributed, tactical, cat-and-mouse game char-
acterized by incremental attrition, one in which neither side has a clear idea of 
which way the balance is tilting� Of course, no such form of warfare would exist 
without a cyber dimension or, at least on the U�S� side, long-range bombers being 
brought into play� These latter elements would likely spawn, sooner or later, con-
ventionally armed ballistic-missile salvos� Whether or when mushroom clouds 
would appear is not knowable, but this extended warfare dynamic might make 
their appearance more likely�
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   57 8/13/15   3:06 PM
62
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
 5 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
In fact, nuclear weapons represent yet another issue that could decisively af-
fect the future naval warfare environment� Beyond their direct effects on a naval 
operation, the issue of whether a war at sea might precipitate an intercontinental 
nuclear exchange is increasingly relevant as nuclear weapons and long-range 
ballistic-missile technology proliferate� This is not the place for an in-depth 
analysis of the question, but we must at least consider whether a naval war devoid 
of capital ships, a war that is likely to be more prolonged and cumulative than 
in the past, would be more likely or less to be consummated without the use of 
nuclear weapons� War games at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated, contrary to the existing opinion 
of the time, that a conventional war with the Soviet Union, even with a robust 
naval component, would not necessarily escalate into a nuclear exchange�26 At 
the time, the Soviet Union had little in the way of capital ships in its navy, but 
the U�S� Navy, of course, was flush with aircraft carriers, a number of which were 
lost in the games until the American players got savvier about using them� The 
only speculation that can be made at this point is that in a “new age” naval war 
(by definition, one between major powers) that dragged on for a considerable 
time—like, say, the Battle of the Atlantic—there would be more opportunity for 
escalation to occur, but it would not be a foregone conclusion�
What does appear to be the case is that in such a world the United States 
would have a much harder time even than it does now providing support and 
security for an ordered global system� Prevention of the emergence of a Eur-
asian hegemon might have to be based on a threat of bombardment, nuclear or 
conventional� Limited wars on the periphery would be more risky, especially if a 
competing naval power—a resurgent Russia, for example—objected� Commerce 
might continue, but if it did, systemic disorder or bloc building on the Eurasian 
or African continent might promote retrenchment of national business interests 
and produce a massive global economic downturn�
CHOICES
The vision that has been presented—one of increased global turbulence and per-
haps prolonged and indecisive missile raids, commerce warfare, and slow-motion 
escalation—is not very encouraging, but it would seem to follow from the loss 
of the strategic airfield-at-sea function and the logic of distributed naval missile 
warfare� The thought experiment we have just conducted examines the edges of 
the envelope and does not presume to be predictive� Nonetheless, in a scenario 
like the one at which we have looked in which capital ships become obsolete, 
what options does the United States have?
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Go “All In” to Keep the Capital-Ship Function Viable. To maintain the capital-ship 
function, the United States would invest as necessary to keep the CVN viable as 
a floating airfield� Directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency obscurants, better 
electronic warfare, and a host of other things might add up to an acceptable level 
of protection� Additionally, improvements to tactical aircraft survivability or a 
shift to unmanned aviation would be required� However, all will be an expensive 
proposition, even if it works, and could well curtail other programs and so mean 
a significantly smaller fleet� That might in turn require the Navy to change its 
forward-presence strategy, perhaps to something approaching a “surge” posture�
Create a “Bimodal” Fleet. Embedded in the development of the 2007 national 
maritime strategy was a bimodal fleet concept created by Captain Wayne Hughes, 
U�S� Navy (Ret�), of the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California�27 In 
his vision the Navy, acknowledging the increasing threat to carriers, creates re-
gional flotillas that conduct routine “presence” cruises and in war attempt to create 
safe operating space in the littoral into which the carriers can subsequently move� 
The carriers themselves, while they might still conduct peacetime presence and 
low-threat operations, in the event of war would seek refuge in the open ocean, 
perhaps providing distant support for regional flotillas, until enemy A2/AD 
capabilities had been sufficiently neutralized� The Navy might well have to reduce 
the number of carriers to afford this option, taking them off center stage as the 
key presence platform�
Preemptive Transformation. Here the Navy would either mothball its carriers or 
maintain only a few as support vessels, as was done with the Iowa-class battle-
ships� Its key striking power would reside in large numbers of missiles housed 
in a wide variety of numerous platforms� The Navy would compensate for the 
loss of the airfield-at-sea function as best it could with unmanned systems and 
long-range land-based aircraft� Depending on budgets, the Navy might be able to 
support a larger fleet (in fact, that would be a necessary element of this option) 
and thus in some ways enhance its forward-presence posture� The risk would be 
that without mobile tactical airpower from the sea, that presence might not be as 
effective�
Debates on the future of the aircraft carrier tend to focus on technical and tacti-
cal issues and thereby to beg a number of important strategic questions� This 
article has attempted to connect some strategic dots: the capital-ship function, 
command of the sea, the littoral, and the world order� Doing so illuminates the 
true relevance of the aircraft carrier, creating a basis for devising and judging 
options in case the carrier becomes obsolescent� One set of options has been 
presented, but many more perspectives are possible� While carrier obsolescence 
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is not a foregone conclusion, it is clear that the geopolitical competitors of the 
United States are seeking ways to nullify the American capability to influence and 
intervene that the carrier confers� Understanding the linkages helps us refine and 
enhance the debate about what to do�
We cannot simply wish away the problem of potential obsolescence or argue 
by assertion� If emergent antiaccess/area-denial technology does not do the trick, 
escalating construction costs coupled with shrinking defense budgets might� We 
have to recognize that the aircraft carrier is not just another warship or defense 
program� It is the current capital ship and as such has an intimate relationship 
with the modern geopolitical terrain—we might even consider the CVN a geopo-
litical terrain feature in itself� It is intimately connected also with the world order 
that the United States has expended so much blood, effort, and taxpayer money 
to create and that has been so congenial to American values and interests� The 
various sides in the current debate, both “pro-carrier” and “con,” should take this 
factor into account�
N O T E S 
 1� Announcement quoted in “Fox News Poli-
tics,” 31 July 2013, www�foxnews�com/�
 2� In this article, “distributed” denotes the divi-
sion of offensive power among a number of 
ships, whereas “dispersed” refers to physi-
cal separation of ships� Tactical dispersion 
involves either spreading out a mutually 
supporting formation over a large area or 
abandoning mutual support to enhance ma-
neuver and the covertness of individual ves-
sels� Dispersion at the strategic level involves 
splitting the fleet into a number of smaller 
formations that can be dispatched to different 
areas of the world�
 3� Articles that address this issue include Cdr� 
Phillip E� Pournelle, USN, “The Rise of the 
Missile Carriers,” U�S� Naval Institute Proceed-
ings (May 2013), and Capt� Henry J� Hendrix, 
USN, At What Cost a Carrier?, Disruptive De-
fense Papers (Washington, D�C�: Center for a 
New American Security, 11 March 2013)� See 
also George Friedman and Meredith Fried-
man, The Future of War: Power, Technology 
and American Dominance in the 21st Century 
(New York: St� Martin’s / Griffin, 1998)� The 
Friedmans develop the concept of weapon 
system “senility,” in which the cost of system 
defense becomes higher than the value of the 
system’s offensive mission capability (see esp� 
chap� 8, “The Aircraft Carrier as Midwife,” pp� 
180–94)�
 4� See Robert C� Rubel, “Command of the Sea: 
An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form,” 
Naval War College Review 65 no� 4 (Autumn 
2012), pp� 21–33�
 5� See, for example, Capt� R� B� Watts, “The End 
of Sea Power,” U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings 
135/9/1279 (September 2009), pp� 40–44�
 6� George Modelski and William Thompson, 
Seapower in Global Politics 1494–1993 (Se-
attle: Univ� of Washington Press, 1988), pp� 
16–17�
 7� Samuel P� Huntington, “National Policy and 
the Transoceanic Navy,” U�S� Naval Institute 
Proceedings 80, no� 5 (May 1954), pp� 490–91�
 8� For an entertaining look at Soviet naval avia-
tion and its approach to anticarrier warfare, 
see Maksim Y� Tokarev, “Kamikazes: The 
Soviet Legacy,” Naval War College Review 67, 
no� 1 (Winter 2014), pp� 61–84�
 9� See Lyle J� Goldstein and Yuri M� Zhukov, 
“A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective 
on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the Mediter-
ranean,” Naval War College Review 57, no� 2 
(Spring 2004), pp� 27–63� 
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   60 8/13/15   3:06 PM
65
Naval War College: Autumn 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 RU B E L  6 1
 10� This is the author’s synthesis of the literature�
 11� See Robert C� Rubel, “The Future of Aircraft 
Carriers,” Naval War College Review 64, no� 4 
(Autumn 2011), pp� 13–27� Aircraft carriers 
have performed a number of different roles 
and functions, that of an airfield at sea being 
one of them� Such a role is very different from 
that of a raider or of a traditional fleet-versus-
fleet “capital ship,” the part they played in 
the six carrier battles of World War II in the 
Pacific� Functioning as an airfield at sea, the 
carrier supports a land fight with continuous 
sorties and must accordingly stay within a 
relatively constrained area, where it can toler-
ate very little threat�
 12� Rear Adm� Yedidia Ya’ari, Israel Navy, “The 
Littoral Arena,” Naval War College Review 
48, no� 2 (Spring 1995), pp� 7–21; repr� Naval 
War College Review 67, no� 3 (Summer 
2014), quotes on pp� 82, 87 (repr�) [emphasis 
original]�
 13� Author’s estimate, arrived at by adding openly 
available unit-cost information for the F-35C, 
F-18E/F/G, E-2D, and H-60� 
 14� There has been a debate since at least the 
1970s on the relative merits of small and 
large aircraft carriers� Despite arguments by a 
number of different writers and analysts, the 
Navy has remained committed to the large 
nuclear carrier� It is beyond the scope of this 
article to incorporate the permutations that 
would have to be considered if a fleet of small 
carriers (perhaps of a vertical/short-takeoff-
and-landing design) either replaced or 
augmented the current CVN fleet� However, 
for a taste of the debate, see Mark A� Randol 
and Wallace J� Thies, “The Opportunity Costs 
of Large-Deck Carriers: Naval Strategy for the 
1990s and Beyond,” Naval War College Review 
43, no� 3 (Summer 1990), pp� 9–31� 
 15� Robert G� Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight: 
The U�S� Navy and Dispersed Operations un-
der EMCON, 1956–1972,” Naval War College 
Review 64, no� 2 (Spring 2011), pp� 79–95� 
 16� Adm� Sandy Woodward, with Patrick Robin-
son, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the 
Falklands Battle Group Commander (Annapo-
lis, Md�: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p� 5�
 17� Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and 
Practice (Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute 
Press, 1986), p� 25� To be clear, tactical offense 
is the actual use of a weapon against a ship� 
Tactical defense is the attempt to destroy or 
somehow evade the weapon� Tactical offense 
could be a method used in conjunction with 
operational-level defense�
 18� At Midway, code breaking allowed U�S� forces 
to predict where the Japanese carriers would 
show up on the morning of 4 June 1942� This 
warning resulted in tactical sightings and a 
first strike by the American task force that 
disabled three of the four Japanese carriers� 
The remaining Japanese carrier, Hiryu, was 
able to launch a strike before being sunk; this 
strike succeeded in disabling the U�S� carrier 
Yorktown, which eventually fell prey to a Japa-
nese submarine� It was the ability to achieve 
an effective first strike that determined the 
outcome of the battle�
 19� Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight,” pp� 83–84�
 20� See Robert C� Rubel, “Deconstructing 
Nimitz’s Principle of Calculated Risk,” Naval 
War College Review 68, no� 1 (Winter 2015), 
pp� 31–45�
 21� See Robert C� Rubel, “Talking about Sea 
Control,” Naval War College Review 63, no� 4 
(Autumn 2010), pp� 38–47�
 22� “Close” is a variable term, depending on wind 
conditions, the range and load of aircraft, 
required response times, and a host of other 
factors� However, as a general rule of thumb, 
“close” would be something between fifty and 
a hundred miles from the beach�
 23� Stephen M� Carmel, “Globalization, Security, 
and Economic Wellbeing” (address to the 
20th International Seapower Symposium, 
Naval War College, Newport, R�I�, 19 October 
2011), available at www�maersklinelimited 
�com/� An adapted text appeared, under the 
same title, in Naval War College Review 66, 
no� 1 (Winter 2013), pp� 41–55� 
 24� Robert C� Rubel, Navies and Economic 
Prosperity, Corbett Centre Paper 11 (London: 
King’s College London, October 2012), avail-
able at www�kcl�ac�uk/�
 25� See Robert C� Rubel, “The Forms of Warfare: 
Integrating Ethos and Warfighting,” in Writ-
ing to Think: The Intellectual Journey of a 
Naval Career, Newport Paper 41 (Newport, 
R�I�: Naval War College Press, 2014)�
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   61 8/13/15   3:06 PM
66
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
 6 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 26� Bud Hay and Bob Gile, Global War Game: 
The First Five Years, Newport Paper 4 (New-
port, R�I�: Naval War College Press, 1993), pp� 
17–18�
 27� Capt� Wayne P� Hughes, Jr�, USN (Ret�), “A 
Bimodal Force for the National Maritime 
Strategy,” Naval War College Review 60, no� 2 
(Spring 2007), pp� 29–47� The 2007 strategy is 
J� T� Conway, G� Roughead, and T� W� Allen, 
“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower,” 17 October 2007, available at 
www�navy�mil/; repr� Naval War College 
Review 61, no� 1 (Winter 2008), pp� 7–19�
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   62 8/13/15   3:06 PM
67
Naval War College: Autumn 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   63 8/13/15   3:06 PM
68
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
Andrew Scobell is a senior political scientist at the 
RAND Corporation and adjunct professor at the Ed-
mund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at George-
town University. He earned a doctorate in political 
science from Columbia University. He is the author 
of China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great 
Wall and the Long March (2003) and China’s Search 
for Security (2012) with Andrew J. Nathan, as well 
as monographs, reports, journal articles, and book 
chapters. 
Michael McMahon is a senior researcher in the Ac-
quisition, Technology, and Policy Center at RAND’s 
National Defense Research Institute. Dr. McMahon 
retired from the U.S. Navy in 2011 as a rear admi-
ral, having served as Program Executive Officer for 
Aircraft Carriers and previously as the Supervisor of 
Shipbuilding for the Navy in Newport News oversee-
ing nuclear carrier and submarine construction and 
refueling. 
Cortez A. Cooper III is a senior international policy 
analyst at the RAND Corporation. Prior to joining 
RAND, Cooper was the director of the East Asia 
Studies Center for Hicks and Associates, Inc. He has 
also served in the U.S. Navy Executive Service as the 
senior analyst for the Joint Intelligence Center Pa-
cific, U.S. Pacific Command. His twenty years’ ser-
vice in the U.S. Army included experience as a China 
Foreign Area Officer. 
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2015, Vol. 68, No. 4
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   64 8/13/15   3:06 PM
69
Naval War College: Autumn 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 One of the most eye-catching episodes in China’s defense buildup was the 25 September 2012 commissioning of Beijing’s first aircraft carrier� The sixty-
five-thousand-ton Liaoning was launched with much fanfare, presided over by 
the president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), then Hu Jintao, as well as 
by the vice president and Hu’s political successor, Xi Jinping� The commissioning 
of Liaoning underscored both the remarkable advances in the PRC’s shipbuild-
ing in recent decades and the significant limitations that remain� The vessel 
immediately became the largest in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)� 
Originally launched in 1988 for the Soviet navy, the carrier, at that point known 
as Varyag and lying incomplete in a Ukrainian yard, had been purchased by a 
Chinese shell company in 1998 and towed to China three years later� The vessel 
was fully refurbished in a Chinese shipyard, and an extensive array of systems was 
installed� Liaoning is considered a medium-sized carrier that can accommodate 
a combination of approximately thirty-six fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, 
with a crew of at least one thousand�
One Chinese security analyst proclaimed the eventual relaunch was on a par in 
“strategic significance” (zhanlue yiyi) with China’s earlier acquisition of the “two 
bombs [nuclear and hydrogen] and one satellite” (liang dan, yi xing), in the sense 
that the commissioning of Liaoning signaled China’s entry into an exclusive club 
of great powers� But other naval analysts sought to downplay the event� Retired 
PLAN admiral Yin Zhuo stressed that the commissioning of the Liaoning was 
only a first step: China, he observed, was very much a “rookie” (xinshou) at op-
erating this highly “complex technical system,” while “other countries” (i�e�, the 
United States) had more than a century of experience�1 No matter how modest 
the beginnings, however, there are strong indications that China has ambitious 
Drivers, Developments, Implications 
Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. Cooper III 
CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM
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plans: Liaoning is likely to be the first of as many as five carriers that the PLAN 
intends to put into service in the coming years� 
Some observers discern the emergence of a naval arms race in the Asia- 
Pacific�2 But however military trends in the region are best characterized, it is 
clear that countries such as China and India are energetically expanding their 
navies� Without a doubt, carrier expansion in the early twenty-first century 
will be concentrated in Asia� Beijing and New Delhi each appear committed to 
commissioning multiple aircraft carriers in the near future� In addition to China 
and India, Japan commissioned a helicopter-carrying destroyer capable of being 
reconfigured to handle short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing aircraft� No decision, 
by Beijing or any other capital, to pursue such an involved program can be taken 
lightly, because it requires a massive commitment of resources and extended time 
horizons� An aircraft carrier is an expensive and complex system of systems� Car-
rier programs require sustained effort, substantial funding streams, and consid-
erable technical and professional competence� Carriers are a luxury few countries 
can afford� Even fewer countries have the shipyards, engineering expertise, and 
associated infrastructure to build these vessels� 
It is ironic that the country that has done more than any other to move aircraft 
carriers closer to obsolescence through advances in military technology has in-
vested in its own aircraft carrier program� The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
for example, has acquired highly accurate antiship ballistic missiles—“carrier 
killers�” What is driving China’s carrier ambitions, and what is the likely future 
trajectory of its carrier program? What new operational capabilities does a carrier 
provide the PLAN? How does the arrival of China’s carrier affect the security situ-
ation in the Asia-Pacific? What are the implications of Chinese aircraft carriers 
for the United States?
We examine first the drivers, the operational capabilities, and then we con-
sider the future trajectory of China’s carrier program� Last, we evaluate the impli-
cations of the carrier program for the balance of maritime power in the western 
Pacific and beyond�
DRIVERS OVER THE DECADES
China’s entry into the exclusive aircraft-carrier club played out over several de-
cades in a slow-motion series of low-key and secretive developments, in a pattern 
that prompts a range of competing explanations about the drivers of the initiative�
The earliest explanation posited for driving China’s maritime ambitions was 
that of bureaucratic interests� These interests were initially identified with the 
South China Sea and have been advanced collectively as the key driver for the 
PRC’s aircraft carrier program�3 The emergence of an actual program suggested 
the growing influence of the PLAN in the armed forces� The navy’s second-rate 
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status within the PLA was and is changing. Since 2004, for example, the com-
mander of Beijing’s navy has had a seat on the Central Military Commission 
(CMC)—the apex of military power in the PRC, a body roughly equivalent to 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, and while the maritime service has 
enjoyed an unprecedented rate of modernization in recent decades, the dominant 
service in the PLA continues to be the ground force.4 Moreover, as will be seen, 
the program’s key champion appears to have been an individual rather than a 
bureaucracy. 
A second explanation is that the PRC’s carrier program is driven primarily by 
nationalism.5 Clearly China’s carrier program has strong public support; there is 
considerable pride in the country’s first aircraft carrier. A wave of aircraft carrier 
euphoria—or a “Hangmu style” craze—swept the country as people imitated the 
pose of two flight-deck crewmen shown in a publicity photo guiding a J-15 fight-
er as it made a historic shipboard landing on Liaoning in November 2012. Most 
Chinese would agree with Major General Zhang Shiping’s insistence that “for 
China to become a major world power without an aircraft carrier is completely 
unthinkable.” The general, an Academy of Military Sciences researcher, insisted 
that “acquiring a carrier was an historical necessity” for China.6 
Possession of multiple carriers epitomizes the overwhelming naval dominance 
of the United States, and their lack emphasizes the continued weakness of China’s 
navy. One of the most jarring moments for China in post–Cold War East Asia 
occurred when in early 1996 the United States dispatched two aircraft-carrier 
strike groups in response to Chinese saber rattling in the Taiwan Strait. For Bei-
jing, the act harked back to the nineteenth century, when China had been bullied 
first by Western powers and then by Japan and forced to sign “unequal treaties” 
trampling on national sovereignty and to concede territory. For the Chinese, U.S. 
aircraft carrier dominance represents a latter-day variant of gunboat diplomacy 
and underscores that China, despite greatly increased military might, continues 
to be inferior, impotent in the face of overwhelming U.S. naval power.
A third possible driver of China’s carrier program is an evolving overarching 
strategic logic or coherent maritime strategy.7 According to this interpretation, 
the PRC is pursuing a grand strategic vision—widely attributed to Admiral Liu 
Huaqing (1916–2011) and first set out in the early 1980s—by which the PLAN 
would gradually extend its reach outward into the Pacific Ocean in a phased ex-
pansion of Chinese seapower. In the first phase, by 2000, the PLAN was to extend 
its area of operations in the “near seas” (the South China Sea, East China Sea, 
and Yellow Sea) out as far as the so-called First Island Chain—the Kuril Islands, 
Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, and Natuna Besar. In the 
second phase, by 2020, the PLAN aimed to project its operational reach out to 
the so-called Second Island Chain—the Bonins, the Marianas, and the Carolines. 
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In the third phase, by 2050, China would become a global seapower, and its navy 
would hence operate on a par with the U�S� Navy� In fact, the PLAN’s activities 
and power-projection efforts have so far kept pace with this timeline� 
This road map for the development of China’s seapower grew in significance 
as China’s economy underwent rapid growth and its seaborne trade experienced 
major expansion during the 1980s and 1990s� China’s maritime strategy gained 
greater traction in the twenty-first century as the PRC perceived itself as being 
under growing threat from the United States� Particularly since the terrorist at-
tacks of 11 September 2001, Beijing has viewed Washington’s behavior around 
its periphery as aimed at containing or encircling the PRC�8 From the Chinese 
perspective, the United States has become increasingly assertive in the near seas, 
especially in the South China Sea�
We suggest that an evolving overarching strategic logic has propelled the 
PRC’s carrier program inexorably forward� This analysis of the historical record 
suggests that while nationalism was certainly an important contextual factor 
and lobbying by PLAN leaders was significant in keeping the idea of a carrier 
program alive, ultimately the decisive driver was strategic logic and operational 
importance� Indeed, the program’s lengthy gestation and its repeated failure early 
on to gain traction are attributable to the absence of a strategic imperative until 
quite recently� The emergence of this strategic imperative and the operational 
demands for a carrier in the twenty-first century correspond to the emergence of 
PLA and PLAN thinking and planning beyond a Taiwan scenario�9 
GENESIS OF CHINA’S CARRIER PROGRAM
China’s carrier program has evolved remarkably over five decades� In the span of 
forty years the program was transformed from one man’s elusive dream in 1970 
to the acquisition and refurbishment of a Soviet-era carrier to the actual commis-
sioning of an aircraft carrier in 2012� 
The 1970s: One Man’s Dream
China’s aircraft carrier program languished for many years, for lack of a strategic 
imperative� But the idea of an aircraft carrier never died completely, because 
of the persistence of a key PLAN leader, Liu Huaqing, who gradually rose to 
the highest post in the military hierarchy, assuming the vice-chairmanship of 
the CMC in 1989� The origins of the PLAN’s aircraft carrier program are inti-
mately intertwined with the career of this prominent military figure� Justifiably 
considered the most important and certainly the most dogged champion of the 
program, Liu is often dubbed the “father of China’s aircraft carrier,” as well as 
“China’s Mahan�”10 Irrespective of these labels, Liu certainly qualifies as the most 
influential military figure in post–Mao Zedong, reform-era China� Significantly, 
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Liu was the last uniformed member of the all-powerful Chinese Communist 
Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, a seat he relinquished in 1997.
According to his memoirs, as early as 1970 Liu floated to his military superi-
ors a proposal that China begin preparations to acquire an aircraft carrier. His 
suggestion does not appear to have received any support within the PLA hierar-
chy.11 This is hardly surprising, since the PRC had nothing remotely resembling 
a blue-water navy in the 1970s; its main threat at the time was overland inva-
sion or attack by the Soviet army, an attack that could come anywhere along the 
several-thousand-mile and very exposed common land border. Neither does the 
most logical maritime scenario—an attack on or invasion of Taiwan—appear to 
have received any serious attention at the time. Thus, there was no compelling 
strategic or operational rationale for the development of a PLAN carrier program 
in the 1970s, and nationalism did not even come into play.
The 1980s: A Vision
In the decade following Mao Zedong’s death, the idea of an aircraft carrier 
seemed a more plausible, if still remote, possibility. While the PRC’s primary 
military threat remained land-centric—the Soviet army—the “reform and open-
ing” policy of Deng Xiaoping significantly altered its national security calculus 
and defense priorities. As the PRC embraced foreign investment and expanded 
international trade, Beijing began to attach much greater weight to maritime 
matters. PRC leaders had to be concerned not only with the security of their land 
borders but also with coastal waters and beyond—that is, both the “near shore” 
or littoral (jinan) and the “near seas” (jinhai).12 Moreover, territorial claims in the 
South China Sea and the unresolved matter of Taiwan provided added impetus 
for modernizing the PLAN. In the mid-1980s, the PLA shifted its preparations 
from imminent all-out global conflagration likely involving nuclear and conven-
tional conflict between China and one of the superpowers to limited, localized, 
conventional war-fighting scenarios.
The geostrategic reorientation and doctrinal transformation produced a new 
strategic logic that was more conducive to the idea of aircraft carriers. Liu recalls 
in his memoirs that in November 1986 he chaired a seminar comprising military 
and civilian leaders and experts: “Many comrades expressed the view that from 
the standpoint of our strategic mission of safeguarding the country’s maritime 
interests, including the recovery of the Nansha [Islands], and the reunification of 
Taiwan, the navy should develop aircraft carriers. My own thinking was consis-
tent with this view.”13 
The purchase in 1985 of the decommissioned Australian navy carrier Mel-
bourne by a PRC company, ostensibly for scrap, signaled Beijing’s growing 
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interest in a carrier program� The vessel was reportedly scrutinized by Chinese 
engineers and naval architects, and the flight deck was kept intact when the rest 
of the ship was scrapped� In 1982, upon being promoted to commander of the 
PLAN, Liu commissioned a research institute in Shanghai to conduct a study on 
the feasibility of carriers� Three years later Liu directed the Guangzhou Naval 
Academy to initiate a training course for aircraft carrier commanders�14 
1990s: A Serious Debate
By the mid-1990s, maritime challenges had moved to the front and center of 
Beijing’s national security concerns� The Soviet breakup had created three new 
neighbors in Central Asia, but Beijing moved swiftly and deftly to recognize these 
states, resolve territorial disputes, and demilitarize border areas� It could then 
focus greater attention on the security of coastal regions and on unresolved mari-
time territorial disputes� The increasing importance of the near seas and China’s 
growing dependence on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) radiating out 
beyond the First Island Chain were highlighted by tensions in the South China 
Sea (in 1995), a crisis in the Taiwan Strait (1995–96), and by China’s becoming 
(in 1993) a net importer of petroleum, most of it by sea from the Middle East 
and Africa� 
Within a three-year span, Chinese entities bought three Soviet-era aircraft 
carriers: Minsk and Varyag (both in 1998) and Kiev (in May 2000)� These buys 
represented a sizable expenditure—reportedly totaling some U�S�$33�4 million 
—and thus a degree of high-level coordination� Moreover, the circumstances 
surrounding these purchases were suspicious, in terms of their announced pur-
poses� For example, the buyer of Varyag, the Chong Lot Tourist and Amusement 
Agency, reportedly had several retired PLAN officers on its board of directors� 
The supposed intent of the company was to turn Varyag into a floating casino 
in the gambling mecca of Macau, but the waters around the former Portuguese 
colony are too shallow to accommodate the vessel, and no application for a gam-
bling permit appears to have been filed� When in early 2002 Varyag arrived in 
China, it docked well away from Macau, in the northern port of Dalian� 
This flurry of activity suggests that Beijing was engaged in a major debate 
about the viability of acquiring an aircraft carrier� The option being most seri-
ously considered was to complete a carrier indigenously on one of the hulls 
purchased overseas, rather than buying a completely fitted, foreign-made carrier� 
During the mid-1990s Chinese entities reportedly made a considerable effort to 
acquire blueprints for an aircraft carrier from a Spanish shipbuilder that was con-
structing one for the Royal Thai Navy, showing far less interest in placing such an 
order themselves�15 By the end of the decade, CMC chair Jiang Zemin had report-
edly given the PLAN the green light to commence work on designing a carrier�16 
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2000s: A Decision Is Made
With the dawn of a new century, the maritime domain loomed ever larger for 
Beijing in strategic significance. The result, according to an authoritative over-
view of PLAN history, was a “paradigmatic change” (zhuanxing) in naval think-
ing from the near seas to the “far seas” (yuanhai).17 PRC aircraft and surface and 
subsurface vessels routinely found themselves operating in the same vicinity as 
U.S. platforms, often at very close quarters. These encounters prompted a grow-
ing number of incidents. Of particular note was an April 2001 episode in which 
a PLAN J-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft some 
seventy-five nautical miles south of Hainan Island. To Beijing, the event signaled 
a growing, perceived threat of U.S. strategic encirclement and the emergence of 
the near seas as a hot zone of U.S.-Chinese contestation.
The decision to go ahead with the construction of an aircraft carrier was re-
portedly made by the CMC in 2004 or 2005;18 the decision was almost certainly 
made in conjunction with CMC chairman Hu Jintao’s December 2004 announce-
ment of revised military strategic guidelines (junshi zhanlue fangzhen) for the 
PLA. These guidelines function as a “rolling national military strategy” that 
provides the key guidance and direction for planning and force development.19 
Addressing the CMC on 24 December 2004, Hu outlined what became known 
as the “New Historic Missions,” representing an important modification of stra-
tegic guidelines issued in 1993. Two of the broad-brush missions he sketched for 
the PLA were protecting China’s “national interests” and safeguarding “world 
peace.”20 The former mission has since been defined ever more expansively to 
include China’s maritime territorial claims inside the First Island Chain and its 
“overseas interests” well beyond. The latter mission provides the rationale for 
a greater global role for the PLAN in a broad spectrum of activities, including 
patrolling the SLOCs and contributing to international humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief.21 Reportedly, Hu subsequently endorsed the concept of “far 
sea operations” (yuanhai zuozhan). Together these developments put in place the 
strategic and doctrinal logic for naval force modernization in general and for, by 
extension, the acquisition of several aircraft carriers. 
Extensive work was under way throughout the middle of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century in a Dalian shipyard to complete Varyag as an operational 
aircraft carrier. But no official public statement was forthcoming; the PRC was 
equipping a major naval surface combatant but keeping mum about the matter. 
Noteworthy was the absence of any mention of the PLAN’s carrier project in 
China’s defense white papers of 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. However, in 2006 
and 2007 several senior military officials did publicly comment that the PRC 
had decided to develop an aircraft carrier program, with the goal of indigenously 
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building them. Finally, in March 2009, the PRC minister of national defense, 
General Liang Guanglie, declared that the PLAN was preparing to build its own 
aircraft carriers.22 
2010s: Commissioning a Carrier 
In the second decade of the century tensions emerged with the United States and 
China’s neighbors in the near seas that seemed only to underscore the growing 
importance of seapower to the PRC. In 2010 China accused the United States of 
meddling in the South China Sea and then heatedly protested a planned U.S.–
South Korean joint military exercise scheduled for the Yellow Sea. Tensions also 
rose in the East China Sea over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Beijing 
claims a two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone in all these areas and insists 
that other countries cannot operate military vessels or aircraft there without 
its prior approval. In November 2013, China announced the creation of an air-
defense identification zone in the East China Sea. China also, looking beyond 
its immediate maritime vicinity to the Indian Ocean, took note of developments 
in India’s aircraft carrier program. In 2009 New Delhi had laid the keel of INS 
Vikrant and proceeded with indigenous construction of carriers capable, like 
Varyag, of operating high-performance tactical aircraft using a short-takeoff-but-
arrested-recovery (STOBAR) design.
The evolution of a strategic logic became more apparent: an aircraft carrier 
was needed to cope with the PRC’s expanding array of maritime interests. It was 
against this backdrop that Varyag underwent its first sea trial in August 2011. The 
vessel cruised the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea for four days before returning to 
port. Further sea trials followed. In late September 2012 ex-Varyag was officially 
commissioned as Liaoning. The ship was ceremonially christened by Hu Jintao 
barely two months before he stepped down as chair of the CMC. As a result, Hu 
will go down in history as the leader responsible for China’s first operational air-
craft carrier, even though experts contend that the carrier will not become fully 
employable for several more years. 
THE TRAJECTORY: A HYBRID NAVY
In the interim, the next three to five years, Liaoning will primarily serve as a train-
ing platform, operating mostly within the First and Second Island Chains. Most 
PLAN ships have three-digit Arabic hull numbers; Liaoning’s two-digit number, 
16, indicates its official rating as a training vessel. 
While China now has a carrier with a sea-based tactical aviation capability, 
time will be needed for its air wing to become operationally competent and for 
the ship itself to conduct proficiency training with destroyers, frigates, and sub-
marines (as Liaoning did in December 2013 for the first time, in the South China 
6844_Scobell,McMahon&Cooper.indd   72 8/18/15   1:43 PM
77
Naval War College: Autumn 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 S C O B E L L ,  M C M A H O N ,  &  C O O P E R  7 3
Sea). Perhaps the most useful benchmark for the operational readiness of Liao­
ning is the level of training, equipment, and organization of its aviation compo-
nent. Properly configuring Liaoning for carrier-group operations will take time, 
but establishing the naval aviation component—fully functioning squadrons of 
carrier-based aircraft—is likely to take much longer. Since its commissioning, 
most of Liaoning’s at-sea time has been devoted to certification of shipboard 
air-operations systems and to initial pilot training, using experienced pilots and 
test aircraft. But China will not achieve a true aircraft-carrier capability until the 
two elements—an organized and trained air component and a fully tested, fleet-
configured carrier—have been coupled. The passing of various signposts may 
be evident on this path as they occur, one being the establishment of a tactical 
aviation air wing. Incorporation of fully trained and organized, mission-capable, 
fleet tactical air wings is not likely until 2018 or later. 
Furthermore, to gauge the timeline for the commissioning of China’s second 
carrier—expected to be indigenously designed and built—it makes sense to mon-
itor the development of air component training and organization and also full 
production of the J-15 aircraft, and perhaps as well the development of the J-31, 
potentially China’s future, fifth-generation, sea-based tactical aircraft. Of course, 
these timelines will run concurrently with the design of any indigenous aircraft 
carrier. The challenge of balancing these two processes may explain the seeming 
deliberateness of the PLAN’s pace in designing and commencing construction of 
its next aircraft carrier.
Moreover, additional aircraft carriers, almost certainly in the cards, will prob-
ably come online gradually, over the course of the next two decades. The longer 
a new, indigenously designed carrier is delayed, the more likely the design will 
be to adopt a large-deck format and increased capabilities. Such a platform could 
accommodate fifth-generation aircraft and incorporate leading technology, elec-
tronics, and design features. Also, the most modern computer-assisted-design 
tools, construction practices, and facilities that China’s shipbuilding industry has 
to offer would be available for the project. The large scope of the design work in-
volved in the conversion (i.e., from the original Soviet “aircraft-carrying cruiser” 
configuration) of Liaoning at the Dalian shipyard is likely to provide a “walking 
start” for a more modern carrier.
The PLAN does not appear to be building a future force that has aircraft car-
riers at its core. Such a goal would require a complete order-of-battle overhaul. 
There may have been a Chinese realization that the role of carrier-based aviation 
would be limited in any potential large-scale conflict with the United States. 
Instead, current doctrine and naval modernization suggest that while the PLAN 
is aiming for at least three additional carriers, they would be focused on power 
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projection—inside the island chains but also in the Indian Ocean, as well as 
distant areas where overseas interests in resources are strong, such as Africa and 
Latin America�23 Nevertheless, as Yin Zhuo observes, the introduction, for what-
ever purpose, of carriers demands a major change in PLAN thinking and requires 
in the near term a modified “grouping format” of escort vessels with Liaoning at 
the center�24 In short, China’s navy appears to have adopted a hybrid approach 
encompassing both carrier and surface-action groups for mission-specific opera-
tions and the projection of influence�
In addition, such an approach comports with political and fiscal realities� Air-
craft carriers are extremely expensive� Whether the hull is acquired from abroad 
or built indigenously does not necessarily make much difference in overall 
cost; both options are expensive, and follow-on carriers may not be appreciably 
cheaper if they are of different designs or possess different subsystems� Moreover, 
while the PLAN has increased its power and influence vis-à-vis the other ser-
vices in the past decade or so, the ground force remains, as noted, the dominant 
service and enjoys the preponderance of political clout� The navy must compete 
with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which has greater representation 
on the CMC—an unprecedented two seats are held by air force generals�25 While 
the defense budget has been growing in double digits annually, overall military 
spending is carefully monitored, and continued increases presume further eco-
nomic growth� In short, the size of the defense budget and constraints on funds 
allocated for PLAN acquisitions are limited�
The Operational Demands on Carriers 
China’s growing oceanic interests expand the operational demands on the PLAN, 
from defending disputed maritime claims to protecting China’s fishing and 
merchant fleets�26 The aircraft carrier can provide much-needed air protection 
for the surface ships and submarines operating several hundred miles out� The 
most obvious region for such operations would be in the southern portions of the 
South China Sea, some nine hundred miles from Hainan Island—well beyond the 
routine patrol range of PLAN land-based aircraft� Indeed, it is in this area that Liu 
Huaqing reportedly felt an aircraft carrier would prove its worth�27
The most pressing operational logic for aircraft carriers relates to the value 
they add in wartime� PLA analysts who studied the Royal Navy’s performance 
in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 concluded that aircraft carriers played a 
key role in the British victory over Argentina�28 Today, carriers offer the PLAN 
extended blue-water capability—to the Second Island Chain and beyond—and 
an improved capacity for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and airborne early warn-
ing (AEW)� The ASW and AEW missions require multiple carriers; however, 
even one fully capable aircraft carrier could represent the PLA’s first steps toward 
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extended air (i.e., offensive) and air-defense cover for regional contingencies and 
an incremental extension of the air-defense umbrella in tandem with advanced 
escort combatants. For the present, ASW and AEW vulnerabilities remain too 
great to allow Liaoning to be successfully employed in high-intensity maritime 
combat; its size and configuration preclude the launch of the larger aircraft that 
would perform these missions. In short, as we have seen, there are limitations to 
what Liaoning can do, especially with such limited operational experience. 
What difference would one or two aircraft carriers make in a contingency in-
side the First Island Chain? In a South China Sea clash, Liaoning would provide 
extra airpower projection against opposing combatants, especially in the south-
ernmost reaches of that body of water; it would also present adversaries with a 
“nice, big target.” One carrier or even two would offer little in an East China Sea 
battle. As for a Taiwan contingency, carrier air would not contribute much in the 
fight itself, although it might have utility as a diversion in more easily protected 
zones away from Taiwan and Japan. Moreover, the use of an aircraft carrier would 
severely complicate the PLA’s current doctrinal approach—missile-centric fire-
power strike and counterintervention operations, supported by advanced infor-
mation warfare. This would be especially true in a Taiwan contingency. 
The choice to retain the original, Soviet-era STOBAR design suggests that 
Liaoning’s missions will be more limited than those of U.S. aircraft carriers. A 
“ski jump” bow and the absence to date of catapults restrict the size and weight 
of an aircraft that can take off from the deck (and accordingly the payload and 
amount of fuel it can carry). Thus the onboard air wing will focus on air defense, 
protecting the carrier and escort vessels at sea. Finally, Liaoning is conventionally 
powered, which limits its range and necessitates regular refueling. 
Noncombat Operations
Additional demands are represented by the contributions an aircraft carrier will 
be expected to make to peacetime operations. Indeed, this noncombat dimension 
has received considerable attention in recent years in China. Moreover, the PLA 
neither has recent war-fighting experience nor anticipates significant combat 
operations in the near future. Thus Liaoning and any subsequent aircraft carri-
ers can expect considerable noncombat operational employment. Since at least 
2008 China’s armed forces have emphasized military operations other than war 
(MOOTW) as a doctrinal component. While MOOTW “with Chinese character-
istics” has a significant domestic dimension, this body of doctrine also includes 
substantial maritime and overseas elements, and the PLAN appears poised to 
play a central role in it. Its MOOTW missions could include “flat deck” (i.e., 
large air-capable ship) operations in support of SLOC protection, humanitarian 
assistance, and disaster relief. China became acutely aware of the usefulness of 
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aircraft carriers during the U�S� Navy’s response to the Southeast Asian tsunami 
in 2004� Furthermore, recent PLA experiences with noncombatant evacuations 
in such places as Libya have highlighted the value of air and naval assets� 
In peacetime, a carrier provides a high-profile presence wherever it steams� 
It can symbolize power and commitment without necessarily raising alarm� But 
the challenge for China in the not-too-distant future will be how to operate a 
carrier close to home without being perceived as threatening by its neighbors� A 
carrier is much more likely to be warmly welcomed outside the First and Second 
Island Chains than within them� If the challenges of the vast distances involved in 
far-seas operations can be met, a Chinese carrier off the coast of Africa or Latin 
America would be a strong symbol of national pride and could also serve as a 
goodwill ambassador, whether visiting ports or patrolling the global commons�
Program Prospects and Implications
China’s carrier program was powered to ultimate realization by an overarching 
strategic logic and still-evolving national maritime strategy� While nationalism 
and bureaucratic interests have played—and will continue to play—important 
roles in the trajectory of the program, the push for a Chinese carrier could neither 
have been sustained across many decades nor have ultimately triumphed without 
the impetus of a larger strategic rationale and the emergence of a coherent mari-
time strategy� The program’s lengthy gestation and repeated failure to gain trac-
tion are attributable to the absence of a strategic imperative before the end of the 
Cold War� This growing strategic logic and the emerging operational demands 
for a carrier in the twenty-first century correspond to an extension of PLA think-
ing beyond a Taiwan Strait scenario� When the PRC’s military was narrowly fo-
cused on operations against Taiwan, an aircraft carrier did not make much sense� 
But its operational value is more evident in other scenarios, including protection 
of the South China Sea and beyond the First Island Chain� Moreover, strategic 
and operational value increases as the PLAN expands its horizons beyond the 
First and Second Island Chains�
More than two years after its commissioning, Liaoning is far from fully opera-
tional� It is still without a fighter wing, although numerous practice takeoffs and 
landings have occurred� It functions essentially as a training vessel and has yet 
to venture outside the First Island Chain� Nevertheless, in China the carrier has 
captured the imagination of leaders and ordinary people who have come to view 
a PLAN aircraft carrier as the ultimate symbol of full-blown Chinese military 
power� A carrier signals China’s desire for global power projection—or at least 
extended offshore reach�
While the PLAN is still years away from being able to project and sustain sig-
nificant naval power—let alone in the form of an aircraft carrier—out of area (i�e�, 
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beyond the island chains), Beijing is intent on becoming able to play a greater role 
in patrolling SLOCs farther afield. Given China’s dependence on imported en-
ergy and the importance it attaches to energy security, a logical priority location 
for increased PLAN operational activity will be in the Indian Ocean. Although 
China has increased the number of overland routes for oil and gas (witness the 
construction of pipelines in recent years from Central Asia, Russia, and Myan-
mar), the PRC remains reliant on seaborne energy, especially petroleum from 
fields in Africa and the Middle East.
Liaoning is a visible symbol of China’s growing naval prowess wherever it 
steams and is useful in noncombat missions. But in an era of precision-guided 
munitions and enhanced over-the-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance, in 
wartime Liaoning becomes vulnerable, a sitting (or more accurately, floating) 
duck, especially in any conflict involving a highly capable adversary. 
China’s carrier program in and of itself, therefore, does not merit alarm by the 
Pentagon. It does not fundamentally transform the balance of military power 
in the western Pacific. One or two PLAN aircraft carriers will not be especially 
useful in the East China or South China Sea. Of course, carriers will extend the 
range of Chinese airpower, and their presence will further complicate an already 
complex maritime operating environment in the near seas. This prospect does 
signal both China’s unmistakable intent to project military power beyond the 
First Island Chain and its aspirations to become a global naval powerhouse. And 
yet by the time—decades hence—that China does possess multiple large aircraft 
carriers and has become adept at operating them, the carrier itself may have be-
come almost irrelevant in the conduct of naval warfare.29 
Perhaps the greatest impact for the U.S. military of one or more Chinese car-
riers will be more perceptual than operational.30 Indeed, the United States and 
other countries in the Asia-Pacific have yet to come fully to grips psychologically 
with the arrival of a new, increasingly capable, and active blue-water navy in the 
region.
N O T E S 
 1. Cited in Jiefangjunbao [Liberation Army 
Daily], 26 September 2012, p. 2.
 2. Geoffrey Till observes that Asia’s “navies are 
modernizing at an unprecedented extent” and 
suggests that the region may be experiencing 
a “slow motion” arms race. See his Asia’s Na-
val Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making? 
(London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2012), pp. 35, 241.
 3. John W. Garver, “China’s Push through 
the South China Sea: The Interaction of 
Bureaucratic and National Interests,” China 
Quarterly, no. 132 (December 1992); Ian 
Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier 
Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” 
Naval War College Review 57, no. 1 (Winter 
2004), pp. 77–93.
6844_Scobell,McMahon&Cooper.indd   77 8/18/15   1:44 PM
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
 7 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 4� See Andrew Scobell and Andrew J� Nathan, 
“China’s Overstretched Military,” Washington 
Quarterly 35, no� 4 (Fall 2012), pp� 135–48�
 5� For the clearest articulation of this interpre-
tation, see Robert S� Ross, “China’s Naval 
Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the 
U�S� Response,” International Security 34, no� 
2 (Fall 2009), pp� 46–81� According to Ross, 
Beijing’s national security needs do not justify 
carriers� Ross dismisses the possibility of a 
strategic rationale and appears to argue that 
all PRC aircraft-carrier proponents are rabid 
nationalists� See the critique by Michael A� 
Glosny and Phillip C� Saunders, “Correspon-
dence: Debating China’s Naval Nationalism,” 
International Security 35, no� 2 (Fall 2010), pp� 
161–69�
 6� Zhang Shiping, Zhongguo Haiquan [Chi - 
na’s Sea Power] (Beijing: Renmin Ribao  
Chubanshe, 2009), p� 2�
 7� Bernard D� Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: 
China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd 
ed� (Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute Press, 
2010); Andrew S� Erickson, Abraham N� Den-
mark, and Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter 
Carrier’ and Future Steps: Alternatives and 
Implications,” Naval War College Review 65, 
no� 1 (Winter 2012), pp� 15–54�
 8� See, for example, Andrew J� Nathan and 
Andrew Scobell, “How China Views America: 
The Sum of Beijing’s Fears,” Foreign Affairs 91, 
no� 5 (September/October 2012), pp� 32–47�
 9� Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew 
Scobell, eds�, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions 
Other than Taiwan (Carlisle Barracks, Pa�: 
U�S� Army War College Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2009)�
 10� See, for example, Bai Ma, “Zhanwang Zhong-
guo haijun de hangmu shidai” [The Prospects 
for China’s Navy in the Era of Aircraft Car-
riers], Jianchuanzhishi [Naval and Merchant 
Ships] (March 2011), p� 18�
 11� Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu [Mem - 
oirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Jiefangjun 
Chubanshe, 2004), p� 477� 
 12� Tang Fuquan and Han Yi, “Renmin haijun 
yanzhe dang zhiyin de chuanxiang polang 
qianjin” [People’s Navy Advances along the 
Course Set by (the) Party] Zhongguo Junshi 
Kexue [China Military Science], no� 4 (2009), 
pp� 13–14�
 13� Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu, p� 478�
 14� Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier 
Ambitions,” pp� 78–79�
 15� Ibid�, pp� 81–84�
 16� Cole, Great Wall at Sea, p� 88�
 17� Tang Fuquan and Han Yi, “People’s Navy Ad-
vances along the Course Set by [the] Party,”  
p� 14�
 18� Author interviews with civilian and military 
analysts in China indicate that a decision was 
made in this time frame� 
 19� David M� Finkelstein, “China’s National Mili-
tary Strategy: An Overview of the Military’s 
Strategic Guidelines,” in Right Sizing the PLA: 
Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed� 
Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Car-
lisle Barracks, Pa�: U�S� Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), pp� 69–140�
 20� The two others are protecting the “ruling 
position” of the Chinese Communist Party 
and guaranteeing “national development�” 
The text of Hu Jintao’s speech has not been 
made public but has been widely cited� For a 
concise overview, see Daniel Hartnett, “China 
Military and Security Activities Abroad,” 
Hearings before the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 111 Cong�, 1st 
sess�, 4 March 2009 (Washington, D�C�: U�S� 
Government Printing Office, April 2009), pp� 
45–55� See also Andrew Scobell, “Discourse 
in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa 
2009,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: As-
sessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s 
Military, ed� Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and 
Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, Pa�: U�S� 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 
2010), pp� 100–101�
 21� See, for example, Andrew Scobell and 
Gregory Stevenson, “The PLA (Re-)Discovers 
Nontraditional Security,” in Not Congruent 
but Quite Complementary: U.S. and Chinese 
Approaches to Nontraditional Security, ed� 
Lyle J� Goldstein, China Maritime Study 9 
(Newport, R�I�: Naval War College Press, July 
2012)�
 22� Cole, Great Wall at Sea, pp� 88–90� 
 23� “At least three carriers” is a RAND estimate� 
See also Richard D� Fisher, Jr�, “Dalian Of-
ficial Says Chinese Planning Four Aircraft 
Carriers,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 21 January 
2014�
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   78 8/13/15   3:06 PM
83
Naval War College: Autumn 2015 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 S C O B E L L ,  M C M A H O N ,  &  C O O P E R  7 9
 24. Cited in Jiefangjunbao, 26 September 2012,  
p. 2.
 25. See James Mulvenon, “The New Central Mili-
tary Commission,” China Leadership Monitor, 
no. 40 (January 2013), pp. 1–10. Gen. Xu 
Qiliang, one of two uniformed CMC vice-
chairs, and Gen. Ma Xiaotian, the air force 
commander, were selected at the Eighteenth 
Party Congress in November 2012.
 26. See, for example, Tang Fuquan and Han Yi, 
“People’s Navy Advances along the Course Set 
by [the] Party,” p. 14.
 27. Storey and You Ji, “China’s Aircraft Carrier 
Ambitions,” p. 86.
 28. Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the 
Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s 
Power Projection and Anti-access / Area 
Denial Lessons from the Falklands/Malvinas  
Conflict,” in Chinese Lessons from Other 
Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David 
Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, 
Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2011), pp. 88, 93.
 29. For this argument from a U.S. perspective, 
see, e.g., Robert C. Rubel, “The Future of 
Aircraft Carriers,” Naval War College Review 
64, no. 4 (Autumn 2011), pp. 13–27. 
 30. Many Chinese analysts have noted this vul-
nerability. In 2011, Adm. Robert Willard told 
the press that as commander of U.S. Pacific 
Command he was “not concerned” about 
the prospect of dealing with the operational 
challenges of China’s first aircraft carrier. 
Nevertheless, he observed that the psycho-
logical impact on the region of this develop-
ment would be “significant.” Viola Gienger 
and Tony Capaccio, “China’s Carrier Poses 
Mostly Symbolic Threat, U.S. Admiral Says,” 
Bloomberg News, 12 April 2011.
6844_Scobell,McMahon&Cooper.indd   79 8/18/15   1:45 PM
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
The Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) uses primary and secondary 
Chinese-language sources to produce original scholarly research that enables current and future 
leaders to understand better the complexities of contemporary China’s maritime rise. The below 
translation offers non–Chinese readers at least a sense of what can be gained by considering 
Chinese texts in the original. Zhang Wei’s article, originally published in the journal Frontiers 
(Xueshu Qianyan) in July 2012, is a historiographical survey of the critical Western and Chinese 
texts and thinkers who have shaped the concept of sea power in China. It gives insight into the 
richness of the Chinese discourse about sea power. Of particular note is the fact that as Chinese 
strategists engage in this discourse, they no longer question the utility of sea power; even the 
country’s most ardent land-power advocates recognize the strategic and economic importance 
of the sea. On the contrary, the primary question now concerns the form and character Chinese 
sea power should take. The CMSI hopes this translated article (in which the endnote citations 
are original) will inform and strengthen the debate in the West about this critical question. 
 At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, the American Alfred Thayer Mahan produced the three volumes of The Influ-
ence of Sea Power upon History and, later, Naval Strategy. At one time, sea-power 
theory was popular in Western countries. In particular, it became an important 
theory in support of America’s rise. China is a traditionally continental state. The 
recognition of sea power within academic and political circles has long wavered 
between contradiction, hesitation, dispute, and even rejection. However, with 
the deepening of China’s reform and opening 
up (gaige kaifang), the ocean’s strategic position 
has risen. It is inevitable that we reexamine, and 
extract things of value from, this theory that has 
had such tremendous impact on the rise and fall 
of great powers. 
Zhang Wei [张炜]
Translated by Shazeda Ahmed
Senior Captain Zhang Wei, of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) Navy, is a researcher at the prestigious 
PLA Naval Research Institute.
The translator is the research assistant at the Naval 
War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute.
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A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF  
CHINA’S SEA-POWER THEORY DEVELOPMENT
HISTORY’S CALL: THE RISE OF RESEARCH ON CONTEMPORARY 
CHINESE SEA POWER
After the First and Second Opium Wars, there arose in China a Self-Strengthening 
Movement centered on the military� At one point China prioritized the establish-
ment of a Beiyang Fleet� In 1885, while stationed in Germany, the Qing diplomat 
Li Fengbao translated New Ideas on Naval Warfare.* This was the first appearance 
of the concept of sea power in Chinese translation� In 1890, when Mahan’s first 
work on sea power was published, it was quickly translated into German, French, 
Russian, and Japanese, among other languages� Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Japa-
nese emperor valued and adopted this theory, which directly influenced the two 
countries’ naval development and their respective rises� But in 1900 the Japanese 
translation of “Theory of the Elements of Seapower” was published in Shanghai’s 
East Asia Times� This was the first time Chinese readers encountered Mahan’s 
classic theory of the “six elements” of sea power� It was, of course, associated 
with China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the navy’s decline� After the 
revolution of 1911 Sun Yat-sen discussed Chinese sea-power issues many times, 
but he was helpless in the face of the numerous great powers and China’s waning 
strength� All he could do was sadly lament the realities of sea power in East Asia� 
In the period following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the 
deep pain felt after a hundred years of imperialist invasion and the new wounds 
of ideological conflict obstructed the introduction of these Western theories� In 
1978, one of China’s most authoritative academic publications, Historical Re-
search, published Feng Chengbai and Li Yuanliang’s “Mahan’s Theory of Strength 
at Sea�” They argued that this theory “was a blueprint that established maritime 
forces for the sake of imperialism, seized control of the sea, redivided colonies, 
and contended for global hegemony� � � � It represented a monopoly of the capi-
talist classes’ interests and demands� From theoretical and strategic perspectives 
it demonstrated the position and function that maritime power occupied in the 
struggle for global hegemony�” The essay also criticized “Russia’s twentieth centu-
ry Mahan,” Sergey Gorshkov, the former commander in chief of the Soviet navy, 
and his propagation of “maritime hegemony�” The authors thought Gorshkov’s 
ideas followed in the footsteps of the imperialism of the old tsarist regime and 
the United States and that building an offensive far-seas navy would become “the 
important force behind the counterrevolutionary global strategy to achieve con-
trol of the seas, seize Europe, and dominate the world�” They saw this as an “evil 
instrument” with which the strong bullied the weak�1 The essay represented the 
Chinese people’s basic understanding of Mahan’s sea-power theory at that time�
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China launched the era of reform and opening up� 
* This is a direct translation from the Chinese� The original German title could not be found�—Trans�
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Chinese people began to use the ocean and reach out to the world� They started 
to acknowledge rationally the relationship between the ocean and the survival 
and development of the Chinese people� Chinese conceptions of the ocean took 
flight, and people began to reexamine sea-power theory� The year 1985 was the 
first time the People’s Liberation Army Navy [PLAN] sent ships overseas and 
became a genuinely “international military service�” The navy also promoted the 
strategic idea of “near-seas defense,” which became a new direction for China’s 
naval development� This led to the post-1990s resurgence of research on sea-
power theory�
In 1991 the Ocean Press published the first volumes of the Ocean Conscious-
ness series, which contained Zhang Wei and Xu Hua’s Sea Power and Prosper-
ity, the first book on sea power openly published in China� The book uses Karl 
Marx’s “two types of natural resources” as its theoretical foundation� It begins 
with an analysis of the early cultures of Eastern and Western states and of their 
natural geographic environments and then compares Chinese and Western civili-
zational history� The work contrasts China, representing land-based civilization, 
with the Mediterranean states, representing maritime civilization� “The former 
is based on agriculture, and is controlled by natural economic patterns� The lat-
ter, however, is based on commerce, and is controlled by the economic patterns 
of commodities�” Zhang Wei and Xu Hua point out that sea power was rooted in 
the conflicts of economic interests opened up by trade between maritime states� 
States that were successful in maritime trade needed to control sea lines of com-
munication and capture desired markets, while simultaneously blocking other 
countries from controlling or occupying them� 
This kind of power was required of states� Power belongs to the realm of poli-
tics, and politics is full of violence� Thus, a few merchant ships began to carry 
soldiers� As ships became more specialized, navies emerged� Therefore, behind 
the rise and fall of Mediterranean and Atlantic states “was hidden an invisible 
sword—sea power�” Zhang and Xu state, “For the sake of their own economic 
and political interests, states use maritime forces (most importantly navies) to 
control the ocean, and this is called sea power�” Their analysis is based on sev-
eral centuries’ history of struggle for control of the oceans� Their book forms, 
by linking the oceans and the state’s political, economic, and military interests, 
an abstract concept� It does not focus on researching sea power itself but rather 
studies its use from the perspective of national strategy� It is a work of high-level, 
state-strategic theory� Dialectically, Mahan’s sea-power theory takes the creation 
and development of capitalist sea power as its object of inquiry� It is strongly af-
fected by the social class of its author and the age in which it was produced� But 
it also has a “rational core”—it accurately recognizes and grasps the patterns of 
capitalist production and development with respect to the use and control of the 
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ocean� From a high-level, national-strategic perspective, sea power exerts a huge 
effect on a state’s rise�2 
In 1998, Zhang Shiping’s Chinese Sea Power was published by the People’s 
Daily Press� Writing with a strong sense of urgency, the author used the past to 
discuss the present� He thought that in human history the states and peoples 
that had been and continued to be powerful and prosperous had either once 
or later possessed sea power� The Chinese people were the first in the world to 
move toward the sea, yet the phrase “sea power” has always been unfamiliar to 
them� Zhang Shiping’s book declares that sea power is a category of history and 
that its meaning—especially the development of concepts of the ocean—changes 
continuously as societies grow� “In the simplest terms, sea power is the freedom 
to conduct activities in the maritime domain�”3 The author emphasizes that to 
maritime countries or people, possession of sea power is not an objective but a 
means, an indispensable way of ensuring the survival and sustainable develop-
ment of the state and nation� The book divides sea power into purely “military” 
and “comprehensive” sea power� Military sea power refers to one party in a war 
asserting control of a fixed maritime space for a certain period of time� Compre-
hensive sea power includes political, economic, and military factors� It denotes 
a state’s freedom to act within a fixed maritime space during a specific period 
of time� The two are closely intertwined� If a state does not have comprehensive 
national power, it cannot possess military sea power; likewise, if a state lacks a 
certain amount of military sea power, it cannot have comprehensive sea power� 
Zhang Shiping identifies four factors affecting sea power in the world today: 
maritime military forces, maritime entities, ocean development, and maritime 
legal systems�
In 2000, the Sea Tide Press ceremoniously rolled out Wang Shengrong’s 
Maritime Great Powers and the Struggle for Sea Power� The book hails America’s 
Mahan as the “founder of ‘sea power’” and the former Soviet Union’s Gorshkov 
as having “reconstructed the new concept of ‘state sea power�’” It uses John F� 
Lehman’s “revival of Mahan’s ‘seapower’ thought” as a section heading and goes 
even farther, systematically explaining the classic theories of “sea power” as 
well as methodically researching and discussing the history of the development 
of Western sea power�4 The book explains Mahanian sea power as follows� Sea 
power is an important historical factor or process� The economic basis of sea 
power involves the rights and interests in the sea—that is, economic sea power� 
The superstructure of sea power is the power to control the ocean—that is, 
military sea power� The cultivation, growth, and development of sea power rely 
on six discrete geographical factors: a state’s geographic position, the natural ter-
ritorial contours of the state, the scope of its territory, the size of its population, 
its national character, and its political traits� Wang believes Gorshkov’s “state sea 
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power” concept is richer than Mahan’s sea-power theory—that “sea power is the 
sum of the organic composition of developing the world’s oceans and protecting 
national interests� Fixed national sea power determines the use of the ocean’s 
military and economic value, and [this form of sea power] is the capacity to 
achieve the state’s goals�” This work has similarities to Zhang Shiping’s Chinese 
Sea Power� They both deeply consider contemporary sea power, and both find 
that China must develop sea power, because “in the twenty-first-century world, 
people are still ‘dancing with wolves’”;5 also, “in the future the world’s oceans will 
still be under the control of strong states that possess sea power�”6 
In this period translations on sea power were published one after the other: 
Gorshkov’s Sea Power of the State, Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History and Naval Strategy, a Mahan collection entitled Sea Power Theory, and 
Lehman’s Command of the Seas, among others� Domestic monographs on sea-
power issues also increased, such as Yang Xinhua and Shi Ping’s Chinese Sea 
Power and Historical Culture, Qin Tian and Huo Xiaoyong’s On the History of 
Chinese Sea Power, Liu Yijian’s Command of the Seas and Naval Strategy, and Lu 
Rude’s Ocean–State–Sea Power, as well as the PLAN Command Department’s 
Modern Chinese Navy and Cheng Guangzhong’s On Geopolitics. All of these ob-
jectively explained and assessed Mahan’s sea-power theory�
It can be seen, then, that after reform and opening up, more and more Chinese 
people became conscious of the ocean and an increasing number of Chinese 
scholars considered the nation’s sea-power issues� This was the call of history�
THEORETICAL DIALECTICS: THE NATURE OF CHINA’S  
SEA POWER
In English, haiquan is translated as “sea power�” “Sea power” can be also rendered 
[in Chinese] as 海上力量 (haishang liliang), 海上实力 (haishang shili), 海上强
国 (haishang qiangguo), etc� As a political term and strategic concept, haiquan 
perhaps comes closest to Mahan’s original meaning� This is because the noun 
“sea” connotes the ocean; Mahan said that he chose it after much careful thought, 
deliberately avoiding the popular adjective “maritime” to compel people to pay 
attention and so make the phrase widely used� Translating “power” as quanli 
gives a more political cast than the alternative word liliang� It may be that [for the 
Chinese] “sea power” has become too politicized or has “bad origins�” Thus, even 
as one set of Chinese people vigorously calls for Chinese sea power, another has 
misgivings� In the early years of the twenty-first century, China’s peaceful rise is 
attracting the world’s attention; the modernization of China’s national defense 
and navy is rapidly proceeding, and the “China threat” theory (especially the 
“Chinese naval threat” theory) is surfacing again and again in the international 
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community� As a result, the question whether or not the nation should develop 
sea power has once again stirred discussion in China� 
Since 2003, the “sea-power school,” of which Zhang Wenmu is a represen-
tative, has attracted a great deal of attention in Chinese academia� Zhang has 
published a multitude of dissertations and books on sea power, including On Chi-
nese Sea Power, China’s National Security Interests within the Global Geopolitical 
System, Command of the Seas, and The Historical Experiences of the Rise of Major 
Powers� He finds the deductive, logical origin of geopolitical theory in resources� 
In this context, humanity’s means for controlling geography have evolved from 
command of land to command of the sea� This is because with the Industrial 
Revolution, mankind’s methods of survival, production, and earning wealth 
changed� States’ economic development expanded beyond national boundaries 
and formed interdependent relationships with global markets and resources� 
The most convenient medium that connects the world is the ocean, and the 
easiest, most direct routes are along sea lines of communication� In the age of 
capital globalization,* whoever had a large, strong navy and effectively controlled 
sea lines held an advantageous position in the division of international interests� 
The reality of history is that trade followed gunboats, not contracts� Any major 
trading power will also be a sea power� Issues of control of the seas are global is-
sues� What happens in China depends on what happens in the world beyond its 
borders� Sixty percent of China’s oil resources come from the Middle East, and an 
enormous amount of trade relies on overseas markets� In today’s world, having 
laws but not power makes justice unattainable� China must have strong maritime 
forces� The navy is an important means for the state to expand its sea power� 
Therefore, to adapt to economic globalization and the context in which China is 
attempting to rise, as well as to the demands of its national interests and security 
strategy, China must greatly develop sea power and establish a strong navy— 
specifically, it should construct a far-seas navy, with an aircraft carrier at its core�7
At the same time, many in China oppose expansion of sea power� Xu Qiyu 
has pointed out, in “Reflections on the Sea-Power Fallacy,” that people currently 
have four misunderstandings about sea-power issues� One is that sea power has 
determined history, that it is in a class of its own, and that this is still the case� A 
second is that globalization demands that states have more international markets 
and resources and that having sea power means a country can guarantee security 
for these things� A third misconception is that major powers must struggle for sea 
power or they will have no prospects for development� The fourth is that through 
the development of naval forces a state can enjoy the sea power of a hegemon and 
that this is the foundation of genuinely equal “friendly relations” with hegemonic 
* A reference to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries�—Trans�
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countries� Xu believes that sea power has indeed played a deeply significant role 
in history but that this does not mean that sea power “determines” history� It has 
functioned within the context of given periods of historical development and has 
never been in a category of its own� He examines sea power from the perspec-
tive of an up-and-coming major power—its strategic choices and geopolitical 
restrictions, its ability by means of comprehensive national power to support 
sea-power development, and its risk of conflict with hegemonic states� In light of 
these considerations, he maintains, China should avoid the “sea-power fallacy�”8
In 2005, Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai published [the article] “A Few Thoughts 
on China’s Sea-Power Development Strategy” in Research on International 
Politics� The essay argued that a state having naval forces alone is incapable of 
becoming a major sea power; traditional Western concepts of sea power are not 
adaptable to the current development of China’s sea power� China’s sea power 
encompasses Chinese capacity for and influence over research on and develop-
ment, use, and control of the oceans� It is not likely that China can become a 
major power with sea power, or even a major power that equally values land and 
sea; rather it can only position itself as a land-based power that has established 
substantial sea power�9 In 2007, Ye Zicheng published “China’s Peaceful Develop-
ment: The Return to and Development of Land Power” in [the journal] World 
Economics and Politics� The essay posits that if China does not regard geopolitics 
from a hegemonic military-strategic perspective, then in the end land power will 
determine the development of sea, air, space, and information power� China’s 
peaceful development is primarily that of a land power, in a certain sense the re-
turn to land power� China’s peaceful growth has been oriented throughout toward 
its economic development and has not made obtaining power to control land its 
primary objective� As a result, China’s peaceful growth has advanced a new con-
cept of land power—one that is focused on land, people, and development, as well 
as on the Eurasian continent and on comprehensiveness� Ye argues that building 
up inland areas was the first level of China’s land-power strategy and that [today] 
the Eurasian mainland should be the focus� China should establish a foothold in 
the Eurasian continent to develop strategic partnerships with Europe, Russia, and 
India� At the same time, good-neighbor diplomacy should be an important ele-
ment in China’s land-power strategy� Moreover, Ye pointed out that land-power 
development is beneficial in easing the strategic contradictions with the United 
States resulting from China’s rise�10 These two essays* can be said to be the repre-
sentative texts of China’s “land-power school�”
In the land-power-versus-sea-power debate, both sides accept the assump-
tions of China’s peaceful rise and that China will not pursue global hegemony, but 
the strategic choices they emphasize are markedly different� 
* That is, that by Xu Qiyu and the one by Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai�—Trans�
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The “sea-power school’s” theories certainly do not embrace Mahan’s original 
meaning� Zhang Wenmu has said that in English “sea power” denotes “maritime 
power,” not “maritime rights�” Moreover, Chinese sea power is a type of mari-
time right pertaining to Chinese sovereignty—not maritime power, much less 
maritime hegemony� In practice, China’s sea power is far from seeking maritime 
power; it is in the stage of merely protecting maritime rights and interests�11 
Zhang also notes that Chinese sea power unifies its objectives and means, to in-
clude “maritime rights” that proceed from China’s national sovereignty and the 
“maritime forces” that would bring about and protect such rights� It should not 
include the “maritime power” for which Western hegemons generally strive� The 
characteristics of Chinese sea power [in Zhang Wenmu’s view] are as follows: 
first, the processes of national unification and achievement of sea power are in 
lockstep; second, as determined by special geopolitical conditions, Chinese sea 
power can be described as limited; third, the development of China’s maritime 
military forces combines the limited nature of China’s long-term strategy with the 
unlimited nature of its near-term strategy� 
The scholar Liu Zhongmin, of the sea-power school, holds that from a geo-
political perspective, China must on the one hand consider how improvements 
in security on land offer the strategic possibility of concentrating force for the 
purposes of promoting sea power, while on the other hand it must consider the 
necessity of developing sea power itself, given the pressures on maritime frontier 
security� With respect to the relationship between developing sea power and 
comprehensive national power, China should be calculating not how to decrease 
the already quite low investment in naval defense but how to increase the contri-
butions of the maritime economy to comprehensive national power� In the rela-
tionship between sea-power development and China’s peaceful rise, the former 
should not conflict with or hinder the latter�12
The doctrine of the land-power school does not completely reject the idea 
that China should develop sea power� Ye Zicheng has said that Chinese sea 
power should be defined as the nation’s capacity and influence with respect to 
researching, developing, using, and to a certain extent controlling the sea� It 
should also address in a detailed way the question of how to “walk the road of 
developing sea power with Chinese characteristics�”13 Ye Zicheng has pointed 
out that China’s peaceful development is a new type of land-power conception� 
If, as it is stated previously, China does not view geopolitics from a hegemonic 
military strategic viewpoint, land power should in the end be determined by sea, 
air, space, and information power�14 Xu Qiyu too has not completely rejected 
sea-power development� He has said that sea power is not simply a military 
question but a grand-strategy issue that concerns national security and develop-
ment� From a grand-strategy perspective, however exalted sea power becomes, 
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it is only one means of actualizing grand strategy� In summary, sea power serves 
strategy—strategy does not serve sea power�15
In 2006 the Current Affairs Press published the book Roadmap for Asian 
Regional Cooperation, which mentions the “theory of harmonizing sea power 
and land power�” This book argues that in the process of economic globalization 
and regional integration, states should advocate peace and cooperation between 
maritime and land-based countries, “adopting peaceful methods to manage and 
use geopolitical relationships between states, promoting enduring peace, security, 
development and prosperity for individual states, the region, and the world,” thus 
realizing “harmony of land and sea” and common development�16
In the context of today’s continuously growing economic globalization and 
the rising importance and usefulness of the ocean, and given China’s deepening 
reform and “opening up,” rapidly increasing foreign trade, and gradual expan-
sion of overseas interests, debate over the question whether or not China should 
develop sea power has become meaningless� This is obviously not the point being 
debated by the two camps� The substantive issues are that of the nature of Chinese 
sea power and the direction of its development, whether or not it should be a 
significant option in China’s national strategy�
Of these, the most basic question is the nature of Chinese sea power; today it 
is a given that China should develop sea power as a significant option of national 
strategy to support the nation’s rise� But China cannot repeat the mistakes of 
Mahanian sea power�
To begin with, times have changed� Mahan’s sea-power theory is from an age 
when capitalism led to imperialism and “imperialism was war�” Therefore it pos-
sessed characteristics of a time when the state used military force to control the 
oceans and promote the expansion of global capitalism and the pursuit of mo-
nopoly� However, ours are globalized times, in which peaceful development is the 
mainstream� Even though as the world’s sole superpower the United States still 
pursues sea-power “fundamentalism,” it too has been forced to change� This is 
because a high level of economic interdependence makes any country unwilling 
or unable to use military force frequently� The conditions under which a state’s 
maritime security rests completely on war and hegemony no longer exist� 
Second, the scientific and technological foundations are not the same� Mahan 
lived in an age of broad-based development in the field of mechanization� Navies, 
because of their integration of surface, air, and undersea operations, as well as 
their good endurance, combat radius, and global power-projection capabilities, 
became the most important services of the age� Although these advantages are 
still maintained by navies in the information age, they cannot be absolute� New 
situations emerge as a result of struggles in space and in the electromagnetic 
realm, as well as over rights to control information and the Internet� The concept 
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of integrated operations guides decisions of military strategy; the technological 
foundation on which the supremacy of sea power rested no longer exists� 
Third, cultural traditions are not the same� “Power” was at the core of Ma-
han’s sea-power theory� It possessed characteristics of traditional Western realist 
theory� To date it still influences the national- and maritime-security policy of the 
United States: develop maritime forces (the most important being the navy) and 
attain sea power—control the ocean (the most important [parts] being sea lines 
of communication)—control global trade—win global hegemony� But the theo-
retical paradigms of traditional Chinese military studies include the concepts of 
concord (hehe) and harmony (hexie) and the fundamental aspects of peace and 
defense� China cannot choose to imitate Mahan’s offensive, hegemonic sea-power 
model�
Fourth, there are disparities in state character� Mahan’s sea-power theory was 
born in the United States, so it has been revered by Western capitalist countries 
and necessarily has the nature and ideological bent of these nations� Today’s 
China is a socialist power under Chinese Communist Party rule� This fact has 
determined China’s foreign strategy and foreign policy and established as the 
preconditions for developing sea power the principles of the “four persists” (sige 
jianchi). Under the guidance of “the five principles of peaceful coexistence,” the 
“new security” concept, and the “harmonious world” concept, China will extract 
the wheat and discard the chaff of sea-power theory�* 
China will not repeat the mistakes of Mahanian sea-power theory, but [to 
ensure that it does not,] the country needs to reflect on the history of its national 
security strategy, how it conceptualizes the ocean, and the conservative, nega-
tive side of traditional military studies� In a certain sense, sea-power theory is 
an achievement of civilization, and China should draw from some of its rational 
elements, including the following: its basic patterns (maritime economic activi-
ties that are characterized by a commodity economy and influence the develop-
ment of productivity, as well as a state’s rise); the philosophical methods it reveals 
(when the ocean ceases to be a barrier and instead brings the world together, a 
state needs to think about global strategy); and the important reality it exposes 
(the essential linkage between a state’s maritime security, national economy, and 
politics, and the navy’s important role among these)� Lenin once pointed out, “In 
the Marxist revolution, the proletariat’s ideology gained historical significance 
because it did not forsake the most treasured achievements of the capitalist class’s 
generation� Conversely, it absorbed and altered that which was valuable from 
* According to a Deng Xiaoping speech of 30 March 1979, the “four persists” are to persist in 
supporting “the socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist 
Party, and both Marxism and Mao Zedong thought�” For the full speech, see “邓小平: 坚持四项
基本原则 (1979年3月30)” [Deng Xiaoping: Persist in Supporting Four Basic Principles, 30 March 
1979], available at www�people�com�cn/GB/channel1/10/20000529/80791�html�—Trans� 
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over two thousand years of humankind’s ideological and cultural development�”17 
This is the attitude we too should adopt toward sea-power theory� 
HISTORICAL CHOICE: DEVELOP SEA POWER WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS
Sea power is an issue that falls within the purview of national strategy and 
national-security strategy, but it does not constitute their entirety� Instead, it 
is the maritime component of national strategy and national-security strategy� 
The state’s understanding and use of sea power are not a matter simply for the 
maritime domain� Rather, sea power is a complete policy, a process of specific 
steps to be implemented� It begins with the land and how the land influences the 
ocean� Emphasizing the development of sea power is not the same as following 
the path that Western powers took to maritime hegemony� Likewise, emphasis 
on a return to land power and a land-centric approach cannot be equated to a 
capacity for naturally peaceful development� A nation with land power can take 
the hegemonic path as well� In reality, a state must base its development on land, 
but it cannot ignore the objective existence of sea power� Thus, people should no 
longer deliberately separate “land power” and “sea power” but should consider 
the two in tandem and conduct integrated planning�
Contemporary Chinese sea power is, in practice, a component of the state’s 
comprehensive national power and strategic capacity� It is a means of actual-
izing China’s peaceful development strategy and national maritime security� It is 
concretely realized in national strategic plans for developing, using, managing, 
and controlling the sea and in the management systems and maritime forces 
themselves� Sea power can be an element of both “hard power” and “soft power�” 
China’s sea power should be formed of the following components: 
• National maritime strategy� Maritime strategy is comprehensive state plan-
ning of maritime matters taking account of such things as the economy, poli-
tics, the military, science and technology, law, and culture� It is a product of 
state power� It is also a fundamental reflection of the state’s concept of the sea 
and of the government’s level of understanding of the sea� National maritime-
development strategy and national maritime-security strategy derive from 
national maritime strategy� Maritime-development strategy mainly expresses 
the general plan for the progression of a state’s maritime economy and 
industry� A state’s maritime-security strategy, however, comprises its compre-
hensive planning for and guidance of security affairs at sea—the sum total of 
the state’s maritime-security concepts in the political, diplomatic, military, 
economic, and scientific domains� 
• Governmental ocean-management mechanisms� The state is the subject of 
sea power, and the government is the material representation of the state’s 
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power� Therefore, government mechanisms for ocean management should be 
a formative part of sea power and should mainly include policy mechanisms, 
legislative and executive institutions, and related cooperative  
structures�
• National maritime forces� They are the executors and protectors of the state’s 
maritime strategy and ocean development strategy; they constitute the major 
support for sea power� These forces include civilian-use marine transport 
resources (the merchant marine), near- and far-seas fishing fleets, scientific 
survey vessels, and marine-resource exploration and development assets, 
among others; military forces at sea (of which the navy is central, but that 
also include maritime militia reserve fleets); and maritime law-enforcement 
forces, which include the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), the Coast 
Guard of the Border Control Department, the China Marine Surveillance 
(CMS), Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLEC), and Maritime Customs, among 
others� 
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, there was a change in China’s 
peripheral maritime security environment� The security demands of national 
sea lines of communication and of overseas interests surged� As China’s national 
power has increased, international society has increasingly demanded that China 
take on the burdens of a great power� As a result, China’s sea-power development 
stands at a new historical starting point� Today, CMS and FLEC are taking posi-
tive actions to safeguard China’s near-seas maritime security� China’s navy has 
implemented routine antipiracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia’s mari-
time space, in accordance with a United Nations resolution� The hospital ship 
Peace Ark has journeyed to third-world countries in Africa and Latin America to 
provide medical care� Combat vessels have entered the Mediterranean for large-
scale evacuation operations from Libya and to provide maritime security� China 
has launched a training aircraft carrier capable of far-seas operations and sent it 
on sea trials� The deep-sea submersible Jiaolong has dived to depths greater than 
seven thousand meters� 
Today, development of Chinese sea power is not a subjective factor but an 
important historical choice of China’s national strategy� First of all, in the age of 
globalization, humanity’s development largely depends on the oceans� China’s 
rise too greatly relies on the oceans� Sea lines of communication and maritime 
resources have already become strategic components of sustainable development, 
components from which the state cannot depart for even a moment� This consid-
eration shapes sea power’s historical influence on the momentous rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation� This influence is not absolutely decisive, but its relative 
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decisiveness must be faced squarely� We need to expand the horizons of our secu-
rity strategy, establish a foothold in the world, and strategically manage [jinglüe] 
the ocean� Furthermore, we should synchronize the maritime expansion of Chi-
na’s national interests and the process of its rise, demanding a modernized navy 
that provides maritime security and implements necessary, limited sea control 
[haiyang kongzhi]� China also requires a navy strong and large enough to fulfill 
new missions, as well as adapt to the nation’s great-power status� Because China 
faces a global trend toward revolution in military affairs (RMA), it must confront 
the immutable laws governing the relationship between “spears” and “shields” in 
contemporary international society�* 
Chinese sea power must have Chinese characteristics� The first such character-
istic is big-picture, highly centralized strategic planning that aligns with China’s 
national strategy regarding peaceful progress toward a harmonious world and its 
foreign strategy� Second, sea power should embody the core values of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics—a socialism that is guided by Marxist tenets, that 
has as its objectives eliminating exploitation and achieving justice, and that dia-
lectically combines China’s national interests and the shared interests of human-
kind� Third, sea power ought to give priority to the maritime economy, maritime 
economic forces, and exploration for and use of ocean resources� Fourth, Chinese 
sea power should emphasize comprehensive security and cooperative security; 
actively develop security cooperation with littoral states and states along sea lines 
of communication; and comprehensively deploy economic, political, diplomatic, 
military, scientific, and cultural means to achieve maritime security� Fifth, Chi-
nese sea power should reflect the national-security strategy of “active defense�” Its 
basic objective should be to assure national maritime security and national eco-
nomic interests� Additionally, Chinese sea power should emphasize the limited 
use of military and paramilitary forces at sea, stressing especially the search for 
ways to use maritime forces in peacetime, including as instruments of political 
diplomacy� This will have to be an important component of China’s future sea-
power theory and a highlight of sea-power theory with Chinese characteristics�
In brief, China’s development of an ability to control and manage the ocean 
is meant not only to protect national interests but also to safeguard world peace� 
This is the crux of the difference between sea power with Chinese characteristics 
and sea power in general� Chinese sea power is the application of national mari-
time forces to developing and using the sea� It is also the process of protecting 
national rights and interests and ensuring national maritime security� Above all, 
it is the process of developing strategic management of national maritime affairs, 
the capability of administering the ocean, and the art of doing so�
* The Chinese characters for “spears” and “shields,” when combined, create the word “contradiction�” 
The author’s point is that contradictions are inevitable�—Trans�
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 The era of maritime discoveries was a period of expansive exploration, one that prompted the emergence of a range of maritime thinking in the six-
teenth century, mainly in the countries of southern Europe� Of all the insightful 
and innovative works written at that time, as shown in table 1, Fernando Oliveira’s 
Art of War at Sea has two distinctive features�1 First, it went beyond the usual 
operational and tactical perspectives and entered the domain of strategy� While 
Art of War at Sea is certainly a period piece, it is unusual in foreshadowing some 
aspects of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century naval strategic thought 
in the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan� Second, as evidenced in table 1, Oliveira’s 
volume was the only one to be published at the time of writing�2 As a matter of 
fact, it was the first printed treatise on naval strategy� However, it was written and 
published in Portuguese and never translated into another language�3 Therefore, 
this article aims at presenting Art of War at Sea 
to English-reading audiences, with a focus on its 
strategic aspects, thus contributing to the interna-
tional naval canon�
BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF OLIVEIRA
Fernando Oliveira was born in the small hamlet 
of Gestosa, in Portugal, in 1507 and entered a 
Dominican convent at age ten�4 He was a disciple 
of one of Portugal’s most important humanist 
scholars, the noted Dominican André de Resende, 
who educated him in Scholastic philosophy and 
A Pioneering Treatise on Naval Strategy
Luis Nuno Sardinha Monteiro
Commander Monteiro is currently serving at the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Com-
mand Transformation headquarters in Norfolk, 
Virginia. A graduate of the Portuguese Naval Acad-
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an MSc and PhD in navigation technology from the 
University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom. 
He has taught navigation and strategy and naval 
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naval/maritime strategy, as well as of several scien-
tific and technical articles. 
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FERNANDO OLIVEIRA’S ART OF WAR AT SEA 
(1555)
theology� Oliveira learned to read and write fluently in Latin and studied the 
most prominent classical authors� When he was twenty-five, he broke with his 
order and escaped to Spain, where he continued linguistic studies and may have 
acquired his interest in shipbuilding�5 
After returning to Portugal, Oliveira published a grammar of the Portuguese 
language in 1536� This was his first book and also the first Portuguese grammar 
ever published�6 It is not clear when and where Oliveira learned navigation, but 
it may well have been during this time, as nautical matters were then popular in 
Portugal�
By 1541, he was again in Spain and embarked from Barcelona on a ship bound 
to Genoa� Oliveira’s ship was captured by the French and taken to Marseille, but 
he soon went from prisoner to pilot of French galleys in the Mediterranean, be-
cause of his navigation knowledge and the high regard afforded to Portuguese pi-
lots� He returned to Portugal in 1543, where he stayed for two years� In June 1545, 
a twenty-five-ship naval force, headed by the baron de La Garde, called at Lisbon 
to replenish stores on its way to Le Havre to join the two-hundred-ship armada 
that planned to invade England during the naval war of 1544–46� Oliveira was 
recruited to serve as a pilot on board the galley of the baron de Saint-Blancard 
and won his confidence, as well as that of La Garde, by virtue of some very useful 
suggestions about ship design�7 
Saint-Blancard’s galley was captured after a skirmish between French galleys 
and an English squadron in May 1546� Oliveira was taken to London, but it seems 
he was never imprisoned� Most probably, he “was employed as an ambassador 
in the negotiations over the French galley and its crew” and became well known 
in the court�8 Some historians believe that he gained the esteem of Henry VIII, 
Date of 
Writing Title Author (nationality) Date of Publication
1516–20 Les faiz de la marine et navi-
gaiges (On the Nature of the 
Fleet and Navigation)
Antoine de Conflans (French) 1842
1530 Quatri partitu en cosmografía 
práctica, y por otro nombre,  
Espejo de navegantes (Naviga-
tor’s Glass)
Alonso de Chaves (Spanish) 1983
1550–54 Della Milizia Marittima (Of 
the Maritime Militia)
Cristoforo Da Canal  
(Venetian)
2010 (fourth book was printed 
in 1930)
1552–54 Arte da Guerra do Mar (Art of 
War at Sea)
Fernando Oliveira  
(Portuguese)
1555
TABLE 1
MAIN WORKS ON MARITIME SUBJECTS WRITTEN IN SOUTHERN EUROPE IN THE  
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
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probably because of his “professional knowledge [as] � � � a pilot” and his “experi-
ence in galley construction and warfare, [which were] of immediate interest to 
Henry at the time�”9 
The quickness and apparent ease with which Oliveira gained the respect of 
La Garde and King Henry VIII are indicative of his profound erudition and 
culture, qualities that made him valuable to those powerful men� Oliveira stayed 
in England for almost a year during a period preceding the rise of the country 
to mastery of the seas under Queen Elizabeth I� By then, Oliveira was certainly 
well aware that sea power was crucial for the integrity of the Portuguese empire� 
Nonetheless, during his stay in England he became acquainted with the Eng-
lish merchant classes (which were engaged in extending their overseas trade), 
consolidating his beliefs on the importance of sea power for the livelihood of 
maritime nations�
In March 1547, shortly after the death of Henry VIII, he was sent back to Lis-
bon with a letter to the Portuguese king, Dom João III� In Portugal, Oliveira did 
not refrain from praising some of the ideas of the arch-heretic King Henry VIII, 
prompting the attention of the Inquisition� Oliveira was interrogated at length 
and condemned on charges of heretical practices� He remained in jail until 1550 
and under monastery arrest for another year�
In 1552 he joined, as chaplain, a Portuguese squadron composed of five small 
warships sent to northern Africa to help an allied Moroccan monarch, the king 
of Velez� The expedition failed, and Oliveira was taken prisoner for a short time 
by the Turks� He recounted (specifically, in chapter 12 of Part II) this failed 
campaign in Art of War at Sea, which he produced from 1552 to 1554 upon his 
return to Lisbon� The book was published in 1555, and 
in it Oliveira criticized some maritime policies of the 
Portuguese administration and described chapters of 
Portuguese history in a manner not aligned with the 
official version� Therefore, he was imprisoned again by 
the Inquisition four months after the book’s dissemina-
tion; he remained in jail for two more years� 
Little is known about Oliveira’s activities from 1557 
until his death in about 1585, except that he continued 
to parlay his vast experience at sea to produce seminal 
treatises on nautical and naval warfare issues� As British 
professor Harold Livermore has written, Oliveira was 
“a passionate character which had imbibed a strain of 
Dominican zeal � � � and combined it with a rhetorician’s 
love of words and a marked taste for erudition: these he 
applied to the meticulous study of seamanship�”10 Cover of the original edition of Art of War at Sea
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Around 1570 he wrote the encyclopedic Ars Nautica (Art of Navigation) in 
Latin, but it was never published� The incomplete manuscript is preserved today 
in the Leiden University Library in the Netherlands�11 It has three parts: one 
about navigation, cartography, and meteorology; another about naval construc-
tion; and a third addressing broad naval logistical and administrative matters� 
According to the Portuguese maritime historian Francisco Contente Domingues, 
the second part was the first theoretical text on naval construction written by a 
Portuguese author and was unparalleled throughout Europe, with its extensive 
array of themes and penetrating analysis and explanations�12
Art of Navigation was followed by a companion work on naval construction, 
written in Portuguese and entitled Livro da Fábrica das Naus (Book on the Build-
ing of Ships)� This piece dealt with the same subjects as the second part of Art of 
Navigation, but it was more than a translation from Latin to Portuguese of the 
earlier treatise, detailing and updating some of its subjects� The book was origi-
nally written around 1580 but was only published more than three centuries later 
in 1898�13 The manuscript of this treatise is in the National Library of Portugal, in 
Lisbon�14 Probably around 1581, Oliveira wrote a History of Portugal, the manu-
script of which belongs to the National Library of France, in Paris�15
Oliveira, then, was a clergyman, a sailor, a pilot, a diplomat, a soldier, a phi-
lologist, a historian, a naval construction theoretician, and a naval strategist� He 
was in fact a true polymath, a man who mastered various fields of knowledge 
and pioneered by writing an original treatise on naval strategy, Art of War at Sea� 
ART OF WAR AT SEA
Art of War at Sea is organized into one prologue and two parts, each containing 
fifteen chapters� The first part, “Intention and Preparation for War at Sea,” is 
dedicated largely to broad political and strategic issues, including a reflection on 
the nature of war in its ethical, ontological, and moral dimensions� The second 
part, “Of Armed Fleets & Maritime Battles & Stratagems,” covers nautical matters 
and naval tactics� Table 2 lists all the book’s chapters�
This table of contents shows the comprehensiveness of the volume through 
a wide range of subjects, including naval construction, ship commissioning, 
navigation, seamanship, meteorology, oceanography, logistics, recruitment, 
training, education, command skills, maritime ceremonial, and intelligence� To 
illustrate his ideas, Oliveira employed warfare examples from ancient Greece 
and Rome, as well as from the discoveries era, with an emphasis on Portuguese 
history� Moreover, he recounted personal experiences, such as the capture of his 
galley by the English in 1546 and the failed expedition to Velez in 1552� Oliveira 
argues that the principal causes for those defeats were deficient leadership in the 
former episode and lack of organization, discipline, and training in the latter� 
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Part I: Intention and Preparation for War at Sea
Chap� 1 That It Is Necessary to Make War
Chap� 2 Of Who Can Make War 
Chap� 3 That War at Sea Is Necessary
Chap� 4 Which War Is Just
Chap� 5 Of the Intention and Conduct of War
Chap� 6 Of the Admiral’s Service
Chap� 7 Of Arsenals and Their Provisioning
Chap� 8 Of Wood for Ships
Chap� 9 Of When to Cut Wood
Chap� 10 Of Warehouses and Their Provisioning
Chap� 11 Of Victuals
Chap� 12 Of Sailors 
Chap� 13 Of Captains of the Sea and of Their Power
Chap� 14 Of How Soldiers Should Be Selected and Recruited 
Chap� 15 Of Soldiers’ Training
Part II: Of Armed Fleets & Maritime Battles & Stratagems
Chap� 1 Of Fleets’ Ships
Chap� 2 Of Ships’ Crews 
Chap� 3 Of Provisioning of Supplies, Munitions, and Rigging
Chap� 4 Of When to Set Sail and of Weather Changes
Chap� 5 Of Storm Signs
Chap� 6 Of Winds, Their Regions and Names
Chap� 7 Some Warnings Useful for Sailing
Chap� 8 Of Tides, Currents, and Streams
Chap� 9 Of How Armadas Set Sail
Chap� 10 Of Sea Battles and Some Needed Stratagems
Chap� 11 Of the Place to Engage in Combat 
Chap� 12 Of How the Ships That Went with the King of Velez Were Lost
Chap� 13 Of Rules of War at Sea
Chap� 14 Of Some General Rules of War
Chap� 15 Of the Work’s Conclusion
TABLE 2
CHAPTERS OF ART OF WAR AT SEA
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Therefore, the book emphasizes the importance of those elements for success in 
naval warfare�
Influences in Art of War at Sea
Art of War at Sea was inspired by Oliveira’s own experience, having spent long 
periods under way in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic aboard Portuguese 
and French ships, and also having become acquainted and, in some cases, even 
working with Spanish, Italian, and English sailors and tradesmen, as well as with 
Moors�
In addition, Oliveira was a man of his time and therefore influenced by the 
Renaissance, a movement characterized by humanism, consisting of the redis-
covery, study, and imitation of the philosophy, art, history, and literature from 
ancient Greece and Rome� Many Renaissance humanists were clergymen, and 
combined the revival of the great classical authors with the promotion of biblical 
texts� That was also the case with Oliveira, whose Renaissance humanism and 
Christianity are clearly evident in his writing� Professor Livermore even consid-
ers that “much of the value of Oliveira’s book lies in the glimpses of reality that 
shine through a welter of classical and Biblical allusions�”16
In the prologue of his treatise, Oliveira claimed the pioneering nature of his 
work on naval warfare “about which no author, to my knowledge, wrote any 
documents before or, if someone wrote about it, I confess it did not come to my 
cognizance, only a little thing from Vegetius�”17 However, Publius Flavius Vegetius 
Renatus’s influence was far from little� Vegetius was a Roman writer of the fourth 
century ad who wrote Epitoma Rei Militaris (Concerning Military Matters), a 
treatise about warfare and military principles to explain methods and practices 
used during the Roman Empire� The final chapters (31 to 46) of Book IV of Vege-
tius’s piece are devoted to naval tactics and constituted Oliveira’s primary source�
Oliveira mentions Vegetius thirty times in Art of War at Sea on such diversi-
fied matters as personnel issues, including conscription, qualities required for 
soldiers and seamen, leadership, training, organization, and discipline; materiél 
issues, including fleet balance, types of ships, logistics, and properties of materi-
als; and employment of military and naval power, including combat readiness, 
military and naval tactics, meteorology, and deception� Furthermore, Oliveira 
presents (in chapter 14 of Part II) thirty-nine general rules of war, inspired by 
Vegetius’s thirty-five general warfare maxims, from chapter 26 of Book III of Con-
cerning Military Matters� While most of Oliveira’s rules were original, some were 
adaptations of Vegetius’s maxims� Oliveira drew as well on the work of a number 
of other Greek and Roman authors, summarized in table 3�18
The other main sources for Art of War at Sea were the Bible (Isaiah, Jeremiah, 
Pauline epistles, and the Gospel according to John) and some medieval Catholic 
authors, such as Saint Augustine� A notable Algerian-Roman theologian and 
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philosopher of the fourth and fifth centuries, Augustine helped craft the just war 
theory, which was central to Art of War at Sea� Oliveira also quotes Saint Am-
brose (on the appropriateness of priests going to war) and Saint Thomas Aquinas 
(on war and religion)�19 
The bibliography employed in Art of War at Sea reveals an erudite author, 
cognizant of an impressive catalogue on the most varied subjects� Most of the 
sources Oliveira used are related not to war at sea but to warfare in general and 
to generic matters, such as rhetoric, wood qualities, and food properties� This 
confirms that he was being truthful in asserting his unawareness of other works 
on naval warfare, with the exception of the chapters on naval tactics in Vegetius’s 
Concerning Military Matters� Even that source must be qualified, as those chap-
ters correspond to only seventeen pages and were written more than a thousand 
years before, when navigation and naval warfare were completely different�20 
Author Topics of the Quotes
Quintilian Rhetoric
Aelian Combat readiness, dissuasion, and military organization
Plato Combat readiness and dissuasion
Sallust Combat readiness and dissuasion
Diodorus Siculus Combat readiness, dissuasion, characteristics of soldiers, and maritime swell
Alexander the Great Politics
Aulus Gellius Characteristics needed for seamen and victory in war
Vitruvius Qualities of shipbuilding wood and ship design
Pliny the Elder Qualities of shipbuilding wood, nourishment of seamen, winds, tides, and advantages of 
teamwork
Julius Caesar Weapons, influence of meteorology, and maritime signaling
Marcus Varro Properties of food, characteristics of men, and leadership
Justinus Unity of command, unity of action, and trade
Cicero Vicious behaviors
Seneca Metaphors from Seneca’s tragedies and information on winds and storm signs
Cato the Elder Seamen and military discipline
Julius Frontinus Seamen and military discipline
Claudian Transition from oared vessels to sailing ships
Columella Maxim from one of Columella’s works
TABLE 3
CLASSICAL AUTHORS QUOTED IN ART OF WAR AT SEA
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Strategic Insights of Art of War at Sea
The British historian Richard Barker opines that “there is little doubt[:] � � � Art of 
War at Sea is on a grander scale than any of its predecessors�”21 It was also a book 
ahead of its time, as it established some of the basis of modern naval strategy, 
according to the Portuguese scholar and naval officer António Silva Ribeiro�22 
In fact, while the preceding and contemporary works on maritime or naval af-
fairs focus on operational, tactical, or technical issues, Art of War at Sea offers a 
strategic reflection on the importance of naval power as the key to maintaining 
a mighty empire, such as the Portuguese held at that time, with territories and 
possessions in all five populated continents� 
In the sixteenth century the concept of naval power had not been introduced� 
Nevertheless, a careful reading of Art of War at Sea shows that Oliveira uses the 
expression “war at sea” in a sense that encompassed all aspects of military orga-
nization for sea warfare, including construction, commissioning, training, and 
operation of warships—that is, what would come to be defined as naval power� 
In his prologue, Oliveira emphasizes the importance of war at sea: “In particu-
lar for this land’s men, that now use the sea more than any others, thus acquiring 
high profit and honor� � � � Nurturing this war [i�e�, this power], Portuguese people 
have gained lots of wealth & prosperity � � � & have gained honor in a short period 
of time, as no other nation in longer periods�”23
Oliveira’s volume throughout reiterates this idea that nations must defend 
their interests at sea by the use of naval power, stressing that maritime security 
should not be taken for granted�
Because the sea is very licentious and men cannot avoid using it to trade, to fish and 
with other purposes, taking supply and profit from it, it is essential to safeguard it, 
through fear or severe punishment� � � � Due to all these reasons, it is necessary to 
have navies at sea, that safe keep our coasts and passages and that protect from the 
surprises that can storm from the sea, which are much more sudden than the ones 
coming from land�24
This view is as applicable today as it was five hundred years ago, because the main 
challenges to naval power in the twenty-first century are similar to those of the 
sixteenth�
Another prominent feature of Oliveira’s book is the way it addresses some pe-
rennial strategic principles, with insights that are still valid and useful� In fact, Art 
of War at Sea highlights the importance of a substantial number of factors (noting 
the reference in the 2008 Portuguese-language edition cited above): 
• National defense: “Good war makes good peace� And therefore the peace 
that we now enjoy was conquered by past wars, but careless peace will leave 
war to posterity� Peace lovers that now enjoy it should not rest if they want it 
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perpetually, because if the enemies of peace see a soft peace, they will take it 
away” (Part I, chap� 1, p� 12)�
• Readiness at sea: “It is necessary to be ready to defend ourselves from those 
who want to attack, because promptitude, as says Vegetius, is sometimes 
more useful than strength in war” (Part I, chap� 1, p� 11), and “Promptitude 
gives victory to the diligent and negligence defeats the careless” (pp� 11–12)�
• Surprise factor: “Sudden attacks terrify the enemies, but expected encounters 
do not frighten them” (Part II, chap� 14, p� 133)�
• Time as a fundamental element of strategy: “There is a time to engage in 
battle, when we have an opportunity or when the advantage is on our side” 
(Part II, chap� 10, p� 118), and “[In battles] the occasion is more important, 
than bravery or wisdom” (Part II, chap� 14, p� 133)� 
• Space as a fundamental element of strategy: “In combats, the location is re-
sponsible for a great part of the victory, because those who find themselves in 
an inadequate position double their works: some caused by the position and 
some caused by the opponent” (Part II, chap� 11, p� 121), “At sea, as well as on 
land, there are places � � � that give and take opportunity and benefit to ships 
at the time of fighting” (p� 121), and “The location is often worthier than the 
force” (Part II, chap� 14, p� 133)�
• Dissuasion: “And therefore, favor weapons because they are not as contrary to 
peace as they may seem, contrarily they protect peace as the dogs protect the 
sheep, although they may seem their foes” (Part I, chap� 1, p� 12)� 
• Deception: “Let us deceive as much as we can, so that we will be taken as 
liars” (Part II, chap� 14, p� 134), and “He who tells the truth to his enemy, 
warns that enemy against himself ” (p� 134)�
• Intelligence: “The captains must have warning about the opponents’ fleets, if 
they are big or not, so that they do not miss or unnecessarily exceed what is 
needed” (Part II, chap� 1, p� 68), and “As important as covering our intentions 
is trying to know the opponent’s” (Part II, chap� 14, p� 134)�
• Unity of command: “The Greek army, while it had only one head and King 
[Alexander the Great], conquered and won the world, but as soon as the King 
died and divisions arose, everything started falling apart” (Part I, chap� 13, p� 
49), and “It is necessary that men of war have a head � � � and one that com-
mands over everyone” (p� 50)� 
• Unity of action: “Many times, a few aligned people can achieve more than 
many non-aligned” (Part I, chap� 13, p� 49)� 
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• Tailoring war-fighting capabilities to the type of conflict: “Thus, according to 
whom we fight, we shall use those weapons” (Part I, chap� 10, p� 42) and “The 
warships must also be adequate to the wars they are expected to fight, both in 
number and in type” (Part II, chap� 1, p� 68)� 
• Balanced fleet composition: “Therefore in the fleets it is necessary to have 
different ships, ones to bear the weight of war, and others to support and help 
those ones” (Part II, chap� 1, p� 69)�
To conclude this analysis of the strategic insights of Art of War at Sea, it is 
worth highlighting some of the listed general rules of war� These short apho-
risms summarize and encapsulate the key takeaways of the book, stressing the 
importance of (as found in Part II, chapter 14, pages 133–34, of the Portuguese- 
language edition cited above) recruitment (“Mistakes in commissioning endan-
ger the battles”), training (“Exercises make men braver than nature”), motivation 
(“When personnel are hesitant, do not enter a fight”), logistics (“Those who do 
not supply themselves with provisions � � � will be beaten without fighting”), or-
ganization and discipline (“Better order than multitude”), leadership (“The pru-
dent captain is always ready, the skillful one does not miss a good opportunity, 
when it shows up”), and meteorology (“It must not be the sea waiting for you, it 
must be you waiting for the sea,” and “We shall protect from sea state and weather, 
the same way we protect against our enemies”)� 
These general rules conclude with a maxim, on the contradictory nature of 
war: “War requires fairness and deceit, truth and lies, cruelty and pity, preserving 
and destroying�”25
Humanitarian Convictions in Art of War at Sea
Another important feature of this treatise is the humanitarian (that is, benevo-
lent) approach to the theory of just war and to the problem of slavery� The just 
war theory evolved from the concepts of holy war contained in the Bible, and 
justum bellum (just war) theorized by the Romans� It sought to justify aggression 
morally through codification of a set of rules that evolved with time� For example, 
Augustine averred that Christians should, by definition, be against war� But the 
pursuit of peace should include the option of going to war (a just war) if that is 
the only option to prevent a grave wrong� Almost nine centuries later, Aquinas 
delineated criteria for just war, as needing to be declared by the proper authority, 
have a just cause, and involve fighting with the right intention�
Oliveira draws on the heritage of Augustine and Aquinas to write in the 
prologue that “the war of Christians that fear God is not bad, it is full of virtues, 
because it is done with a desire for peace, without greediness nor cruelty, as a 
punishment to the bad and relief of the good�”26 Then, he invoked Augustine to 
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define just war as “the one that defends a people from those who want to offend 
it without reason � � � and [the war] that punishes the offenses to God�”27 
By the mid-sixteenth century, theologians were expanding this theory to 
rationalize the fights against pagans and heathens who had never encountered 
Christianity—namely, the indigenous peoples of Africa and the New World� How-
ever, Oliveira’s work takes a more fraternal approach: “We cannot make just war 
to the infidels who were never Christians, like Moors, Jews and pagans, that want 
to be at peace with us and did not take our lands or prejudiced Christianity�”28 
Oliveira also imposes humanitarian rules of engagement: “You shall not kill 
women, children nor beasts, cut fruit trees, burn warehouses, nor damage the 
things that men need�”29 These humanitarian convictions prompted him to con-
demn slavery—a position that was anathema among the widespread acceptance 
of slavery as natural in the sixteenth century� Audaciously, Oliveira condemns 
slavery as a “bad habit,” arguing that “no human reasoning allows the public and 
free practice of buying and selling free and peaceful men, as one buys and sells 
beasts, cattle or horses�”30
Art of War at Sea and Mahan
Because Art of War at Sea was neither widely disseminated nor translated, it had 
only marginal impact on subsequent naval strategy� Nonetheless, the main ideas 
that would later be conceptualized and publicized by some of the most notable 
naval thinkers were already present in this pioneering treatise� In particular, Art 
of War at Sea is a distant yet direct ancestor of the works of the world’s best-
known maritime strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who 350 years later brilliantly 
theorized about the influence of sea power on history and its importance for 
the wealth and prestige of nations� Both strategists shared the conviction that 
the prosperity and international status of maritime nations (like Portugal and 
the United States) depended heavily on seaborne trade and connected maritime 
activities� They believed that those nations should develop robust sea power, 
including powerful navies, to achieve their full potential� The main difference 
between Oliveira and Mahan is that Oliveira wrote when the Portuguese empire 
was starting to decay (his writings constituting a warning about the consequences 
on economic and political status of disinvestment in naval power), whereas 
Mahan wrote when the United States was initiating an expansionist era (his writ-
ings representing a road map to world supremacy, based on a strong sea power 
and a dominant navy)� 
Furthermore, Oliveira and Mahan were both pious Christians, Oliveira a 
Catholic and Mahan Protestant� They shared views consistent with the theories 
of just war and advocated the use of naval/sea power to disseminate Christianity� 
In Art of War at Sea, Oliveira commends the use of naval power for spreading 
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Christianity, praising the Portuguese discoveries as “allow[ing] multiplying the 
God’s faith & the salvation of men�”31 He also adds that “His Highness [the king 
of Portugal] has armadas at sea to augment the Christian faith and to defend his 
lands�”32 Mahan offered a similar sentiment in “A Twentieth-Century Outlook,” 
an essay for the Harper’s New Monthly Magazine:33 “The great task now before the 
world of civilized Christianity, its great mission, which it must fulfil or perish, is 
to receive into its own bosom and raise to its own ideals those ancient and differ-
ent civilizations by which it is surrounded and outnumbered�”34
Although written more than 450 years ago, Art of War at Sea is comprehensive 
and relevant, addressing the various elements of establishing, organizing, and 
employing naval power� It is innovative in the conceptualization of naval power 
as an instrument for countries’ political goals and economic interests� It considers 
perennial principles of strategy, with insights that remain valid and applicable� 
Additionally, its respectful approach is unique and commendable; its benevo-
lence and prescience guarantee this treatise a place in posterity� 
It was, therefore, a book ahead of its time, helping to establish the foundations 
of modern naval strategy� However, Art of War at Sea did not enjoy the inter-
national dissemination it deserved and has remained in obscurity, having been 
written in sixteenth-century Portuguese and never translated� This impediment 
will soon be overcome by a forthcoming English translation�35 The translation 
will allow the treatise to receive the attention it deserves, owing to its historical 
value, the broad range of issues analyzed, and its strategic insights, many of which 
ring true today� 
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 1� For more information on this emergence of 
naval thinking in Europe from the sixteenth 
century to the beginning of the seventeenth, 
see Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, “L’émergence 
d’une pensée navale en Europe au XVIe siècle 
et au début du XVIIe siècle,” in L’évolution de 
la pensée navale (Paris: Economica, 1994), 
vol� 4, available at www�institut-strategie�fr/�
 2� Full bibliographic information on the sources 
listed in table 1 is as follows� Antoine de 
Conflans, Les faiz de la marine et navigaiges 
(1516–20), printed in Augustin Jal, “Docu-
ments inédits sur l’histoire de la marine (XVIe 
siècle),” Annales maritimes et coloniales 2 
(1842), pp� 29–95� The book was republished 
in 1982 as Michel Mollat du Jourdin and Flo-
rence Chillaud-Toutée, “Le livre des faiz de la 
marine et navigaiges d’Antoine de Conflans, v� 
1516–1520,” in Actes du 107e Congrès national 
des sociétés savantes, Colloque d’histoire mari-
time (Paris: 1984), pp� 9–44� The fifty-one-
page scanned manuscript is available online 
at gallica�bnf�fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9059155s�
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  Alonso de Chaves, Quatri partitu en cosmo-
grafía práctica, y por otro nombre, Espejo de 
navegantes, ed� Paulino Castañeda Delgado, 
Mariano Cuesta Domingo, and Pilar Hernán-
dez Aparicio (Madrid: Instituto de Historia y 
Cultura Naval, 1983)�
  Cristoforo Da Canal, Della Milizia Marittima 
(Venice, It�: Filippi, 2010)�
  Da Canal, Della Milizia Marittima: Libri 
Quattro, ed� Mario Nani Mocenigo (Rome: 
Libreria dello Stato / Istituto Poligrafico dello 
Stato, 1930)�
  Fernando Oliveira, Arte da Guerra do Mar 
(Coimbra, Port�: João Alverez, Imprimidor do 
Rei, 1555)� There are only two copies of the 
original 152-page treatise, one in the National 
Library of Portugal, in Lisbon, and another 
in the Central Library of the Navy, also in 
Lisbon� The book has been republished four 
times: Fernando Oliveira, Arte da Guerra 
do Mar, with an introduction (“Comentário 
preliminar”) by Quirino da Fonseca and a 
study (“Comentário à Arte da Guerra do Mar 
do padre Fernando Oliveira”) by Alfredo 
Botelho de Sousa (Lisbon: Arquivo Histórico 
da Marinha, 1937); Fernando Oliveira, Arte 
da Guerra do Mar, with the introduction and 
study of the 1937 edition (Lisbon: Ministério 
da Marinha, 1969); Fernando Oliveira, Arte 
da Guerra do Mar, with the introduction and 
study of the 1937 edition (in Portuguese, 
English, and French) and with a facsimile of 
the original 1555 edition (Lisbon: Edições 
Culturais da Marinha, 1983); and Fernando 
Oliveira, Arte da Guerra do Mar: Estratégia e 
Guerra Naval no Tempo dos Descobrimentos, 
with an introduction (“O Padre Fernando 
Oliveira: Breve Apontamento Biográfico”) 
and a study (“A Obra: Estudo Introdutório 
à Arte da Guerra do Mar”) by António Silva 
Ribeiro, and a facsimile of the original 1555 
edition (Lisbon: Edições 70, 2008)�
 3� An English-language translation for publica-
tion is currently being prepared by Tiago 
Maurício� 
 4� This short biography is based on the 
following sources: Quirino da Fonseca, intro-
duction (“Comentário preliminar”) to Arte da 
Guerra do Mar (1969), pp� xi–xxxvii; Francis-
co Contente Domingues, “A expedição de au-
xílio ao rei de Velez em 1552: o relato oficial 
versus o testemunho de um participante,” in A 
Guerra Naval no Norte de África (séculos XV–
XIX), comp� Francisco Contente Domingues 
and Jorge Semedo de Matos (Lisbon: Edições 
Culturais da Marinha, 2003), pp� 157–72; 
António Silva Ribeiro, introduction (“O Padre 
Fernando Oliveira: Breve Apontamento Bio-
gráfico”) to Arte da Guerra do Mar (2008), pp� 
ix–xiii; João Gonçalves Gaspar, “Fernão de  
Oliveira: Humanista insubmisso e precursor,”  
in Fernando Oliveira: Um Humanista Genial 
—V Centenário do seu nascimento, ed� Carlos 
Morais (Aveiro, Port�: Universidade de 
Aveiro–Centro de Línguas e Culturas, 2009), 
pp� 31–82; Francisco Contente Domingues, 
“A enciclopédia do mar: o manuscrito da Ars 
Nautica e a sua história,” in ibid�, pp� 405–29�
 5� Oliveira claimed to have practiced and 
studied in shipyards in Spain, Italy, France, 
and England, and even in those of the Moors, 
probably in North Africa� Fernando Oliveira, 
Livro da Fábrica das Naus (Lisbon: Academia 
de Marinha, 1991)�
 6� Fernão de Oliveira, Grammatica da lingoa-
gem portuguesa (Lisbon: Germam Galharde, 
1536)� The book has been republished eight 
times, in 1871, 1933, 1936, 1975, 1981, 1988, 
2000, and 2002�
 7� His recommendations centered on the ef-
ficiency of the rowing arrangements� Oliveira, 
Arte da Guerra do Mar, pp� 71–72�
 8� Richard Barker, Fernando Oliveira: The En-
glish Episode, 1545–47 (Lisbon: Academia de 
Marinha, 1992), p� 16�
 9� Ibid�, p� 14�
 10� Harold Livermore, “Padre Oliveira’s Out-
burst,” Portuguese Studies 17 (2001), p� 41�
 11� Cod� VOSS� LAT� F 41, pp� 1–283v�
 12� Domingues, “A enciclopédia do mar,” pp� 
418–19� 
 13� Fernando Oliveira, Livro da Fabrica das Naos 
(c� 1580), printed in Henrique Lopes de  
Mendonça, “O Padre Fernando de Oliveira e 
a sua obra náutica� Memoria, compreenden-
do um estudo biográfico sobre o afamado 
grammatico e nautógrafo e a primeira repro-
ducção typographica do seu tratado inédito 
Livro da Fabrica das Naos,” Memorias da 
Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa 7, part 
2 (1898), pp� 149–221� The book has been 
republished twice, in 1991 and 1995� 
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 14� Cod� 3702, pp� 1–164�
 15� Fonds Portugais 12, pp� 1–176�
 16� Livermore, “Padre Oliveira’s Outburst,” p� 33�
 17� Oliveira, Arte da Guerra do Mar, prologue, 
n�p�
 18� Marcus Fabius Quintilianus was a Roman 
rhetorician of the first century ad� Aelianus 
Tacticus was a Greek military writer of the 
second century ad, author of the military 
treatise On Tactical Arrays of the Greeks� Plato 
was a famous Greek philosopher of the fifth 
to fourth century bc� Gaius Sallustius Cris-
pus, a Roman historian of the first century 
bc, wrote on the Catiline and Jugurthine 
wars� Diodorus Siculus, a Greek historian 
of the first century bc, is known for writing 
a monumental universal history, Historical 
Library� Alexander is, of course, the famous 
king of Macedonia and military genius of 
the fourth century bc� Aulus Gellius was a 
Latin author and grammarian of the second 
century ad� The writings of Marcus Vitruvius 
Pollio, a Roman author and architect of the 
first century bc, inspired Leonardo da Vinci 
to draw the Vitruvian Man� Gaius Plinius 
Secundus, a Roman author, philosopher, 
and military commander of the first century 
ad, wrote the encyclopedic Natural History� 
Julius Caesar, Roman general and statesman 
of the first century bc, played a key role in the 
demise of the Roman Republic and the rise of 
the Roman Empire� Marcus Terentius Varro 
was a Roman scholar and writer of the second 
and first centuries bc� Marcus Junianus Jus-
tinus, a Roman historian of the third century 
ad, wrote an abridgment of the monumental 
(forty-four book) historical work Historiarum 
Philippicarum� Marcus Tullius Cicero was a 
Roman politician, orator, and writer of the 
first century bc� Lucius Annaeus Seneca, a 
Roman statesman, philosopher, and dramatist 
of the first century ad, wrote tragedies still 
famous today� Marcus Porcius Cato was a 
Roman statesman and military commander 
of the third and second centuries bc� Sextus 
Julius Frontinus, a Roman senator of the 
first century ad, is best known for technical 
treatises, including one on military matters, 
Stratagems� Claudius Claudianus was a Ro-
man poet of the fourth century ad� Lucius 
Junius Moderatus Columella, a Roman 
author of the first century ad, was the most 
important writer on agriculture of the Roman 
Empire� Oliveira translated to Portuguese 
Columella’s masterpiece Res Rustica�
 19� Ambrose, an Italian bishop who became one 
of the most influential ecclesiastical figures 
of the fourth century, influenced, among 
others, Augustine� Aquinas, Italian priest 
and Dominican, was an extremely influential 
theologian and philosopher of the thirteenth 
century who further deepened Augustine’s 
arguments about just war�
 20� Flavi Vegeti Renati, Epitoma Rei Militaris 
(Leipzig: Editio Altera, 1885), pp� 150–66� 
 21� Barker, Fernando Oliveira, p� 9�
 22� António Silva Ribeiro, “Uma visão estratégica 
da Arte da Guerra do Mar,” Revista Militar 
2465/2466 (June–July 2007), pp� 719–33�
 23� Oliveira, Arte da Guerra do Mar, prologue, 
n�p�
 24� Ibid�, part 1, chap� 3, p� 19�
 25� Ibid�, part 2, chap� 14, p� 134�
 26� Ibid�, prologue, n�p�
 27� Ibid�, part 1, chap� 4, p� 23�
 28� Ibid�
 29� Ibid�, part 1, chap� 5, p� 27�
 30� Ibid�, part 1, chap� 3, p� 20�
 31� Ibid�, prologue, n�p�
 32� Ibid�
 33� Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America 
in Sea Power, Present and Future (London: 
Sampson Low, Marston, 1897)�
 34� Ibid�, p� 243�
 35� Tiago Maurício, Expanding the Naval Canon: 
Fernando de Oliveira and the 1st Treatise on 
Maritime Strategy (Washington, D�C�: Center 
for International Maritime Security, 16 July 
2014), available at cimsec�org/�
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From the sixth floor of the University of Chicago Gleacher Center you can look 
down the river and into the reflected prism of the bustling city’s concrete, steel, 
and glass� In the opposite direction you look out across Lake Michigan where the 
blue and grey come together at a far horizon� These remarkable vistas welcomed 
the second annual Defense Entrepreneurs Forum (DEF) in October 2014� Over 
one hundred and fifty military personnel, defense-industry professionals, and 
innovation experts came together for three days to discuss the issues and critical 
questions faced by American defense in the twenty-first century�
DEF was the brainchild of a small group of relatively junior officers� Coming 
out of more than a decade of war, many served with a high level of responsibility 
that is uncommon for young men and women� They encountered not just the 
issues of life and death that combat brings but also the demands of humanitar-
ian work for entire towns, nation-building responsibilities in large cities, and the 
need to come up with creative solutions to the problems they faced� Frequently 
this included working with limited resources or for an unresponsive, stagnant 
bureaucracy� They knew, with challenges looming in the coming decades, that 
the search for critical thinking needed an advocate 
in today’s military services�1
DEF was established to bring together those 
creative junior men and women, who heartily 
embrace the Silicon Valley definitions of the terms 
innovation and entrepreneur, with civilian work-
ers in the defense industry and both critics and 
current leaders� Through personal interaction at 
conferences and encouragement to advocate for 
ideas through professional writing, DEF’s board 
THE NEW YOUNG TURKS
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RESEARCH & DEBATE 
of directors looked to expand the circle of people talking about new ways of ad-
dressing the defense world� They aimed to support those who were being con-
structively critical of military organizations, particularly those inside the system�2
As a naval officer by profession and military helicopter pilot by trade, I was 
drawn to these ideas� As a historian by education, I also knew that the processes 
they were exploring and the grand narrative they looked to build were not quite 
as new and disruptive as some believed� Context, as is said, is king� 
Twice I’ve been asked to serve as a speaker at the annual DEF conference in 
Chicago, most recently as the opening keynote� My historical talks have looked 
to illuminate some of the recurring questions that come along with defense in-
novation and adaptation�3 But as I have interacted and collaborated with these 
inspired defense professionals, I have also come to realize that there is a great 
deal of history in the existence of this organization, despite its clearly twenty-
first-century roots�
A COMMENDABLE LITTLE INSTITUTION
Almost two hundred years ago during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, a pe-
riod emerged in U�S� naval history that some historians have termed an age of 
naval enlightenment� The first two decades after the U�S� Navy’s refounding in 
1798 were a busy time for naval officers, who saw four wars: the Quasi-War with 
France, First Barbary War, War of 1812, and Second Barbary War� The following 
Jackson years brought a period of relative peace for the service, opening up a 
period of reflection and professionalization�4
With less combat and fewer deployments, officers began considering the 
details of their service more closely� The officers assigned to the Brooklyn Navy 
Yard took inspiration from the lyceum movement that had spread across Europe� 
In 1833 they established the U�S� Naval Lyceum in a small building on the base� 
Dominated by junior officers, the group wrote in its constitution: “We, the Of-
ficers of the Navy and Marine Corps, in order to promote the diffusion of useful 
knowledge,—to foster a spirit of harmony and a community of interest in the 
service, and to cement the links which unite us as professional brethren, have 
formed ourselves into a Society, to be denominated ‘The United States Naval 
Lyceum�’”5
Their effort was twofold� First, they looked to establish a museum of artifacts, 
art, and curiosities that naval officers collected from their deployments across the 
seven seas� Second, they established the Naval Magazine to discuss the pressing 
issues of the day�
For two years the Naval Magazine was at the forefront of naval professional-
ism and criticism� Subjects for discussion included the military promotion sys-
tem and rank structure, the introduction of new technology like steam power, 
and strategic and geopolitical subjects� Unfortunately, the maintenance of the 
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   109 8/13/15   3:06 PM
114
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
 1 1 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
museum and building that housed the lyceum appears to have taken up a major-
ity of the funds, and the magazine ceased publication in 1837� But the ideals of 
innovation and reform were alive and well, as one of the magazine’s pseudony-
mous authors wrote: “The spirit of the times and the necessities of the navy loudly 
declare that change is requisite� We cannot remain as we are�”6
The lyceum lived on well beyond the last issue of the magazine, continuing to 
host lectures and talks on the vital naval subjects of the day� The museum’s col-
lection grew into an important repository� The New York Times described it as 
“a commendable little institution in every sense�”7 The members who established 
the organization as junior officers rose through the ranks and became important 
naval leaders of the Mexican-American War and the Civil War� They commanded 
America’s first steam-powered warships and led the Navy’s growing responsibili-
ties on the global stage� The lyceum established a vital intellectual foundation for 
military officers who looked to improve their service�
THE DECADE OF NEGLECT
Following the end of the American Civil War the United States continued a pat-
tern that has been displayed throughout its history by dramatically cutting back 
on defense spending� The War between the States, reconstructing the nation in 
its wake, and the promise of continued expansion westward guided the American 
populace to a continental, internal focus that led to cuts in the Navy’s size and 
capabilities� Many naval officers saw it as a decade of neglect�
In October 1873 fifteen of these officers came together on the grounds of the 
U�S� Naval Academy� Senior and junior commissioned naval officers, as well as 
warrant officers and Marines, they began as a discussion group to debate naval 
affairs and national and international issues� They named their society the United 
States Naval Institute� Many of the early meetings included discussing and com-
menting on papers that were prepared and presented by the members� They de-
cided to publish their own journal, containing the best of the papers and some of 
the commentary� In December 1874 the journal was first published as the Papers 
and Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute and is now known today as 
Proceedings magazine�8
Early members of the institute included officers who would have enormous 
impacts on the Navy and Marine Corps, and even the nation at large� Stephen 
Luce, one of the first officers to present a paper, is best known as the greatest 
advocate for, and founding President of, the U�S� Naval War College� His vir-
tual invention of American professional military education had an impact on 
strategic thought and military and naval affairs that rippled across generations� 
Another early member was Alfred Thayer Mahan, known to most students of 
military history for his strategic writing and his famous book The Influence of Sea 
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Power upon History� He was one of the institute’s earliest presidents� He began his 
publishing career with his essay on naval education in the pages of Proceedings� 
From Civil War officers like Admiral David Dixon Porter to the future Spanish-
American War leaders like W� T� Sampson and George Dewey, the organization 
grew rapidly� The articles published in Proceedings questioned the status quo and 
raised American knowledge of naval affairs as the country came out of its Mani-
fest Destiny period and returned its attention to the larger world�9
The U�S� Naval Institute and Proceedings began primarily as a place for junior 
and midlevel officers to express their ideas and advocate for reform� Over time 
they continued that tradition but also became a place for thought leaders, from 
senior admirals to established academics, to debate the issues with upstart junior 
officers and military critics who looked to move in new directions� The profes-
sional society officially adopted the mission “to provide an independent forum 
for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the profes-
sional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical 
to national defense�”10
REGENERATING SERVICE INTELLECTS
Forty years after the officers met in Annapolis another group gathered in discus-
sion in Hampshire, England� These Royal Navy officers saw the approach of the 
Great War and feared that their service was unprepared� They met, as Reginald 
Plunkett said, to develop “some means of regenerating Service intellects before 
Armageddon�”11 These British sailors were focused on their own officer corps, 
which they believed needed a greater understanding of naval affairs and war as 
the United Kingdom approached the looming conflict� 
Inspired by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the noted civilian strategist 
Sir Julian Corbett, they founded what was originally thought of as a correspon-
dence society� The purpose was to bring junior officers together in discussions 
for their own self-improvement� In 1913 they began publication of a journal 
titled the Naval Review� There was significant official resistance from the newly 
established Naval War Staff, and during World War I the Admiralty ordered the 
Naval Review to cease publication� However, W� H� Henderson, the editor at the 
time, continued to collect material and even circulated some of it to members in 
the original spirit of a correspondence society� At the end of the war the Naval 
Review began publication again, including the material Henderson had collected, 
to ensure there wasn’t a loss of lessons learned from the conflict�12
When publication began again in 1919, Henderson’s opening article specifi-
cally took inspiration from the U�S� Naval Institute but looked to take a uniquely 
British tack� Concerns that expressing contrarian views would have a negative 
impact on the careers of junior officers, who were the target audience, led to a 
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unique editorial policy� Where Proceedings has a clear editorial requirement for 
authors to write under their own names, and the Naval Magazine encouraged the 
use of pseudonyms, the Naval Review elected not to use bylines at all� Articles 
were considered “from the membership,” and the editors diligently protected the 
contributors�13
The no-name policy had a secondary impact� Senior officers or establish-
ment supporters could write counterarguments without standing on their rank� 
Genuine debates about naval subjects were fostered through the process� Over 
the course of time the publication, which is still active and vibrant today, has 
gone through cycles of official approval as well as censure from the Admiralty� 
In World War II there was no censorship, and the “Diary of the War at Sea” pub-
lished in the journal’s pages has become an important historical record� Today, 
the Naval Review has adjusted its editorial policy to allow both pseudonyms and 
real names, increasing flexibility for writers and editors while maintaining the 
ability to protect new thinkers� Like Proceedings in the United States, it has be-
come the central place for discussions of naval affairs and constructive criticism 
from inside the naval sphere�14 
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY YOUNG TURKS
At the start of the twentieth century a cadre of revolutionaries in Ottoman Turkey 
was first described with the label the Young Turks� Across the past hundred years 
the label came to mean a new breed or a young advocate for change� American 
politicians in the 1920s and beyond have described the junior officers who drove 
debate and writing in the pages of the Naval Magazine, Proceedings, and the 
Naval Review as Young Turks� Today, the members and leaders of DEF follow in 
the wake of these previous reformers and idealists� The ease of access to publish-
ing created by digital and social media has led to a growing proliferation of new 
groups looking to foster ideas and critical debate� Examples include think-tank 
Internet forums like the Center for International Maritime Security (based in 
Washington, D�C�); blogs focused on strategy, policy, and leadership, such as the 
Bridge (also known as the Strategy Bridge on Facebook and Twitter) and War 
Council; and more formal web-based publications like War on the Rocks�
These new organizations should look to the history of reform-minded socie-
ties of the past to help chart their way� The career dangers from a military culture 
that remains conservative and slow to change are still real for internal critics, 
despite historical examples of successful reformers� Many senior officers still ap-
pear to ascribe to Admiral Arleigh Burke’s invective that “dissent is not a virtue�” 
Because of this, questions of attribution and clearly stated publication policies are 
important for the new Young Turks to consider� The longevity of Proceedings and 
the Naval Review offers both examples and warnings about balancing new ideas 
and criticism with explanations and defense of established policies�
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It is inspiring to see those who are interested in looking at their military ser-
vice, or employment in the defense world, with a critical eye� The field of critical 
military studies sometimes focuses on the work of academic, political, or civilian-
interest groups to reform our military forces and defense industries from the 
outside� These groups can occasionally be seen as antagonistic toward those who 
wear uniforms, or even dismissive of them� However, criticism and dissent from 
within the armed forces are important drivers of change and adaptation� Publica-
tions, formerly in print but now commonly online, where these thinkers express 
themselves remain a vital outlet not only for forwarding modern debate and in-
novation but also for studying the past successes and failures of military criticism� 
Finding organizations that, like DEF, aim to bring civilian and uniformed crit-
ics together to think of new ideas and harvest solutions will be an important part 
of progress in the twenty-first century�
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BOOK REVIEWS
A CALL FOR RESTRAINT
Posen, Barry R� Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, N�Y�: Cornell Univ� 
Press, 2014� 234pp� $29�95
Sometimes, less is more� “More” may 
seem the order of the day in U�S� security 
policy, between ISIS, Ukraine, and other 
issues, but MIT political scientist Barry 
Posen offers a powerful cry for “less!” 
His book Restraint: A New Foundation 
for U.S. Grand Strategy calls for doing 
less, promising less, and spending less 
than the United States does today� The 
book is not a plea for isolationism or 
disarmament, but it makes a convincing 
case that America’s current strategy of 
“liberal hegemony” is both wasteful and 
counterproductive, creating more prob-
lems than it solves� Posen’s strategy is not 
entirely novel—it is a form of offshore 
balancing—but Restraint is a worthy 
contribution� The book offers the most 
thorough and theoretically grounded 
rationale for offshore balancing to date, 
as well as practical diplomatic and 
defense planning recommendations, in a 
concise and well-organized monograph�
Posen has not always been in the re-
straint camp� A long-standing scholar 
of grand strategy, in the 1990s Posen 
favored “selective engagement”—main-
taining U�S� alliances and forward pres-
ence in Europe, Asia, and the Persian 
Gulf, but eschewing liberal intervention-
ism or pursuit of global primacy� Why 
should America now pull back? First, 
Posen argues, the relative economic and 
military strength of the United States has 
eroded; supplying security while allies 
take a free ride is not affordable� U�S� 
soft power has also been diminished by 
the excesses of liberal hegemony� The 
Iraq war, the Kosovo war (the geopoliti-
cal consequences of which Americans 
underestimate), NATO expansion, “color 
revolutions,” and the like convinced Chi-
na, Russia, and even democracies like 
Brazil that America is not a status quo 
power, and many nations now affirma-
tively challenge U�S� activism� Third, na-
tionalism remains a potent force—contra 
the predictions of liberals—meaning 
that an anti–United States stance is 
good politics in many countries, and 
that U�S� meddling in other regions 
motivates nonstate extremist groups� 
Posen recommends two basic changes 
in U�S� military intervention and 
military posture� He believes the 
United States should avoid intervention 
by force in other nations’ politics—
whether preemptive regime change or 
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“humanitarian” operations in the middle 
of civil wars� The more fundamental 
change he advocates is for the United 
States to withdraw gradually from secu-
rity guarantees and permanent forward 
basing of American forces� Pulling back 
would incentivize allies—NATO, Japan 
and South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
etc�—to provide more of their own 
security� Posen recognizes and accepts 
that some allies might go nuclear in 
response, but he sees such prolifera-
tion as less risky than U�S� entangle-
ment, particularly since some allies 
treat U�S� support as a blank check for 
reckless behavior� In Posen’s world, the 
United States would rely on local power 
balancing to prevent the rise of regional 
hegemons in Eurasia, on nuclear deter-
rence as an ultimate backstop for the 
United States, and on “command of the 
commons” both to prevent power pro-
jection by others against U�S� interests 
and to facilitate American involvement 
in Eurasia if that becomes necessary� 
Perhaps the most compelling case 
against this minimalist approach comes 
from fellow realists like Robert Art, who 
would agree with the critique of liberal 
hegemony but argue that the costs of 
U�S� alliances and forward basing are 
better than the risks inherent in letting 
local powers sort out power relation-
ships on their own� The United States 
might be safe from attack, but regional 
wars could damage the global economy, 
bringing painful recessions to American 
citizens� Posen does address that argu-
ment, responding essentially that there is 
a great deal of ruin in a global economy 
(apologies to Adam Smith)� True, there 
is much alarmism on the subject, par-
ticularly around oil shocks, but one still 
wonders about applying past examples 
of neutral countries doing fine during 
major wars to today’s tightly coupled 
supply chains and financial markets� 
Posen also offers force structure implica-
tions� Many grand strategy proposals 
leap directly from foreign policy ideas to 
laundry lists of weapons to purchase or 
cancel� To his credit, Posen conducts the 
intermediate linking step of identifying 
military missions and broad operating 
concepts (the guidance provided—in 
theory—by a National Military Strat-
egy)� The core recommendation is to 
design a force for securing “command 
of the commons,” i�e�, sea, air, and space� 
This is an idea Posen has advocated for 
some time, but is fully appropriate to 
offshore balancing� The Navy fares very 
well in his recommended force structure, 
e�g�, keeping nine carriers, while the 
Army and Marines take the bulk of cuts� 
Overall Posen thinks spending 2�5 per-
cent of GDP on defense would suffice, a 
25 percent cut from today’s base budget� 
While it is suited to his strategy, some 
might criticize Posen’s proposed force 
as too conventional in its details—i�e�, 
emphasizing aircraft carriers in the 
face of growing threats like the Chinese 
DF-21 missile� There is room for more 
attention to such emerging challenges� 
That said, Posen’s strategy would have 
little requirement for close-in U�S� 
strikes against the Chinese or Russian 
homeland versus being able to thwart 
an adversary’s attempts to project 
power across open oceans at us�
For those familiar with the grand strat-
egy literature, the broad case in Restraint 
is in line with those of other offshore 
balancers, like John Mearsheimer, Steve 
Walt, and Christopher Layne� What 
Posen adds is a comprehensive theory-
grounded analysis of the problems 
of liberal hegemony and merits of an 
offshore approach, backed by forty-five 
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pages of endnotes� Uniquely, the book 
also develops practical recommenda-
tions for implementing the strategy 
with serious attention to timelines and 
regional nuances� Where Layne’s Peace 
of Illusions traces historical failings of 
the hegemonic approach, Restraint is 
a timely, fleshed-out policy proposal� 
Ultimately, many policy makers will nev-
er get past page 1, where Posen defines 
American national security interests as 
the traditional sovereignty, safety, terri-
tory, and international power position� 
Threats to those are modest and Posen 
makes a compelling case they are best 
managed through limited overseas com-
mitments� On the other hand, many in 
Washington believe American hegemony 
—euphemized as “leadership”—is in 
and of itself a fundamental interest, and 
that no economic and physical risks are 
acceptable� That one televised beheading 
five thousand miles away can so alarm 
America suggests this will not change 
soon� For those willing to think criti-
cally about America’s security needs, 
however, Restraint offers a deeply logical 
challenge and a thoughtful blueprint�
DAVID T� BURBACH
Stavridis, James G� The Accidental Admiral: A 
Sailor Takes Command at NATO. Annapolis, Md�: 
Naval Institute Press, 2014� 288pp� $32�95
In the early days of the Second World 
War, General Eisenhower, the first 
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, 
struggled to keep the alliance together� 
One of the more interesting anecdotes 
about this struggle is when he almost 
fired a member of his staff because the 
officer was, shall we say, culturally insen-
sitive� The story goes that an American 
officer, a colonel on Eisenhower’s staff, 
insulted a British officer by calling him 
a British bastard� Ike wasn’t pleased� 
Ike threatened to bust him down to 
private� Being a bastard, he said, was not 
a national characteristic� All were equal 
in the eyes of the allies� But admittedly, 
handling NATO has not gotten any 
easier over the years� Secretary Gates, 
prior to his departure, had some choice 
words for the alliance, urging more 
NATO members to meet the required 2 
percent of their GDP on defense spend-
ing� America, he noted, continues to 
pick up the slack—from Afghanistan 
to Libya� Yet the alliance remains�
Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret�), 
most recently Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe (SACEUR) and 
commander of U�S� European Com-
mand (EUCOM), and unofficially, the 
Navy’s advocate of the well-known 
John Adams quotation—“Let us 
tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore 
the means of knowledge� Let us dare 
to read, think, speak and write”—has 
written an enjoyable memoir of his 
time in Eisenhower’s old chair� 
Stavridis’s memoir stays away from criti-
cism of U�S� officials and discussions of 
contentious closed-door meetings� This 
is in contrast to two other high-profile, 
former administration officials’ memoirs 
—those of Ambassador Christopher Hill 
and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta 
—which were published around the 
same time to much hoopla� While 
Stavridis was dual hatted as SACEUR 
and EUCOM his reputation around the 
headquarters was one of civility and 
intelligence, certainly not a bad combi-
nation� Stavridis says he wants to show 
the reader not what happened during his 
four years, but rather why it happened� 
He proceeds to take the reader on a tour 
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of challenges: from the toppling of Qad-
hafi to the civil war in Syria, Israeli secu-
rity, a resurgent Russia, the Balkans, and 
finally, of course, Afghanistan� Thus the 
first few chapters are a whirlwind of in-
dividuals, meetings, and events� Among 
all this, he often pauses within chapters 
to highlight some of the more important 
senior military and political officials 
that make up the NATO alliance�
Stavridis spends considerable time 
in these early chapters setting up the 
facts—stating what happened—and 
then trying to balance it against why 
it happened and what he learned from 
it� The first part of the book, however, 
feels rushed and compressed, and even 
in his best efforts the balance tilts 
toward more numbers and facts and 
away from a deep exploration of the 
why� If there was one weakness, this is 
it� You are left wanting more discus-
sion on how the policy was shaped 
in Washington and in Brussels� What 
was the dialogue during these many 
meetings? And why was it persuasive? 
The second part of the book shines� 
Here he discusses leadership, strategic 
planning, innovation, and strategic 
communication� All of these chapters 
are excellent and well worth the price of 
the book� In one chapter, Stavridis talks 
about the actions that led to Generals 
McChrystal’s and Petraeus’s resigna-
tions—and his own stumbles� It is here 
he almost passes the George Orwell test� 
Orwell once said, “Autobiography is only 
to be trusted when it reveals something 
disgraceful� A man who gives a good 
account of himself is probably lying, 
since any life when viewed from the 
inside is simply a series of defeats�” And 
for Stravridis it is not all good� Stavridis 
explains that he was nominated to be 
the Chief of Naval Operations, following 
what was, by many accounts, a success-
ful tour as the supreme allied command-
er� This was not to be� He describes, 
plainly, that some of his official travel 
was not properly paid for, and a single 
trip was deemed questionable by the 
inspector general� He accepted respon-
sibility for his and his staff ’s mistakes, 
and made reparations� Although he was 
cleared by the Secretary of the Navy 
from any wrongdoing, the long inves-
tigation was enough to complicate the 
political winds that are Washington, and 
the Secretary of Defense had to remove 
his nomination� While certainly not ris-
ing to Orwell’s definition of disgraceful, 
nonetheless, it was not his shining hour� 
For this reader, the stories of his days 
commanding USS Barry, beautifully 
captured in his book Destroyer Captain, 
remain my favorite� Its style, written in 
a journalist’s hand, is intimate and mov-
ing—a man that loves the sea yet knows 
he is human and only can go as far as his 
crew takes him� Still, his new memoir 
is a refreshing dose of honesty, intel-
ligence, and reflection—much needed 
in today’s Navy and tomorrow’s leaders� 
CHRISTOPHER NELSON
Winklareth, Robert J� The Battle of the Denmark 
Strait: A Critical Analysis of the Bismarck’s Singu-
lar Triumph� Havertown, Pa�: Casemate Publish-
ers, 2012� 336pp� $32�95
From Johnny Horton’s 1960 ballad 
“Sink the Bismarck” to James Cameron’s 
Expedition Bismarck for the Discovery 
Channel in 2002, the sole sortie of the 
German battleship in May 1941 has 
held the attention of both the general 
public and naval historians� The latter 
mainly concentrate on the destruction of 
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Bismarck on 27 May after a lucky aerial 
torpedo hit disabled the ship’s steering 
mechanism� Not so Robert Winklareth�  
His focus instead is on Bismarck’s “sin-
gular triumph” in destroying the British 
battle cruiser Hood three days earlier� 
A 38 cm shell from its fifth salvo sliced 
through Hood’s armored side below 
the aft turrets, setting off first the 4 in� 
secondary armament magazine and 
then the main 15 in� magazine� Only 3 
of its complement of 1,421 survived�
So, what is new? Winklareth, a mili-
tary weapons systems expert, traces all 
action at sea in five-second intervals� 
He primarily uses translated German 
records of the battle of the Denmark 
Strait to offer a salvo-by-salvo analysis, 
to re-create the speed and headings of 
the major combatants, and to determine 
the precise firing angles and effects of 
the heavy guns� Unsurprisingly, the book 
is highly detailed and a feast mainly for 
naval engineering and gunnery enthu-
siasts� It is complemented by count-
less charts, diagrams, photographs, 
and pencil drawings (by the author)� 
Winklareth’s own battle is with the 
(unnamed) historians who claim that 
just before the engagement with Hood, 
Bismarck, in a mere six minutes, came 
up the port side of the heavy cruiser 
Prinz Eugen, crossed its wake to its 
starboard side, and then recrossed the 
cruiser’s wake to take up position on its 
port side again (15–16, 258)� What he 
calls a “reversed photo” error resulted 
in this assumption� Few will cross 
swords with the author on this matter�
On the other hand, serious historians 
of the battle will take umbrage at two 
of Winklareth’s strong statements, both 
on the first page (11) of the book� His 
claim that the battle of the Denmark 
Strait “was undoubtedly one of the most 
famous and most important naval battles 
of World War II” will raise the hackles 
especially of historians of the U�S� Navy 
in the Pacific 1941–45� And his sec-
ond claim, that the encounter between 
Bismarck and Hood “is perhaps the most 
documented event in naval history,” 
will come as news to German naval 
historians who are all too aware of the 
fact that Bismarck’s war diary (Kriegs-
tagebuch) went down with the ship�
With regard to the broader aspects of the 
battle of the Denmark Strait, Winklareth 
spends a great deal of time sketching 
out the past histories of the German and 
British navies as well as the major ship 
designs of the two powers� The ac-
tual artillery duel between the German 
battleship and the British battle cruiser, 
in fact, consumes but half a dozen pages 
of chapter 13� Unfortunately, there is 
no attempt to place “Operation Rhein-
übung,” the German sortie into the 
Atlantic, into the wider context of Grand 
Admiral Erich Raeder’s double-pole 
strategy of attacking Britain’s maritime 
commerce with two modern battle 
fleets in the Atlantic Ocean, while a 
third fleet of elderly battleships tied 
the Royal Navy down in the North Sea� 
The reader deserved this analysis�
HOLGER H� HERWIG
Untermeyer, Chase� Inside Reagan’s Navy: The 
Pentagon Journals. College Station: Texas A&M 
Univ� Press, 2015� 352pp� $25
The Washington diary is something of a 
lost art these days� Instead, we have to be 
satisfied with books of instant journal-
ism using largely anonymous sources or 
memoirs too often tendentiously crafted 
after the fact� Chase Untermeyer is a 
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wonderful outlier� Apparently, Unter-
meyer started keeping a diary at age 
nine, and has already published excerpts 
covering his initial Washington service 
as executive assistant to Vice President 
George Bush (1981–83)� This latest 
volume covers the period of his service 
in the office of the Secretary of the 
Navy (1983–88), during the tenures of 
John F� Lehman and later James Webb 
as Secretary of the Navy� The result 
is an engaging portrait of the glories 
and miseries of life within the Beltway� 
Though lighthearted and refreshingly 
modest, Untermeyer’s book also offers 
up telling anecdotes and keen insights 
into the practice—or lack thereof—of 
civilian control of the United States Navy 
at a critical juncture of the Cold War�
Though he had served briefly in the 
Navy as a very junior officer, Unter-
meyer was the classic political appointee� 
Born in Texas and educated at Harvard, 
he became involved in Texas politics and 
was elected to the statehouse in 1976� 
After his stint working directly under 
the vice president, Untermeyer was 
appointed initially as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Installations 
and Facilities, and then for some four 
years served as Assistant Secretary for 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs� Both 
jobs are political plums, offering many 
opportunities for ingratiation of the 
holder with defense contractors and 
members of Congress� Untermeyer 
makes no attempt to hide his own am-
bitions, or the intoxicating effects of 
constant mingling with the good and 
the great not only in Washington but on 
many tours of inspection or protocol in 
the provinces� (At one point, he charm-
ingly announces that he has at last be-
come a “toff ”)� But he also makes clear 
that he took his responsibilities seriously 
and was intent on serving the boss well�
And what a boss! To get the flavor of 
John Lehman, it is hard to improve on 
this riff of Untermeyer’s at Lehman’s 
farewell party at the Naval Observatory 
in April 1987: “People have asked me, 
what’s the difference between Jim Webb 
and John Lehman? And I’ve said that the 
thing to remember is that Jim is a former 
Marine officer� Tell him to take a hill, 
and he’ll take the hill� But with John it’s 
a little different� Tell him to take a hill, 
and the first thing he’ll do is get together 
with Mel Paisley [perhaps best described 
as his consigliere] for a few drinks to 
concoct the plan� � � � Then John will 
start a competition among real estate 
agents over the purchase price of the 
hill� Next he’ll go to the senator in whose 
state the hill is located and make a deal: 
the Navy will build the chrome bumper-
guard assembly for the Trident sub in 
his hometown if the senator will slip an 
amendment into the Wild and Scenic 
Areas Act to purchase the hill� Then, 
with the money saved from the competi-
tion, John buys another Aegis cruiser�”
Lehman’s methods did not appeal to 
everyone, and in fact could be outra-
geous; but he could claim results� He 
nearly achieved the “600 ship Navy” 
for which he lobbied so ferociously� But 
the Navy leadership was ambivalent 
toward him� He had a habit of break-
ing Navy crockery—for example, by 
forcing the Naval Academy to put more 
humanities in its curriculum, and by 
engineering the retirement of Admiral 
Hyman Rickover (the story of Rickover’s 
tantrum in his departing courtesy call 
with Ronald Reagan is told with great 
relish at the beginning of Lehman’s 
memoir Command of the Sea)� Anyone 
concerned about the current state of 
civil-military relations in Washington 
would do well to read this book� 
CARNES LORD
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Armstrong, Benjamin F�, ed� 21st Century Sims: 
Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the 
Modern Era. Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015� 176pp� $21�95
Over a century after first being com-
posed, the writings of Admiral William 
S� Sims continue to have relevance to 
all Navy leaders� Benjamin Armstrong 
has compiled a selection of Proceedings 
articles (originally published between 
1905 and 1940) and provides an in-
formative perspective of the character 
and career of Admiral Sims and the 
impact of his initiatives on innovation 
and commitment to leader develop-
ment� Armstrong introduces us to the 
young Lieutenant Sims as he begins his 
journey of revolution in Navy strategy, 
education, and ship design� From the 
deck plate to the President of the Naval 
War College, we gain an appreciation for 
Admiral Sims’s career and his achieve-
ments from this compelling collection 
of his writings that resonate with the 
challenges of the twenty-first century�
Armstrong’s commentary provides us 
with insights into each topic’s rel-
evance� From the “Gun Doctor” and 
“The Battleships of High Speed” to the 
chapter on military character, we view 
the development of Admiral Sims as a 
military leader as someone who chal-
lenges the bureaucracy of the military 
institution� In his lecture on military 
character, Sims reflects on the qualifica-
tions of a military leader and emphasizes 
a strong moral character as essential for 
the development of a military leader� 
While this was written in 1916, this topic 
remains critical for the development of 
twenty-first-century military leaders� 
Sims’s perspective provides a lens for 
the reader to evaluate breaches in ethics, 
morality, and decision making in the 
twenty-first century� Sims challenges 
each person to view character as an ele-
ment of leadership and effective decision 
making� He commands officers that “it is 
the duty of every officer to study his own 
character that he may improve it�” Upon 
reflection, this is perhaps the most im-
portant message taken from this volume 
of articles, as moral character underlies 
and reinforces decision making� Today, 
in an era during which our nation’s 
military leaders have committed numer-
ous ethical violations, there is a moral 
imperative to develop military character 
as part of the education process of every 
military officer� For it is from the foun-
dation of their moral character that lead-
ership matures and enables our nation’s 
military leaders to build a bridge of trust 
between the military and our nation�
This collection of Sims’s writings and 
Armstrong’s analysis provides a lens 
for us to view and share Sims’s perspec-
tives as he moves through the pre– and 
post–World War I period� Although 
Sims’s career was nearly a century ago, 
the issues he addressed remain current, 
including acquisition reform, techno-
logical deficiencies, and the need to 
educate Navy leaders� Armstrong invites 
us to accompany Sims on his journey as 
he moves across Europe, inspecting and 
reporting on the deficiencies of gunnery 
and battleship designs� Imagine, if you 
will, meeting the young Lieutenant Sims 
as he moves around Europe checking 
on the newest advances in ship design� 
A young Lieutenant Commander Sims 
boldly sparks criticism with his critique 
of gunnery techniques, technologies, 
and platforms, as he sets the course for 
a career of innovation� Impervious to 
criticism, Sims challenges bureaucracy 
and is the first to push for a change in 
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gunnery and the development of  
continuous-aim fire� He begins to  
innovate!
Sims forged the Navy in preparation 
for World War I with his focus on 
naval gunnery, battleship design, and 
destroyer operations� Always the rebel 
and revolutionary, his insights were 
grounded on firsthand knowledge and 
experience� Sims was a critical thinker 
whose ability to evaluate technologies 
and platform designs was matched by 
his determination to fight for those 
changes required for military readi-
ness� He abhorred risk-averse behavior 
and what he termed “military con-
servatism,” referring to the “danger-
ous reluctance to accept new ideas�”  
From Sims’s perspective, the opportu-
nity for officers to conduct war games 
served to enhance the development of 
critical thinking skills and innovative 
operational solutions� He would enjoy 
exploring advanced technologies, such 
as drones, networks of autonomous, 
unmanned systems, and artificial 
intelligence, and would integrate these 
technologies into military war-fighting 
capabilities� Sims would be the first 
to accept and adopt these technolo-
gies to gain a military advantage� 
As President of the Naval War College, 
Sims exemplified a career dedicated to 
the education and development of Navy 
leaders� Throughout his career, Sims 
emphasized the need for the develop-
ment of leaders with strong moral 
character, who were capable of strategic 
thinking and effective decision making�
Sims continues to inspire and challenge 
a new generation of Navy leaders� Sims 
would remind us that the main objec-
tive of the Navy is to prepare for war! He 
cautions us to be aware of our own fleet’s 
vulnerabilities and tasks us to remain 
vigilant with regard to maintaining 
military readiness� While I would not 
presume to know how he would handle 
each of the military crises in today’s mil-
itary operational environment, I would 
offer that Sims would applaud the Naval 
War College’s commitment to excellence 
in education and its commitment to de-
veloping revolutionary innovative naval 
warfare concepts through war gaming� 
In conclusion, Sims serves as a model 
for all leaders and challenges us to 
examine our personal and professional 
development� How do we compare in 
our dedication to duty, our commit-
ment to discipline and moral courage, 
our ability to innovate, and our ability 
to challenge ourselves continuously by 
learning? One could argue that we need 
a young Lieutenant Sims today if we are 
to remain a world power� The question 
is, Would we recognize a Lieutenant 
Sims in the twenty-first-century Navy? 
This is a welcome addition to the 21st 
Century Foundations series from the 
Naval Institute Press, informative, 
inspiring, and a must-read for those 
interested in leader development� The 
bibliography provides further read-
ing recommendations to enhance 
the reader’s interest in this topic�
YVONNE R� MASAKOWSKI
Kaiser, David� No End Save Victory: How FDR 
Led the Nation into War� New York: Basic Books, 
2014� 408pp� $28
David Kaiser’s No End Save Victory 
stands out as the best of several books 
published in 2014 that examine FDR’s 
leadership during the interlude between 
the fall of France and the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in December 
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1941� In contrast to Lynne Olson’s Those 
Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and 
America’s Fight over World War II, Susan 
Dunn’s 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, 
Hitler—the Election amid the Storm, 
and Nicholas Wapshott’s The Sphinx: 
Franklin Roosevelt, the Isolationists, 
and the Road to World War II, Kaiser 
extends his analysis beyond the domes-
tic struggle between Roosevelt and the 
isolationists� While his analysis includes 
discussions of congressional politics, 
neutrality legislation, the America First 
Committee, and the election of 1940, 
it encompasses additional dimensions 
that shaped FDR’s foreign and security 
policy ranging from the role of ULTRA 
and MAGIC intercepts to naval and 
military advice regarding capabilities 
and force development� Kaiser presents a 
wide-ranging analysis of policy, strat-
egy, capacity, and mobilization during a 
period when danger loomed but much 
of the public opposed direct military 
intervention in the ongoing conflicts 
in Europe, China, and the Atlantic� 
His cast of individuals and institutions 
includes not only the familiar top tier of 
figures and committees but the military 
planners, labor union bosses, business 
leaders, and second tier of executive 
officials who translated FDR’s visionary 
ideas into tangible plans and policies�
Kaiser is particularly skillful in three 
areas� Most strikingly, his narrative does 
a marvelous job of capturing the flavor 
of FDR’s decision making� While highly 
organized individuals such as Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief 
of Staff George Marshall could be  
driven to distraction by the president’s  
intuitive—sometimes meandering— 
approach to strategy and planning, the 
reader gains an understanding of what 
Roosevelt was doing� He was exploring 
and creating options� He was testing 
ideas and concepts, sometimes dropping 
them and sometimes merely pocketing 
them for later use at the appropriate 
time and place� Kaiser repeatedly points 
out how Roosevelt prodded subordinates 
to provide him feedback on various 
germinating concepts months and 
sometimes years before they became 
policy, with Lend-Lease, the destroyers-
for-bases deal, the occupation of Iceland 
and Greenland, and the oil embargo of 
Japan among the concepts he examined 
discreetly and informally well before he 
unveiled his intentions to cabinet mem-
bers, congressional leaders, and allies� 
Second, Kaiser makes clear that FDR 
was thinking in terms of victory over 
the Axis powers even while Marshall, 
Hap Arnold, and others remained 
focused on hemispheric defense and 
building up American forces in 1939 
and 1940� Even before the outbreak of 
war in Europe, Roosevelt grasped the 
importance of airpower, pushing for a 
huge air force “so that we do not need to 
have a huge army�” Likewise, the Two-
Ocean Navy Act passed in the summer 
of 1940, providing the U�S� Navy with 
the means to mount offensives in the 
Pacific even while supporting Anglo-
American amphibious assaults in the 
Mediterranean and France in 1943–44� 
Lastly, Kaiser takes on the latest genera-
tion of literature postulating that FDR 
sought to find a “back door to war” 
against Germany by implementing an oil 
embargo of Japan that he knew would 
provoke a Japanese military response� 
Kaiser weighs the evidence very care-
fully, and while he concludes that FDR 
was fully aware that implementing the 
embargo might lead to war with Japan, 
FDR was reacting to MAGIC intercepts 
that indicated that the Japanese occu-
pation of southern French Indochina 
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was designed to prepare the way for the 
conquest of Singapore and the Dutch 
East Indies� FDR, aware that Japan had 
plans for continued expansion, sim-
ply did not see why the United States 
should supply Japan with the means 
for its southward drive� Kaiser puts it 
as follows: “The American embargo 
did not lead the Japanese to decide on 
a southward advance� That decision 
had taken place before the American 
freeze of Japanese assets” (258)� 
Kaiser’s work is a must-read for those 
interested in strategy, policy, and 
the preparation for war� Kaiser rates 
Roosevelt’s performance very highly� 
While the book lacks a bibliography, 
the endnotes confirm that the work 
rests on a thorough use of both primary 
and secondary sources� Those seeking 
to understand how Roosevelt prepared 
the United States for a war he viewed as 
inevitable will find this book insight-
ful, delightful, and multilayered�
DOUGLAS PEIFER
Fisher, David� Morality and War: Can War Be Just 
in the Twenty-First Century? Oxford Univ� Press, 
2012� 320pp� $30 (paperback) 
David Fisher’s recent book, Morality and 
War, offers an account of the philosophi-
cal foundations of the just war tradition 
that integrates various contemporary 
forms of ethics into a new approach 
he calls “virtuous consequentialism�” 
He argues against moral skeptics and 
antifoundationalists, insisting that some 
account of the underpinnings of moral-
ity must be given if moral prescription 
is to maintain its normative force and 
not collapse into relativism� For Fisher, 
thinkers as diverse as Isaiah Berlin and 
Michael Walzer succumb to a false 
dichotomy; the impoverished moral 
vocabulary of the twentieth century 
forces them to oscillate between two 
extremes—an infallible totalitarian-
ism and a groundless liberalism� In this 
picture, any attempt to define what is 
required for all humans at all times and 
everywhere to flourish is seen as the 
attempt to subjugate one’s own choices 
to an irrationally inerrant worldview, 
which in the postmodern age is criti-
cized as feigning objectivity for the 
interests of prevailing power structures� 
Countering this, Fisher adopts an 
Aristotelian approach to moral theory� 
Aristotle’s teleology allowed him to 
understand the life of virtue as both 
necessary for all human flourishing 
and pluralistic in its manifold expres-
sion� Both the athlete and the artisan 
might flourish as human beings just 
so long as they possess the virtues, 
even if it is understood that courage, 
justice, and the rest are expressed in 
very different ways between the two; 
and a soldier’s courage is the same even 
when comparisons are made between 
drastically different times and places� 
Yet despite this endorsement of Ar-
istotle, Fisher believes that no single 
moral theory—Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
utilitarianism, deontology—adequately 
accounts for the complexity of our 
contemporary moral lives� Therefore, 
his project combines consequential-
ism with virtue ethics because he sees 
each as having something the other 
requires to make sense of contemporary 
morality� Fisher argues that to know 
what the right thing to do might be in 
a given situation we must reflect on 
how our actions conduce to human 
flourishing but also understand our 
actions’ consequences� That is, virtue 
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theory provides but one piece of what 
is required and cannot fully account for 
the richness of our moral experience� 
Fisher’s hybrid approach results in a 
theory about war that rejects a firm 
distinction between the morality of 
the individual and that of the political 
community� He answers Plato’s question 
“why be just?” by saying that one should 
be just because it is in one’s self-interest� 
However, Fisher advocates an under-
standing of self-interest that goes beyond 
what he thinks is a post-Enlightenment 
preoccupation with selfish individual-
ism and takes into account our com-
munal nature as social animals� Justice 
is necessary for the proper functioning 
of society, and since man is funda-
mentally a social animal then justice is 
required for his own flourishing� Just 
as utilitarianism’s cost-benefit calcula-
tions are otiose when explaining how 
mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters 
relate to each other in families, so too, 
Fisher argues, for societies as a whole�
Still, consequences matter; and Fisher 
wants to demonstrate that no theory of 
virtue is complete that ignores them� He 
thinks our communal nature enables 
virtue ethics and consequentialism to 
become united in a way that helps an-
swer questions about justice—including 
justice in war� Fisher’s approach reinter-
prets the moral precepts of the just war 
tradition and argues not only for their 
adequacy but for their necessity in the 
contemporary moral evaluation of war� 
The result is an interesting and ad-
mirably lucid attempt to fill the gaps 
in contemporary moral theory while 
rendering it serviceable to the just war 
tradition� Morality and War is, therefore, 
an important contribution to a grow-
ing body of literature that attempts to 
make various aspects of Aristotelian 
ethics serviceable to normative reflec-
tions about warfare� It is no wonder 
that Fisher’s book won the prestigious 
W� J� M� MacKenzie Book Prize by the 
Political Studies Association in 2013� 
Fisher, who died in March 2014, had a 
distinguished career in the British Civil 
Service, serving as a senior official in the 
Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office, 
and the Cabinet Office, before taking 
up a post at King’s College London as 
a Teaching Fellow in War Studies� His 
ability to combine practical know-how 
with theoretical sophistication was a 
rarity, and Morality and War demon-
strates this with aplomb� For example, he 
concludes his book by offering several 
practical proposals, focused mainly 
on the UK Ministry of Defence, that 
seek to help improve justice in war� 
Despite these abilities, Fisher’s approach 
is ultimately inadequate� His rejection 
of a thoroughgoing Aristotelian view, 
one without references to modern 
moral theories such as utilitarianism, is 
motivated by important misunderstand-
ings and misappropriation of Aristotle� 
While Fisher’s insistence that a reinter-
pretation of the just war tradition must 
include aspects of the recently resurgent 
virtue ethics approach is refreshing, 
his rejection of key tenets of Aristotle’s 
views—from the doctrine of the mean 
to the unity of the virtues—led Fisher to 
adopt modern consequentialist doc-
trines that sour what promised to be 
a thoroughly Aristotelian approach to 
the ethics of war� As such, many virtue 
ethicists would argue that Fisher’s 
theory offers a distasteful blending of 
traditions without sufficiently exhaust-
ing the resources Aristotle offered� 
Furthermore, Fisher’s charge that no 
contemporary moral theory can 
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adequately account for the complexity 
of our contemporary moral lives rests 
on epistemological presuppositions 
that take the moral speech acts of the 
present as an epistemic starting point 
rather than as resulting from histori-
cal contingency� Finally, Fisher leaves 
questions about the adequacy of the just 
war tradition in accounting for contem-
porary warfare largely unexamined�
JOSEPH M� HATFIELD
Emerson, Stephen A� The Battle for Mozambique: 
The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992. Soli-
hull, U�K�: Helion, 2014� 288pp� $35
Stephen Emerson has written the defini-
tive work on the war in Mozambique be-
tween Frelimo (Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique) and Renamo (Mozam-
bican National Resistance) that began in 
1977 and ended with the signing of the 
General Peace Agreement in October of 
1992� It would be an impressive effort to 
capture just the fight between these fac-
tions vying for control of Mozambique, 
then newly independent after 450 years 
as a Portuguese colony: Emerson goes 
much further� He describes the complex 
environment in which this struggle takes 
place—overshadowed by a larger Cold 
War and bordering countries like South 
Africa with its own fight over apart-
heid, as well as the war against white 
minority rule next door in Rhodesia�
Emerson traces the beginnings of 
Frelimo and its armed struggle against 
Portugal� Despite its success in gaining 
independence from Portugal in 1975 
after over a decade of war, Frelimo 
struggled with postindependence na-
tion building� Formed by opponents of 
the Marxist-aligned Frelimo, Renamo 
initially achieved operational effective-
ness by obtaining arms, logistics, train-
ing, intelligence, and planning support 
from a Rhodesia seeking to counter 
Frelimo’s support of Robert Mugabe and 
the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) forces� Mugabe’s eventual 
success in establishing an internation-
ally recognized Zimbabwean state cost 
Renamo its major benefactor� In the 
1980s, however, Renamo gained a new 
partner in its fight against Frelimo from 
the South African government of P� W� 
Botha looking to create instability in its 
“frontline states” as a way to stave off 
support for the African National Con-
gress� This patronage allowed Renamo 
to continue its fight against Frelimo—
now the ruling party of an independent 
Mozambique—for another thirteen  
years�
The conflict’s ebbs and flows af-
fected every part of the country and 
its inhabitants� Between 800,000 and 1 
million Mozambicans were killed in the 
fighting, and more than 2 million were 
displaced� The war’s effects included 
a plundering of natural resources and 
environmental disasters made worse 
by drought� An end to the Cold War 
and South Africa’s apartheid regime—
coupled with leadership changes in 
Frelimo itself and all-around war 
exhaustion—eventually enabled peace 
talks and a successful settlement� 
The Battle for Mozambique benefits 
from Emerson’s decade of research� It 
reflects his access to formerly classified 
Rhodesian military documents coupled 
with the firsthand accounts gleaned 
from hundreds of hours of interviews 
with both former Frelimo and former 
Renamo fighters as well as Rhodesian 
and South African military and civil-
ian personnel� The descriptions of 
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operations and battles are graphic and 
bring a reality not seen very often�
A longtime resident of southern Africa, 
Emerson is a renowned scholar of 
African affairs, having served as Chair 
of Security Studies at the U�S� National 
Defense University’s Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies, and as head of the 
Africa regional studies program at the 
U�S� Naval War College� His knowledge 
and experience make The Battle for Mo-
zambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 
1977–1992 a must-read for anyone 
seeking to understand the history and 
challenges of the African continent�
ROGER H� DUCEY
Epstein, Katherine� Torpedo: Inventing the 
Military-Industrial Complex in the United States 
and Great Britain� Cambridge, Mass�: Harvard 
Univ� Press, 2014� 328pp� $45
Kate Epstein’s book about the relation-
ships between the torpedo and the 
creation of the military-industrial 
complex builds on her earlier work 
about naval tactics, in particular her es-
say in the April 2013 Journal of Military 
History about “torpedoes and U�S� Navy 
battle tactics” before World War I� (See 
Katherine C� Epstein, “No One Can 
Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: 
Battle Tactics and U�S� Naval History 
before World War I,” Journal of Mili-
tary History 7, no� 2 [April 2013], pp� 
491–520�) Here she goes after much 
bigger “fish”—excuse the pun� Epstein 
wastes no time in getting to her primary 
thesis in this fascinating monograph 
about the development of the torpedo 
as a weapon system in the United States 
and Great Britain� She begins boldly: 
“Thus, in addition to the part they 
played in the origins of the military-
industrial complex, torpedoes were at 
the nexus of the international arms race, 
globalization, and industrialization after 
World War I�” Epstein takes the reader 
on a journey back in time to relate a 
story little told and even less known�
The modern self-propelled torpedo, 
invented and improved in the last half of 
the nineteenth century by the English-
man Robert Whitehead, was naval 
warfare’s first “fire and forget” weapon� 
Like breech-loading rifles and artillery, 
also products of the nineteenth century, 
it changed the landscape of war in its  
environment—the maritime domain� 
Just as breech-loading rifles increased 
the lethality and scope of land warfare, 
so too did the torpedo, but on un-
imaginable scales in a very short time 
period� As Epstein notes in her introduc-
tion, “Over a fifty-year period the speed 
of torpedoes had increased by roughly 
800 percent, and their range by 5,000 
percent� They were the cutting edge of 
technology�” When combined with other 
so-called disruptive technologies, like 
the airplane and the submarine—that is, 
technologies so unique that they break 
sociopolitical, commercial, and military 
paradigms—they had the potential to 
and, in fact, did throw existing notions 
of sea power, naval tactics, and even 
maritime strategy into question� It was 
no accident that the great maritime 
strategists—A� T� Mahan and Sir Julian 
Corbett—emerged during the period 
of the torpedo’s rise to prominence 
as sailors recast their thinking about 
naval tactics in the modern age in part 
because of cutting-edge technology�
Epstein builds on the work of historian 
William McNeill and his arguments 
about the emergence of “command 
technology” in the nineteenth century, 
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which she defines as “technology com-
manded by the public sector from the 
private sector that was so sophisticated 
and expensive that neither possessed 
the resources to develop it alone�” 
Because the public sector could not 
deliver expensive new technology on its 
own, it “had to invest in [research and 
development] by the private sector�” Her 
larger argument about the emergence 
of military-industrial complexes in the 
United States and Britain hinges on this 
relationship, and torpedoes represented 
what one might call an agency technol-
ogy, providing a forcing function for 
public and private sectors to overcome 
the difficulties in solving complex 
military problems—problems that could 
only be solved in partnership� Through-
out the book Epstein emphasizes, con-
stantly, the contingent nature of these 
developing relationships—that the actors 
did not conform to some script� They 
simply wanted to solve difficult, complex 
problems, and their decisions shaped 
how the military-industrial complexes 
and both countries developed as a result�
In her closing Epstein makes conclu-
sions that get to the heart of today’s 
discussions about American decline, 
technological challenges, and innovation 
and that may seem counterintuitive 
—especially in light of the challenge of 
China and antiaccess and area denial 
(A2/AD) strategies� These may be of 
some comfort to the pessimists out there 
who claim America is in an irrevers-
ible decline� The British had a larger 
research and development infrastruc-
ture in both public and private sectors 
precisely because they were the naval 
hegemon of that era� Even though many 
of their decisions vis-à-vis technology 
seemed more cautious than those made 
by American naval officers—who were 
somewhat credulous in embracing new 
technological ideas—the British came 
out ahead in developing better torpedoes 
in the long run� It also seems counterin-
tuitive that the British would do better 
than the weaker Americans in develop-
ing a weapon that threatened Britain’s 
naval hegemony, but that is precisely 
what happened� The British did better 
in developing the “weapon of the weak” 
than the relatively weak Americans, who 
would have seemed to have had more in-
terest in such weapons� The British went 
further, realizing savings in the long 
run as they envisioned a future without 
battleships, using flotillas of torpedo 
craft and battle cruisers to protect their 
interests� This future essentially came to 
fruition during and after World War II 
as the new battle cruiser—designed to 
patrol the global commons and protect 
British maritime interests—evolved 
into the aircraft carrier� As for torpedo 
flotillas, what emerged during the Cold 
War were submarine and antisubma-
rine fleets of very large size both to 
dispute and to protect those same sea 
lines should all-out war break out�
The one critique this reviewer has of the 
book involves the impact of the Russo-
Japanese War on torpedo development 
during the period covered by this book� 
Japan’s opening torpedo attack on the 
Russian fleet in 1904 at Port Arthur 
was not exactly a “coming-out party” 
for the weapon system: 85 percent of 
the Japanese torpedoes missed their 
targets� Perhaps the Americans and 
British thought they had solved the clear 
problems that torpedoes presented in 
their design and use, but a mention of 
this key episode in the development of 
the torpedo—a flop on opening night if 
you will—would seem merited� None-
theless, Epstein’s book goes places and 
discovers truths that few other books 
on naval history have� Although it is not 
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an easy read, the arguments it makes 
are of vital interest to naval strategists, 
innovators, and those interested in 
the complex relationships and pro-
cesses that are now part and parcel 
of the national defense paradigm�
JOHN T� KUEHN
Friedman, B� A�, ed� 21st Century Ellis: Opera-
tional Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern 
Era� Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute Press, 2014� 
150pp� $21
21st Century Ellis is a solid contribu-
tion to the Naval Institute’s 21st Century 
Foundations series and the scholarship 
regarding the touted U�S� Marine Corps 
visionary Lieutenant Colonel Earl “Pete” 
Ellis� The strength of this volume lies 
in the compilation of most of Ellis’s 
scholarly works� B� A� Friedman has 
assembled five articles written by Ellis 
in the decade between 1911 and 1921 
(a total of about 110 pages) into four 
chapters� Ellis’s text is supplemented by 
Friedman’s introduction and additional 
commentary highlighting the value of 
Ellis to both his contemporaries and 
current executors of the operational art� 
Friedman arranges the essays by subject 
rather than chronologically� This allows 
the reading of the book by section with-
out any loss of flow or context� Chapter 
2, the shortest, reviews Ellis’s First World 
War experience in France on the staff of 
John A� Lejeune� Chapter 3 is substan-
tially longer but unlike the preceding 
chapter is perhaps of more applicability 
to modern practitioners� Two lectures 
prepared by Ellis during his tenure as a 
faculty member at the U�S� Naval War 
College examined the challenges of 
fighting a naval campaign in the western 
Pacific� Composed in 1911–12, these 
proved prescient in their assessment of 
the tension building between Pacific 
naval powers and the war they would 
fight after Ellis’s death� There is great 
legitimacy to the editor’s claim that “El-
lis predicted war with Japan in 1912�”
Chapter 1 may be most relevant to 
Marines of this century� Ellis draws 
from his substantial experience fighting 
counterinsurgency in the Philippines 
during the early years of last century� His 
seventeen-page article “Bush Brigades” 
provides a solid foundation for any 
twenty-first-century warrior preparing 
for service in Iraq or Afghanistan� The 
editor summarizes how Ellis’s tenets 
are strongly reflected in the Marine 
Corps’s Small Wars Manual as well as 
today’s counterinsurgency doctrine, 
while lamenting the “ill use of many of 
these tenets” in more-modern conflicts� 
A current practitioner would benefit 
by paying attention to Ellis’s words�
The final chapter built around Ellis’s 
work, chapter 4, is the longest and the 
major impetus behind Friedman’s effort� 
Ellis is frequently viewed by Marines 
as the man who laid the template for 
modern amphibious operations� Read 
in detail, Ellis’s article “Advanced Base 
Operations in Micronesia” reinforces 
that view� Ellis systematically takes a 
reader through the requirements for an 
advance across the Pacific to be suc-
cessful� Many of these tenets informed 
Marine Corps development prior to 
the U�S� entry into the Second World 
War, laying the groundwork for highly 
successful amphibious operations in 
both the Pacific and European theaters�
While successful in providing a new 
generation of military practitioners easy 
access to Ellis’s work, 21st Century Ellis 
could have more successfully achieved 
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the book series’s stated purpose of asking 
“the right questions�” With the opera-
tional factors of time, space, and force 
still vital to success, few questions with 
which the Marine Corps must struggle 
in the twenty-first century relative to 
Ellis were asked� The editor’s acceptance 
of “Air-Sea Battle” as a valid concept 
relative to Ellis falls short� The editor’s 
comments fail to question shortfalls of 
the current Navy–Marine Corps team 
to sustain the logistics necessary for any 
large-scale amphibious operations in the 
maritime environment of the Pacific—
a setting whose scope and scale have 
not changed since Ellis’s day� Questions 
should be asked about whether current 
equipment procurement can fulfill the 
tenets Ellis was prescient in defining 
should they become required again in 
this century� This solid work of scholar-
ship, produced by a junior Marine Corps 
officer, missed a chance to challenge 
current Marine Corps efforts by failing 
to ask tough questions the way that 
Ellis did a century ago� So, for practi-
tioners of war, read this book, but keep 
a paper and pen handy to scribe your 
own tough questions for the future�
DAVID C� FUQUEA
Friedman, Norman� Fighting the Great War at 
Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology. Annapolis, 
Md�: Naval Institute Press, 2014� 416pp� $85
This title is the most recent “tour de 
force” from this prolific and authori-
tative naval historian� It is a massive 
undertaking in almost every way, from 
its imposing 12ʺ × 10ʺ coffee-table 
format to its 360-plus pages (over 400 
with notes) filled with dense, small print 
and lavishly illustrated with contempo-
rary photographs� People familiar with 
Friedman’s other works will understand 
that it is no exaggeration to say that the 
detail that he provides in these cap-
tions alone could form the framework 
for any number of smaller, themed 
books were they to be collected and 
organized differently� So, coffee-table 
format it may be, but this is a serious 
work, covering all aspects of the mari-
time war in an encyclopedic fashion� 
The endnotes alone run to forty-plus 
pages and, while we may lament the 
imprecise citations in some areas, the 
notes are filled with further ideas to 
stimulate still more work in the future�
In many ways this is a book that only Dr� 
Friedman could have attempted; most 
others would have shied away from the 
immensity of the task and back into 
the comfort of a focused analysis on a 
smaller, more easily bounded theme� 
Friedman, however, has an almost 
unique ability to sweep across the disci-
plines, picking out the main points and 
delving into both the historical and tech-
nological detail where necessary� A case 
in point is his exposé of the loss of the 
three British battle cruisers at Jutland, a 
tragedy that he lays squarely at the feet 
of the poor magazine practices preva-
lent in certain quarters of the Grand 
Fleet at the time and not, in spite of the 
official sanction, the result of any undue 
design flaws in the ships themselves� 
Such an approach is not an easy one, 
and some may feel that the book sits 
rather uncomfortably between the true 
historical monograph or narrative and 
a specialist reference work as a result� 
Technically speaking, it is neither� The 
text is not chronological and is too dense 
and concentrated to be read easily from 
cover to cover, while the inconsistent ci-
tations, although far better than in other 
works, will likely still aggravate the seri-
ous scholar� Enticing and unattributed 
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comments like “in the words of one 
senior officer � � �” or “Jellicoe’s pre-battle 
correspondence reveals � � �” can make 
for a frustrating start for a researcher� 
What the volume does do very well is 
to provide a technically well-informed, 
strategic, and tactical analysis of the 
main events from a maritime prac-
titioner’s perspective� As Friedman 
himself explains in his introduction, 
“It is not a full, operational history, but 
instead it explores various themes in 
the naval history of the war, many of 
them technological and tactical�” He 
opens, logically enough, by examining 
the prewar strategic aspirations and 
expectations of the main protagonists, 
following with two very useful chapters 
on the resources available to each side 
and their expectations with regard to 
the new technology� Somewhere here in 
these first four chapters, however, there 
is arguably one of his few omissions, and 
this would be a more detailed coverage 
of Admiral “Jackie” Fisher’s interde-
pendent and comprehensive series of 
reforms drawn out for the Royal Navy 
between 1902 and 1907� While admit-
tedly taking place well before the period 
covered by the book, they (and Fisher’s 
character) were hugely influential in 
shaping the navy that fought the Great 
War—from the ships that it built to the 
intellectual leanings and the polariza-
tion of attitudes within the officer corps� 
Given the depth with which Friedman 
covers the other, related subjects and the 
controversies surrounding the advent of 
the “all-big-gun” ship to which he later 
refers, this would have been a useful 
foundation and might have enriched 
the rather truncated and one-sided 
discussion on the rationale for the battle 
cruiser that comes later in chapter 8�
The second half of the text examines the 
nature of the ships themselves, starting 
with the capital ships and the fleets 
into which they were organized, before 
moving on to consider the newer forms 
of warfare, including inshore warfare, 
amphibious warfare, submarines and 
their counters, trade protection, and 
mine warfare� This is where Friedman 
excels, his eye for detail and techni-
cal acumen allowing him to describe 
accurately the precise ways in which 
new technologies altered the very 
nature of the maritime problem� As has 
often been said, while the big fleets and 
the capital ships that make them up 
may underwrite the notion of a na-
tion’s claim to sea control and act as its 
overall guarantor, it is the smaller craft 
that actually exercise it� So it was with 
the Great War, and Friedman amply 
recognizes this point, affording each 
and every aspect of the naval problem 
good coverage, thereby cementing the 
comprehensive nature of his work� Here 
again, though, the interrelated nature 
of some of his chosen themes, and in 
particular the first eight chapters, which 
deal with differing aspects of essentially 
the same capital-ship dilemma, can lead 
to a tendency toward repetition, which 
is unfortunate, even if understandable� 
The overall message, though, is timeless 
—as valid today as it was one hundred 
years ago� Friedman concludes that the 
strategic flexibility conferred by allied 
sea power was the decisive factor, allow-
ing the allied powers to continue to trade 
and to run the world’s economic engine 
for their benefit across the maritime 
trade routes while denying the same lux-
ury to the Central powers� As Friedman 
explains, the fact that Ludendorff was 
not beaten in the west was ultimately 
irrelevant� Ludendorff ’s lack of viable al-
lies by 1918 meant that he had no other 
options but to hold on in the west: a path 
that was as futile as it was exhausting� 
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The only bright light was the submarine 
offensive, which, for a while at least, 
looked as though it might threaten the 
British trade security� Once the allies 
recognized the threat, their subsequent 
mastery over the sea gave them all the 
options they needed to maintain an 
unpredictable and intolerable pres-
sure over their adversary, an advantage 
that could only lead to one outcome�
In summary, this is not a book for the 
casual-interest reader� It will, however, 
suit those who have a background in 
the basics of the period and in mari-
time warfare generally, and who wish 
to know more� Dr� Friedman’s research 
credentials are impeccable, and the 
huge amount of factual detail he has 
unearthed will be sure to delight many� 
While not definitive in any individual 
theme area, there is nothing comparable 
in either depth or scope out there, and 
for this reason, if no other, this book 
is likely to become a standard work on 
the naval aspects of the Great War� 
ANGUS ROSS
Patalano, Alessio� Post-war Japan as a Sea Power: 
Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the 
Making of a Navy. London: Bloomsbury Aca-
demic, 2015� 272pp� $112
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense 
Force (JMSDF) is one of the world’s 
most powerful naval forces� As Alessio 
Patalano points out in his new history 
of the JMSDF, Post-war Japan as a Sea 
Power, its surface force is twice the size 
of that of the Royal Navy’s, and Japan 
has three times as many submarines as 
France� However, the JMSDF has been 
the focus of surprisingly little writ-
ing by international historians� In fact, 
prior to Patalano’s welcome contribu-
tion, only three English-language books 
have been dedicated to the subject: 
Jim Auer’s The Postwar Rearmament of 
Japanese Maritime Forces, 1941–1971 
(Praeger, 1973); James Wolley’s Japan’s 
Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000 
(Lynne Rienner, 2000); and Euan 
Graham’s Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 
1940–2004 (Routledge, 2005)�
Post-war Japan as a Sea Power is particu-
larly important because it offers unique 
insight into JMSDF history by exploring 
its organizational and cultural identity� 
Patalano investigates the extent to which 
the modern JMSDF draws on the experi-
ence and culture of its predecessor, the 
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), through 
access to previously unavailable archival 
materials, specifically records from the 
service’s education system, recruitment 
data, and internal JMSDF guidance 
documents such as the New Instruc-
tions issued by each incoming chief of 
staff from 1961 to 2012� On top of this 
bedrock of archival research, Patalano, a 
professor at King’s College London who 
averages several months a year in Japan, 
took advantage of his well-developed 
relationships with JMSDF officers of all 
ranks to conduct both focused inter-
views and group surveys� Patalano’s 
extensive research reveals how heavily 
the IJN legacy influences the structure, 
role, and strategic outlook of the JMSDF�
When Japan sought to establish a 
maritime security force in the aftermath 
of World War II, its leaders studied the 
IJN—both its dramatic rise and cata-
strophic defeat� Patalano explains that 
the founders of the JMSDF, many of 
them IJN veterans, determined that the 
prewar navy had been plagued by its 
narrow professional focus� They con-
cluded that IJN leaders and planners had 
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failed to match naval strategy to national 
security requirements� The result was an 
impressive fleet designed to defeat an-
other major navy rapidly in blue-water 
action, when a more flexible force capa-
ble of securing and defending vital mari-
time interests might have served Japan 
better� The force structure and mentality 
of the IJN led to dramatic success for 
Japan in the early stages of World War II, 
but those gains could not be sustained, 
and Japan’s poorly guarded sea lines of 
communication became a vulnerability 
that American submarines exploited to 
decimate Japan’s merchant marine and 
undermine the Japanese economy�
As a direct result of this experience, 
writes Patalano, the founders of the 
JMSDF sought to ensure that Japan’s new 
navy would have a broad, maritime focus 
rather than a narrow naval one, and that 
new generations of naval leaders would 
anchor their maritime strategies in 
Japan’s national policy objectives� These 
leaders also worked to make the JMSDF 
immune to the internal rivalries that 
wracked the IJN in the 1930s by central-
izing the JMSDF’s command functions 
under a single Maritime Staff Office 
reporting to a single chief of maritime 
staff firmly under the control of civilian 
bureaucrats� The JMSDF’s study of the 
IJN’s failure to secure its sea lines of 
communication during World War II 
influenced the prioritization of sea-lane 
defense during the Cold War� Addition-
ally, interservice rivalries that weakened 
the efforts of the Imperial Japanese 
Army and Navy during World War II 
were addressed postwar by the consoli-
dation of initial officer training to foster 
interservice cooperation and camara-
derie� Yet the IJN is more than a mere 
cautionary tale—its esprit de corps and 
traditions live on in the modern JMSDF�
Patalano’s outstanding work falters only 
when the author attempts to explain 
the JMSDF’s current tactics as a func-
tion of its IJN heritage� While the IJN’s 
influence on the JMSDF is undeniably 
proven by the book’s analysis, the links 
between the JMSDF’s identity and its 
tactics are not clearly traced� It is the 
reviewers’ experience and assessment 
that JMSDF tactics are generally either 
adopted directly from the United States 
or the product of analytical efforts to 
maximize the effectiveness of the force’s 
combat systems vis-à-vis perceived 
threats� While it is logical that culture 
and identity elements are strong influ-
ences on those analytical processes, 
Patalano’s argument lacks tangible 
examples to delineate this connection 
clearly� The link between JMSDF stra-
tegic culture and IJN heritage is clear, 
but the relationship between the IJN 
and modern JMSDF tactics is tenuous�
Well articulated, broad in scope, and 
drawing on sources not previously ac-
cessed by Western researchers, Patalano’s 
work delves into previously unexplored 
territory essential to making sense of 
Japanese decision making in the mari-
time domain� Given rapidly developing 
events in East Asian waters, Post-war 
Japan as a Sea Power deserves atten-
tion from anyone seeking to understand 
maritime affairs in the Asia-Pacific�
CARLOS ROSENDE AND JOHN BRADFORD
Oliver, Dave� Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leader-
ship Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy. 
Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute Press, 2014� 
178pp� $27�95
Hyman Rickover almost single-handedly 
delivered nuclear power to the United 
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States Navy and, when this was com-
bined with submarine and missile 
technology, gave the United States the 
assured second-strike capability that was 
the bedrock of Cold War deterrence� 
Rickover also ruled his nuclear navy for 
decades, setting unrivaled standards 
for safety and performance while also 
becoming one of the most controversial 
military officers of the twentieth century�
Dave Oliver, a retired rear admiral and 
veteran submariner who joined the Navy 
in the nuclear navy’s adolescence, had a 
career that provided him both a unique 
opportunity to observe Hyman Rickover, 
and a chance to think deeply about what 
might be referred to as “the Rickover 
method�” This book purports to examine 
that method, with a particular empha-
sis on Rickover’s leadership style and 
how he changed naval and submarine 
culture� Oliver does this by focusing 
on large themes, such as “planning for 
success,” and “innovation and change�” 
He populates each chapter with descrip-
tions of Rickover in action and more 
than a few personal anecdotes that in 
some cases simply beggar the imagina-
tion� The result is a fast-paced volume 
that reads much more like a memoir 
than a scholarly study of leadership or 
management� From this perspective, 
Against the Tide is a success� The book 
also has value as a window into a branch 
of the Navy that, for reasons good, bad, 
and inevitable, was insulated, isolated, 
and opaque to most outside observers�
Readers who approach this work with 
the hope of learning how to achieve 
similar results to Admiral Rickover’s will 
be disappointed� In part this is due to 
Rickover’s unique story, his consistent 
refusal to produce any form of compre-
hensive autobiography or memoir, and 
the complexity of his career� Rickover 
is a hard man to understand truly and 
perhaps impossible to replicate� Oliver 
points out that Rickover himself oc-
casionally deviated from his own first 
principles, but fails to explain why that 
happened� In another case Oliver argues 
that Rickover was able to anticipate the 
future far more accurately than almost 
all his peers, but offers no suggestion 
about how this gift might be replicated� 
Here too, questions arise� One of the 
examples used to demonstrate this pre-
science involved the admiral pulling an 
answer for a technical problem from a 
stack of solutions, written long ago, that 
he kept in his desk� The scene is dra-
matic, but leaves the obvious question; 
if Admiral Rickover, with his ability to 
anticipate the future, foresaw the prob-
lem, why didn’t he fix it beforehand? In 
another example, toward the end of the 
book Admiral Oliver offers the observa-
tion that “hard work and focus can suc-
ceed for anyone�” Yet in earlier chapters 
he makes a very convincing argument 
that Rickover’s controversial interviews 
and ruthless “culling of the herd” of 
prospective and serving nuclear officers 
was warranted because some of those 
men, including one from his own ward-
room, no matter how hardworking and 
focused, lacked what it took to be a suc-
cessful officer on a nuclear submarine�
Oliver, when all is said and done, openly 
admires Admiral Rickover� He tries to 
maintain a balanced approach when 
it comes to identifying and analyzing 
Rickover’s blind spots and personal 
weaknesses but still minimizes some of 
Rickover’s less commendable attributes 
—while engaging in occasional hy-
perbole when it comes to describing 
the admiral’s detractors� For example, 
Oliver refers to Admiral Rickover’s 
“adversaries” as “attacking with the 
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viciousness and mindlessness of a pack 
of stray dogs�” The imagery is bold, 
but the truth is that, as later described 
by Oliver, some of those adversaries 
were principled officers with differ-
ent and often broader portfolios and 
perspectives whose opposition to 
Rickover was anything but mindless�
To its credit, this book touches on and 
invites thought and discussion about 
more than a few attributes of senior 
leadership, including personal account-
ability� Rickover was quick to dismiss 
subordinates who he felt had failed his 
program—yet the degree to which he 
would be willing to sacrifice his own 
position and power is less clear, particu-
larly when even many of his supporters 
feel the admiral clung to power too long 
and eventually became a detriment to 
the program he had created� Another 
area involves personal and professional 
ethics� Oliver seems to make the point 
that when the stakes are high enough, 
the ends do justify the means and a suc-
cessful outcome justifies questionable or 
even illegal actions� This invites a subse-
quent discussion involving the deepest 
questions of what it is to be an officer 
and member of the profession of arms�
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of 
Admiral Oliver’s book is the revela-
tion that the author identifies Admiral 
Rickover as a manager and not a leader, 
contrary to what Rickover desired and 
believed� Today, Admiral Rickover is 
among the leadership biographic cases 
senior students study at the Naval War 
College and the question—Was he a 
leader or manager?—always comes up� 
While there are some students who agree 
with Admiral Oliver, the majority iden-
tify Rickover as a leader� However, all 
are agreed Rickover should be credited 
for daring greatly, building to last, and 
being most worthy of continued study�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Dubbs, Chris� America’s U-boats: Terror Trophies 
of World War I. Lincoln: Univ� of Nebraska Press, 
2014� 206pp� $24�95
Chris Dubbs, a Gannon University 
executive, followed a fascination with his 
discovery of a First World War German 
submarine wreck in Lake Michigan� He 
pursued meticulous research through 
collections of First World War U-boat 
accounts and recorded American atti-
tudes on the war and the public fascina-
tion with submarines� Throughout the 
book, he grabs the attention of readers 
as he skillfully recounts the arrival of the 
German freighter submarine Deutsch-
land in the United States to reopen trade 
with Germany, the horrors that U-boats 
caused during the war, and the end of 
the war, when the allies claimed U-boats 
as war prizes� His well-cited account 
of events in the United States, at sea, 
and in Europe between 1916 and 1920 
entertains readers with riveting images 
of German submarines and crews, the 
perils of war at sea, and public reaction 
and debates on the war� Dubbs offers 
an informative and historically accurate 
description of the impact U-boats had 
on the evolution of warfare and the sub-
sequent employment of submarines as 
offensive weapons in war� He concludes 
his book with a note on the entrance 
of the United States into the Second 
World War, when Admiral Harold Stark, 
Chief of Naval Operations, ordered U�S� 
submarines to commence unrestricted 
submarine warfare against Japan, 
thereby disregarding the moral outrage 
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against sinking ships without warning� 
USS Swordfish (SS 193) consummated 
the intent of that order nine days after 7 
December 1941 when it torpedoed a Jap-
anese freighter� Swordfish, commissioned 
on 22 July 1939, was certainly designed 
and constructed based on exploited 
First World War U-boat technology�
Dubbs has never served in our Navy or 
been identified as a naval warfare ana-
lyst; however, his account of submarine 
technology and warfare describes in 
compelling detail the phases of a revolu-
tion in military affairs brought about by 
offensive employment of submarines�
Dubbs details capability/counterca-
pability phases and the evolution of 
technology that began a revolution in 
military affairs� While this aspect of 
the book is not Dubbs’s main focus, it 
serves as a textbook lesson for naval 
innovators and strategists in under-
standing the narrative on submarines 
and submarine warfare that continues 
today in the form of the U�S� Navy’s 
undersea warfare dominance�
Dubbs offers details on how Germany, 
with the initial advantage of superior 
submarine technology, executed a strat-
egy designed to intimidate the United 
States and then threaten American 
and allied shipping at sea and Ameri-
can cities along the Atlantic coast�
Imagine a Chinese high-speed freighter 
submarine arriving at the Port of 
Los Angeles to deliver bulk consign-
ments of rare earth minerals� Imagine 
there were no known accounts of the 
Chinese freighter submarine being 
constructed or warnings of its pas-
sage until it surfaced west of Santa 
Barbara Island� Imagine its arrival in 
LA, with fanfare, public fascination, 
and U�S� government mortification�
This hypothetical arrival of a Chinese 
freighter submarine today is comparable 
to Dubbs’s account of the 1916 prewar 
arrival of Deutschland. Deutschland 
commenced its surface transit through 
the Chesapeake Bay bound for a call 
on the Port of Baltimore on 9 July 
1916� Deutschland delivered not only 
rare dyes from Germany but strate-
gic communications that the British 
blockade of Germany was ineffective 
against German submarines and that 
German combat U-boats could arrive 
undetected along the Atlantic coast�
Deutschland’s technology and ap-
parent ability to transit the Atlantic 
established the first phase of a revolu-
tion in military affairs� It demonstrated 
superior German U-boat operational 
and functional capabilities to wartime 
enemies and potential adversaries�
Other accounts of German U-boat 
capabilities strengthened the initial 
demonstration of a strategic capability 
that provided Germany with a means 
of achieving strategic ends� Dubbs’s de-
tailed accounts of U-boat exploits, while 
compelling reading, also inform present-
day arguments for operating forward 
with superior war-fighting capability�
Throughout the book, maritime warfare 
is recounted in deep detail including 
tactical maneuvers and operational 
effects that have strategic consequences 
in warfare� Phases of a classic revolution 
in military affairs are brought into focus 
as submarine operations versus antisub-
marine warfare illustrates a response 
cycle to the introduction of unrestricted 
submarine warfare in the Atlantic� 
Wartime incidents described by Dubbs 
are certainly significant revelations for 
some readers and provide persuasive 
details related to military-political af-
fairs for strategists� Those narratives 
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alone are well worth a serious reading 
of Dubbs’s wartime U-boat operations�
The revolution in military affairs cre-
ated by U-boats in the First World War 
had a dramatic effect on the public, 
the conduct of the war, and the near 
attainment of German strategic aims� 
According to Dubbs, German U-boats 
were a major focus in negotiating 
the armistices that ended the war�
Dubbs chronicles the debate by Ameri-
can Navy leaders on the benefits of tak-
ing U-boats as war prizes� They had to 
be convinced that there were benefits to 
crewing U-boats with American subma-
riners and crossing the Atlantic� Dubbs 
also introduces American submariners 
in his account of these events� Those 
officers would later emerge as leaders of 
the submarine force in the Second World 
War� Their efforts to inject First World 
War U-boat technology into U�S� subma-
rines formed the basis for the U�S� Navy’s 
undersea warfare dominance today�
America’s U-boats is an important book 
for naval warfare professionals and 
submariners� It conveys a near-complete 
history of the origins of submarine war-
fare and the revolution in military affairs 
that submarines have delivered to mari-
time and strategic warfare then and now�
WILLIAM F� BUNDY
O’Connell, Aaron B� Underdogs: The Making of 
the Modern Marine Corps� Cambridge, Mass�: 
Harvard Univ� Press, 2012� 400pp� $18�95
In Underdogs, Aaron B� O’Connell (U�S� 
Naval Academy) presents a cultural his-
tory of the U�S� Marine Corps from 1941 
to 1965� A lieutenant colonel in the Ma-
rine Corps Reserve, O’Connell explores 
how mistrust among the Marine Corps, 
other military services, and civilian 
policy makers often motivated Marines 
to distinguish themselves� In response, 
Marines cultivated relationships with 
formidable allies in the U�S� Congress, 
media, and even Hollywood to dissemi-
nate their narratives to the public, which 
ultimately benefited the institution� Stu-
dents, scholars, and general readers in-
terested in military culture or the Marine 
Corps should find the volume useful�
O’Connell’s purpose is to explain the 
Marine Corps’s rapid growth from an 
undersized force of fewer than twenty 
thousand Marines in 1939 to a force 
peaking at nearly five hundred thousand 
Marines in 1945 and settling around two 
hundred thousand Marines by 1965� His 
thesis is that culture forms a vital tool 
for military organizations� O’Connell 
argues three main points: that Marine 
Corps culture was unique, that it helped 
the group thrive, and that it impacted 
American society as well� To his credit, 
O’Connell presents both positive and 
negative implications of these dynam-
ics, highlighting subjects ranging from 
esprit de corps to alcohol abuse�
The author supports his arguments with 
extensive sources, examining archival 
material such as military and govern-
ment records, personal papers, letters, 
and diaries, as well as published sources 
such as newspapers, magazines, films, 
and recruiting commercials� He makes 
good use of the Marine Corps Gazette 
and Leatherneck to present stories 
that Marines told� He also scrutinizes 
surveys, public opinion polls, memoirs, 
and oral history transcripts� A major 
strength of the volume is the inclusion 
of interviews that O’Connell conducted 
with Marine veterans, which personal-
ize the broader narratives of the book�
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First, O’Connell explores the massive 
expansion of the Marine Corps that oc-
curred during World War II and the re-
sulting stories that comprised the group’s 
culture� He explains that Marine Corps 
culture functioned much like a religion 
in that it “bound people together in a 
system of shared obligations and beliefs�” 
World War II reinforced those ties, since 
most Marines served in the Pacific, and 
the Corps suffered more than twice the 
casualty rate of other military services�
Second, he considers the dissemination 
of these stories to American society 
between World War II and the Korean 
War� Brigadier General Robert L� Denig’s 
public relations specialists, known col-
loquially as Denig’s Demons, eventu-
ally worked with nearly five thousand 
newspapers across the country� Other 
examples included the Toys for Tots 
program, which started in 1947, and the 
Marine Corps’s collaboration with Hol-
lywood in Republic Pictures’ Sands of 
Iwo Jima, which included participation 
by more than one thousand Marines�
Third, the author studies the Marine 
Corps’s mobilization of political power 
in the U�S� Congress� He explores avid 
supporters of the institution such as Paul 
H� Douglas (D-Ill�) and Joseph R� Mc-
Carthy (R-Wis�) and explains how their 
efforts protected Marine Corps missions 
and budgets� O’Connell rightly points 
out the irony that Marines’ political 
efforts often “argued against militarism 
and excessive military influence in 
politics, even as they became the most 
politically activist branch of the armed 
services�” For example, a nebulous group 
of influential supporters known as the 
Chowder Society led Marine Corps con-
gressional efforts from relative obscurity�
Next, O’Connell explores American cul-
ture and civil-military relations after the 
Korean War� He analyzes stories about 
participants in the iconic Marine Corps 
battle at the Chosin Reservoir during 
the winter of 1950 and then investigates 
problems resulting from Marine Corps 
culture after the Korean War� Central 
among these difficulties was the 1956 
Ribbon Creek scandal� This incident 
caused the deaths of six Marine recruits 
and resulted in the court-martial of 
Staff Sergeant Matthew C� McKeon 
for marching them through swamps 
around Parris Island, South Carolina�
Finally, the author considers the influ-
ence of culture on military strategy� He 
details the rise of Marine air-ground 
task forces (MAGTFs), which had 
both positive and negative implica-
tions� This novel structure provided 
scalable and relevant power projection 
capabilities focused on low-intensity 
conflict, but also risked militariza-
tion by making deployments easier to 
initiate for civilian policy makers�
Underdogs is a valuable addition to an 
understanding of military culture and 
illustrates how military organizations 
are unique� O’Connell contributes useful 
concepts such as “narratives of Marine 
exceptionalism”; “cultural discipline”; 
and “cultural politics,” which relate 
culture to military institutions, militari-
zation, and power� Ultimately, Underdogs 
explains how and why the Marine Corps 
created a distinctive identity after World 
War II and illuminates the dynamic 
and symbiotic relationship between the 
Marine Corps and American society�
WILLIAM A� TAYLOR
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John Bradford is the Regional Cooperation Coordinator on the staff of the U�S� Seventh Fleet� He 
holds a bachelor’s degree from Cornell University and earned a master’s degree from the Rajarat-
nam School of International Studies in Singapore as an Olmsted Scholar� He has written articles 
for publications that include Asian Policy, AsianSecurity, Asian Survey, Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Naval War College Review, and U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings.
William F. Bundy directs research and teaches graduate warrior-scholars in the Center for Naval 
Warfare Studies� He received a PhD from Salve Regina University and served in the Navy as a 
career submarine officer, having served in seven submarines, including attack, nuclear attack, and 
nuclear fleet ballistic missile submarines� He had command in a conventional attack submarine�
David T. Burbach is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, 
where he teaches courses on force planning, national strategy, and regional security� Dr� Burbach 
received a BA from Pomona College, and earned a PhD in political science from the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.
Roger H. Ducey is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College� 
Previously he served as the senior Air Force adviser to the Naval War College� He retired after 
almost thirty years of service� He holds a bachelor’s of business administration from the University 
of Miami and master’s degrees from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and the U�S� Naval 
War College.
David C. Fuquea joined the Naval War College’s Maritime Staff Operators Course faculty as an 
associate professor following his retirement from the United States Marine Corps as a colonel after 
twenty-nine years� He conducts research and writes on modern amphibious warfare and the U�S� 
naval war in the Pacific, and has published in the Journal of Military History, the Naval War College 
Review, and Proceedings� 
Joseph M. Hatfield is an active-duty naval intelligence officer and received a PhD from the Uni-
versity of Cambridge� He currently is assigned to the United States Naval Academy faculty and 
teaches political science�
Holger H. Herwig holds a dual position at the University of Calgary as Professor of History and as 
Canada Research Chair in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies� He has published more 
than a dozen books, including the prizewinning The First World War: Germany and Austria-
Hungary 1914–1918�
John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U�S� Army Com-
mand and General Staff College (CGSC)� He received a PhD from Kansas State University� He 
retired from the U�S� Navy in 2004 at the rank of commander after twenty-three years of service 
as a naval flight officer� His latest book is Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great 
Campaigns.
Carnes Lord is Professor of Strategic Leadership at the Naval War College, director of the Naval 
War College Press, and editor of the Naval War College Review. He received a PhD (classics) from 
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Yale University, as well as a PhD (government) from Cornell University� His latest books are The 
Politics of Aristotle (editor and translator) and Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership 
from Rome to America Today.
Yvonne R. Masakowski is an Associate Professor of Strategic Leadership and Leader Development 
at the U�S� Naval War College� She received a PhD and a master’s degree from the City University 
of New York, and a master’s degree from the University of Connecticut� She is a contributing edi-
tor to the Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making.
Christopher Nelson is a career naval intelligence officer and graduate of the University of Tulsa 
and Naval War College� He is also a graduate of the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in 
Newport, R�I�
Richard J. Norton is a professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College� He is a 
retired naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy� His most 
recent publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and Marine Corps University 
Journal.
Douglas Peifer is a professor and chair of the U�S� Air War College’s Department of Strategy� His 
latest book, Naval Incidents and the Decision for War, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press� 
He is currently researching the historical record of “gunboat diplomacy,” air control, and coercive 
airpower�
Carlos Rosende is an active-duty naval officer in USS Stethem (DDG 63), forward deployed to 
Yokosuka, Japan� He holds a bachelor’s degree from the U�S� Naval Academy and his research and 
writing have been featured in Naval History and U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings.
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer; graduate of, and Professor of Joint Military Operations 
at, the Naval War College� A graduate of the Naval War College, he received a second MA from 
Providence College and is currently working on PhD studies, looking at naval transformation 
prior to the First World War� His recent published works include articles in this journal and others 
on the dilemma facing both the Royal Navy and the U�S� Navy in the wake of the Dreadnought 
revolution�
William A. Taylor is Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Angelo State University� A graduate 
of the United States Naval Academy and former Marine Corps officer, he received a PhD from 
George Washington University� He is author of Every Citizen a Soldier: The Campaign for Universal 
Military Training after World War II and the forthcoming volume In Defense of Democracy: Ameri-
can Military Service from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom�
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IN MY VIEW
THE INDIAN NAVY AND THE PIVOT
Sir:
Apropos the article by Harsh V� Pant and Yogesh Joshi titled “The American 
‘Pivot’ and the Indian Navy: It’s Hedging All the Way,” in the Winter 2015 Naval 
War College Review� The authors argue that India has been overly cautious in 
demonstrating its support to the U�S� “pivot strategy,” based on the lack of any 
visible response by the Indian Navy in the region�
In my view, India’s primary interests lie in the Indian Ocean and India’s defence 
relations with the regional littorals in the West Pacific are driven by their own 
interests in the safety and security of their maritime trade in the Indian Ocean, 
rather than by India’s interests in the Pacific� A case in point is Japan, which re-
ceives almost all of its oil imports through the Indian Ocean� It would therefore 
be inaccurate to view the extant level of India’s navy-to-navy relations with Japan 
and Australia as a sign of India’s interest in the Pacific or a measure of India’s 
contribution to the American “pivot” in the Indo-Pacific� I think that task will 
always remain for the regional littorals, including Australia, Japan, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Vietnam, to back the U�S� Navy in the region or their respective 
areas of interest� Emergent navies, such as the Indian Navy, like to engage with 
other modern navies, such as the USN, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, 
or the Royal Australian Navy, for various reasons, including “bench-marking” of 
their operating standards, learning and emulating best practices, or keeping pace 
with the latest technologies, besides developing a comfortable level of operational 
interoperability that could be put to use in time of crisis�
The emergence of the Indian Navy as a net provider of security in the Indian 
Ocean does, however, support the American “pivot,” since by easing its opera-
tional burden in the Indian Ocean region it allows the USN, as well as other Pa-
cific navies, to focus assets in the Pacific theatre� Moreover, notwithstanding the 
extant level of naval exercises, the Indian Navy, as highlighted by the authors, has 
over the years built close trust and interoperability with the USN� This is more 
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important than the nature of exercises per se, a fact underscored in the 2007 U�S� 
“Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which aimed at developing 
cooperative partnerships with like-minded nations over time, because in mo-
ments of crises, “[while] forces can surge when necessary � � � trust and coopera-
tion cannot be surged�”
SHISHIR UPADHYAYA
Commander, Indian Navy (Ret.)
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
COMING SOON TO YOUR COMMAND’S LIBRARY: HOW WE FIGHT
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the program man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
 The Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) re-cently began distributing How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter 
to all CNO-PRP libraries around the fleet� In describing the 166-page, full-color 
handbook, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, USN, says in his foreword: 
“How We Fight” is a concise, single volume that explains the basic, unique, and 
enduring attributes associated with being a Sailor, going to sea, and conducting war 
at sea� It highlights the fundamentals of the environment in which the Navy oper-
ates, our uniquely maritime characteristics, our history in this domain, and the way 
of Navy warfighting� This book should serve as a companion piece to other sources 
of literature enabling Sailors to understand the essence of being “a Sailor” as they 
develop their skills as seagoing professionals�
The introduction to the handbook further explains its purpose: 
Every Sailor is a warfighter first� The U�S�  Navy exists to protect our nation and our 
access to the world� Our duty is to prevent and deter wars and, if necessary, fight and 
win them� The protection we provide the American people extends far beyond our 
homeland and includes the defense of our national interests and allies� 
As a Service, the Navy is unique in that its continuing maintenance—directed by the 
U�S� Constitution—reflects the fact that our nation’s economic prosperity is based in 
a large part on international trade in products and resources, the majority of which 
travels by sea� We protect that access every day in peacetime� In conflict, we are dedi-
cated to victory� 
Those are facts we all know� We also know that our Navy is designed to operate 
forward in the far regions of the world� Much of our time, both in peace and conflict, 
is spent on deployment in the areas of potential crises, promoting, safeguarding and, 
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when required, defeating an enemy and restoring the peace� We protect American 
interests on a global basis, something with which we are very familiar� 
We know that we must “be ready”—fully prepared to conduct warfighting operations 
while forward deployed into regions of potential crisis and conflict� 
[The purpose of this book] is simple—to articulate in a single volume the elements 
that determine the way we operate, as well as some of the overall concepts that guide 
our methods� We are shaped by so many factors: the maritime environment, our 
Service attributes, our history, and our current and projected future missions� 
These are the factors we examine in these pages� The book is meant to put all these 
pieces together and define who we are and what we do in a comprehensive, yet read-
able fashion� For some, it is a good review of material they have long known� For 
others, it may hold ideas with which they are not as familiar or have never examined 
intently� For civilian readers, it helps to explain what the U�S� Navy is truly about: 
what it does for our nation, what molds its culture, and what makes it unique among 
our joint U�S� Armed Forces�
The CNO-PRP managers at the Naval War College will ensure that a number 
of hard copies are made available to every ship, squadron, and major activity 
in the Navy for inclusion in their CNO-PRP lending libraries� An electronic 
(e-book, ISBN 978-1-935352-42-6) version will be available for download from 
the official Navy website at www�navy�mil and from the CNO-PRP website at 
navyreading�dodlive�mil� Command procurement officials can purchase addi-
tional hard copies (ISBN 978-1-935352-41-9) from the Government Publishing 
Office (GPO) bookstore at bookstore�gpo�gov� Individuals (including private 
citizens) who desire to add this book to their professional libraries may purchase 
copies from GPO using personal funds�
We strongly encourage everyone to read How We Fight: Handbook for the Na-
val Warfighter� It tells a story of honor, courage, and commitment that spans the 
centuries and provides a vision for the future� 
JOHN E� JACKSON
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